Book Review: 1812: War with America
Scott Hughes Myerly - History Review
Apr 23, 2008
1812: War with America, by Jon Latimer
In this weighty book, Jon Latimer, a Territorial Army veteran, and author of several books on World War II, provides the largest detailed survey of the War of 1812, using abundant primary and secondary sources. Chapters cover all the major and minor campaigns and actions, including the Old Northwest; the Great Lakes; the Niagara peninsula; Washington, DC/Baltimore; West Florida/Louisiana; the naval war/British blockade; and others. Writing from "the British perspective" (vii), he challenges the idea of an American victory in the war, calling it a "marginal" British victory (4).
Latimer portrays the war as a failed U.S. conquest of Canada, certainly with much truth, highlighting that persistent U.S. filibuster fantasy from the 1770s that Canadians were simply waiting to be "liberated" by U.S. aggression. Yet while he rightly deserves praise for his extensive research and detailed narrative, he is not a trained historian but an oceanographer and military intelligence officer, which is apparent in his rather black-and-white approach. He makes numerous-and often well-deserved-criticisms of U.S. political and military leaders but treats their British counterparts far more gently. Further, he sometimes hedges, simplifies, or disregards the conclusions of specialists, a problem in an otherwise solid and most substantial effort. For example, although he cites Spencer C. Tucker's The Jeffersonian Gunboat Navy (1993) and Gene A. Smith's For the Purposes of Defense (1995), he ignores their more measured conclusions when he claims that Jefferson, one of the best educated, most intelligent men of the age, had an "ignorance" of naval affairs (53).
Another weakness is Latimer's one-sided advocacy of the British government's interests and a failure to go beyond a British perspective. He seems irritated that the United States presumed to declare war, argues that Britain's crusade against Napoleon legitimized its actions, and asserts that U.S. objections to Britain's "precious naval rights" (361), including kidnapping American seamen for service on British warships, were "unreasonable" (21). He claims that Britain "took great pains to investigate" whether impressed sailors were Americans or deserters (17), but beyond isolated instances, the evidence is unconvincing that this was the norm for Royal Navy captains desperate for men. Latimer also seems unaware that Britain harbored ambitions for some sort of paternalist "federal union" with the United States (Aftermath of Revolution [Ritcheson 1969]) and, after 1803, increasingly encroached on U.S. maritime sovereignty, "commanding the Americans as one commands lackeys" (The Democratic Republic [Smelser 1968]), thus potentially discrediting and imperiling the republican experiment (4, 223). Latimer asserts the war "was by no means a 'second war of independence'" (3), implying Americans should simply have acquiesced to British actions. Quoting Mackay's archaic Extraordinary Popular Delusions, he suggests that the United States was "reckless" and "crazed" in 1812 and lost its senses (1), and although other factors are discussed, he fundamentally attributes the war to U.S. "attitudes of mind" (400).
Latimer also dismisses the notion that Britain might have reversed the peace treaty if New Orleans had fallen because Britain "fully expected success" (402), even though military campaigns are normally a gamble. He apparently believes that this essential export outlet for much of the latter-day United States would have just been handed back, but various factors undermine this assertion: a complete administration for Louisiana accompanied General Packenham, the British later captured Fort Bowyer in Mobile Bay, the treaty was not binding until both sides ratified it (thus giving Britain more flexibility), and harsh realities of international diplomacy prevailed. The United States was in trouble in early 1815 in various ways; British persistence might have significantly altered North American history, especially if they had not betrayed the Native Americans with repeated promises to fight on to victory.
Some areas could have received more treatment in the book, such as the peace negotiations, which started soon after the United States declared war, and especially the 1814 Ghent talks. Latimer also fails to fully cover and appreciate the then most significant Indian/French Canadian victory on the Upper Mississippi in 1814. This moved the battlefront southward, almost to St. Louis, where residents (some of doubtful loyalty) voiced widespread discontent with the government's ineffective military efforts, exhibiting panic well into early spring.
Latimer is at his best covering battles, campaigns, and the naval war, which make up most of the content, and the above criticisms should not discourage using this abundantly footnoted work, which is valuable for scholars and students in that it provides more text, information, documentation, and evidence than any other survey and offers a readable, well-written, in-depth account for general readers-and at a bargain price, too.
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