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A former partner in a top-10 global management consulting firm, Joe Buff is a seasoned risk analyst and professional writer on national security and defense preparedness. Two of his non-fiction articles received annual literary awards from the Naval Submarine League. He is also a national bestselling author of tales of near-future warfare featuring nuclear submariners and special operations forces in action at their bravest and best. Joe holds a master's degree in math from MIT, earned under a National Science Foundation Fellowship. He worked as an intern at the Argonne National Laboratory. Previously a qualified actuary for twenty years, with extensive experience at interpreting policy implications of dire "what if" scenarios, he is now a member of the Society for Risk Analysis, a non-partisan international scholarly body headquartered in McLean, VA.
Joe's father was an enlisted man in the Navy (Seabees in the Pacific Theater) from 1946 through 1951, and his uncle was a merchant mariner on the North Atlantic convoys late in World War II, before being drafted into the U.S. Army to serve in the Occupation of Nazi Germany. Joe is a Life Member of the following Navy-related organizations: U.S. Naval Institute, the Navy League of the United States, the Fellows of the Naval War College, CEC/Seabees Historical Foundation, and the Naval Submarine League. During 2004, after having been a guest luncheon speaker at their Annual National Convention, Joe became a sponsored Life Associate Member of the U.S. Submarine Veterans, Inc. He was recently made an Honorary Life Associate Member of the Navy Seabee Veterans of America, partly in recognition of his pro bono work for Operation Seabees Knowledge.
Joe
Buff Article & Column Archive
Joe Buff Contact Info:
readermail@joebuff.com
http://www.JoeBuff.com
Joe Buff Books:
Seas of Crisis (12/1/05)
Straits
of Power
Tidal
Rip
Crush
Depth
Thunder
in the Deep
Deep
Sound Channel
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July 13, 2005
[Have an opinion on this column? Sound off in Military.com
at the Frontlines.]
Preface for Military.com: With Submarines, Size Does Matter
Too few Americans fully appreciate the continuing and emerging vital roles of U.S. Navy nuclear submarines, and that is most unfortunate because each one is so important to our national security. To achive the myriad missions our country demands of them and their crews in the 21st century, including various taskings of the sort that Joe Buff has discussed in his prolific writings for years, subs need to be relatively large and fast as undersea warships go, and consequently expensive. Some pundits have raised the issue of whether America should buy a larger number of cheaper diesel boats instead. A more robust response for America's unique global-reach strategic interests is the Tango Bravo feasibility study now underway, searching hard for "Technology Breakthroughs" (hence the name) that might make nuclear submarines be less costly to build and man, while they also become even more effective than now. Within this broader context, Joe Buff has carefully looked at the question of submarine size in isolation. He offers compelling observations, both technical and practical, to help demonstrate that -- everything else being equal -- smaller alone is often not better.
Joe's analysis was aided by his previous work in thinking about and writing of the world of submarining. His sources of information were in the public arena and it was his interest, ingenuity and common sense which has made him a knowledgeable commentator on issues of undersea science, strategy and operations. He has done that not only in his several novels but in the pages of THE SUBMARINE REVIEW, a professional magazine for the submarine community. As Editor of that magazine I have asked Joe to write about some subjects and his own initiative has led him to investigate and comment on other substantive issues. Our readership has responded positively to those efforts.
It is particularly appropriate that those interested in general military matters have the benefit of Joe Buff's insights.
Captain James C. Hay, USN (Ret.)
Editor, THE SUBMARINE REVIEW
Introduction
The extreme quiet of a diesel sub on batteries is well known, although according to some Silent Service practitioners the decibel difference relative to a modern nuclear submarine moving at quiet tactical speeds is somewhat overrated. Air independent propulsion (AIP) systems have been developed or proposed that would augment the diesel's traditional engine-generator-motor set and battery bank to enhance the "indiscretion ratio" of these boats, i.e. improve their non-snorkeling submerged endurance. In addition, the smaller size of diesel and diesel-AIP boats (here collectively denoted SSK) could be seen as an advantage in littoral (shallow water and/or near-shore) warfare vice a nuclear-powered fast attack sub (SSN).
This article will examine the relatively low displacement (weight and size) of representative modern SSKs compared to Western SSNs, and will help show that the smallness of "enemy" SSKs can be a significant weakness in real combat operations against the U.S., UK, and our allies. (Other reasons for the U.S. Navy to choose good SSN designs over cheaper SSKs will be discussed in later Parts of this multi-part article, including lessons to be learned from the Royal Navy's budget-strapped decision to go from a mixed SSN/SSK fleet to an all-SSN fleet.)
Note first one fundamental fact: Since all submarines while submerged (main ballast tanks flooded) are by their nature neutrally buoyant, anything that adds weight without reducing safe operating depth (i.e., thinning the pressure hull) forces the pressure-hull envelope to increase buoyancy in the only way that it can, by displacing more water -- it has to get bigger. Otherwise, once all variable ballast tanks were pumped or blown dry, the sub would sink like a stone until it either hit the bottom, or passed through crush depth and imploded, whichever came first. And a bigger hull, for the same propulsion-system power output, means a slower vessel, causing both strategic and tactical disadvantages. More propulsor power to solve these problems, in turn, means more (heavier) propulsion machinery and thus an even bigger hull -- a vicious circle in which the SSN always beats the SSK, because its nuclear reactor has much greater power density than any diesel-AIP could ever achieve.
The present writer will here, in part, take a view as futurist. Some of the following discussion would apply over the next ten to fifteen years, as advanced off-board sensors and remote combat vehicles become operational with our nuclear-powered SSN fleets, while other countries acquire more SSKs.
Surfaced Displacement Comparison
Consider the following data on surfaced displacement (weight) in tons:
| SSK | SSN |
| Russian Improved Kilo 2,350(a) | USS Seawolf (SSN 21) 7,467 |
| German Klasse 212A 1,370(b) | USS Miami (688-I) 6,300 |
| Swedish Type A-19 1,384(c) | UK Astute Class(d) 6,690 |
| Notes: (a) no AIP. (b) Fuel cell AIP. (c) Stirling cycle AIP. (d) in service 2006. |
The percentage of total displacement dedicated to combat sensors and systems, weapons loadout and other stores, plus crew habitability tends to be similar for both SSKs and SSNs: approximately 13% or 14% according to published references. Thus it can be said that undersea warfighting payload (defined here as the sum of these components of weight) may be, in absolute number of tons, 2.5 to 5 times as large for an SSN as for an SSK: between 185 and 320 tons for representative diesel or diesel-AIP boats, vice from 800 to 1000 tons for the SSNs. Furthermore, the reserve buoyancy (taken as submerged displacement minus surfaced displacement) of the SSN designs averages 2.3 times that of the SSKs. Why does any of this matter?
(continued)
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