Proceedings, February 2003
By Vice Admiral Henry C. Mustin, U.S. Navy (Retired), and Vice Admiral Douglas J. Katz, U.S. Navy (Retired)
The Navy does not have what it takes to score a rapid, decisive victory against an adversary who is bent on making it tough and bloody to operate in his littoral waters. The fleet needs to be able to sail into any littoral environment with asymmetric strengths—and the Littoral Combat Ship, as one of a Family of Ships, is key to that capability. Also essential is a new shipbuilding concept that delivers ships faster that can be reconfigured easily, or the Navy will lose the battle to control its shipbuilding.
In 2003, a group of senior naval officers stands around a long conference table. A large and worn nautical chart covers the table. These guys, who resemble a collection of B movie villains, are part of an axis of evil, and they are trying to figure out how to deal with a U.S. expeditionary strike group. They know they cannot deny the U.S. Navy ultimate access, but they want to make the cost high enough that the United States will cease and desist for domestic political if not military reasons. They watch CNN; they saw Beirut, Haiti, and Somalia; and they understand it was the threat of mines that kept the Marines from making an amphibious assault on Kuwait during Desert Storm. So, in spite of the fact that theirs is a second-rate coastal navy, they think they can challenge the U.S. Navy in the littoral by investing in asymmetric means. Thus, after hours of heated debate, they start to move diesel submarines, mines, and missile-armed surface craft around the chart.
(KOCKUMS)
This collective global threat—torpedo-firing diesel submarines, an array of new and old mines, and swarms of small, fast, missile-firing boats—is real, formidable, relatively cheap, and will continue to grow rapidly. The U.S. Navy can handle these threats today, but not without high risk to existing surface combatants (which were constructed with a different operating environment and threat in mind) and increased risk to amphibious forces, maritime prepositioning ships, and U.S. and allied shipping.
There is a problem here. The Navy has to be able to gain access for joint forces in the littorals, and it has to do so quickly and with minimum losses. And yet, the surface Navy's capabilities in littoral antisubmarine warfare, mine warfare, and antisurface warfare against swarms of small craft have failed to keep pace with emerging threats. The collection of half measures over the past 30 years does not add up to what is required today. The fleet must be able to sail into any littoral environment with asymmetric strengths.
To address this need, the Navy recently unveiled two bold new concepts: the Family of Ships—DD(X), CG(X), and the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), which is to be the firstborn; and a shipbuilding concept that promises to deliver ships faster and in configurations that are more easily modernized. The LCS has become the focal point for those who do not support these concepts, and passionate arguments against that ship, usually delivered out of context, seem to dominate conversations throughout the Navy.
Some assert that the Littoral Combat Ship will not work as envisioned, that it is too small, will become too expensive, or that technologies are not mature enough to justify the effort. As usual with any new initiative, more heat than light has been shed on this issue, but at the end of the day the fleet still faces the kinds of threats outlined here. If properly managed and funded, LCS will be a leap forward in littoral warfare capabilities. Its critics need to take a second, closer look.
There is more at stake for the Navy than just the specific characteristics of the LCS. Unless the Navy can get its shipbuilding act together fast, it will lose control of shipbuilding to outside agencies.
A New Approach to Shipbuilding
The problem starts with the Navy's rigid approach to shipbuilding. The recent debacles of the Arsenal Ship and DD-21 programs highlighted the Navy's inability to bring in a new start in surface combatants. Indeed, the last combatant ship new start, the Arleigh Burke (DDG-51)-class destroyer, originated more than 20 years ago, and its DD(X) successor will not enter the fleet until 2011. The result is a shipbuilding account that is unstable, unrealistic, and, from an industry standpoint, frustratingly unpredictable. All of this has been to the detriment of the nation's highly skilled shipbuilding industrial base. Simply stated, the law of evolution applies: use it or lose it. Unless the Navy builds more combatants, those who build them will go out of business.
The process by which the Navy designs and builds ships is slow, risk intolerant, and unfriendly to future upgrades. Acquisition time lines that deliver ships a decade after design do not keep pace with threats in today's environment of rapid technological advances and global proliferation. Promising new technologies in critical mission areas often languish when the risk or costs of adding them to a shipbuilding program are deemed too high. Growth margins, necessary to accommodate technological advances, are always the first to go in a budget crunch. Meanwhile, those who wish the United States harm acquire newer and newer technology and find more ways to hurt us with their old stuff. The result is newly commissioned ships with systems that lag the threat and, once such deficiencies finally are recognized, costly upgrades in hulls already jam-packed with yesterday's technology. Thus, the Navy never was able to add surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems to the Spruance (DD-963)-class destroyers or the Knox (FF-1052)-class frigates because of the cost involved, despite the fact that those ships cried out for SAM systems.
Previous attempts to forward fit littoral warfare capabilities into new construction surface combatants have been fragmented and largely unproductive. Retrofits to existing combatants have been reactive (e.g., after the mine disasters of the late 1980s in the Persian Gulf), as well as enormously expensive and with adverse effects on existing missions and capabilities. At the same time, advancements in technology now bring modular mission capability within reach, but current ship classes do not have the architecture and interfaces to accommodate this concept.
A different approach, whereby the Navy and industry build ships quickly in increments to deliver an initial capability, with follow-on improvements based on testing and advances in technology, is the answer. This approach—termed spiral development—is being applied to the LCS's design and acquisition.
Spiral development is nothing new to the Navy, despite what some vocal critics would have us believe. Indeed, the "core vessel" and "mission module" concepts are as old as aviation at sea, and have served the country well since the first aircraft carrier, the USS Langley (CV-1), joined the fleet. Spiral development is the bedrock of the modern aircraft carrier. When the Kitty Hawk (CV-63) was authorized 50 years ago, her current "mission modules," such as the F/A-18 Super Hornet, were not even a gleam in the Navy's eye. And the carrier's recent performance in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, with employment of special operations "mission modules" that turned her into a sea base for projection of special operations forces a thousand miles inland, was not foreseen in the 1950s by even the most forward-thinking naval professionals.
Now try to imagine Boeing Corporation developing a new carrier aircraft if there were no carriers in the fleet from which to operate. Visionary Navy leaders took enormous risks and invested heavily in the aircraft carrier, despite vigorous opposition from the battleship admirals and the fact that the first generation of carrier aircraft had very little combat capability. A new industry, carrier aviation, followed. Spiral development drove the carrier and its air wing to what it is today—an indispensable platform for projecting U.S. power around the world.
The same type of risk taking and experimentation must be applied to the LCS. Without a ship on which to focus, there can be no real involvement by industry in the relevant mission areas of littoral combat.
The Navy no longer can afford to seek total combat systems development, and then build a ship. When the surface Navy first sought funding for the Aegis system in the DLGN-38 class cruisers, for example, naysayers cried, "Why are you asking for tax dollars to take these high-risk, untried computers to sea?" Then, when the DLGN-38 was canceled, Aegis sat in a cornfield in New Jersey for ten years, because the Navy had no ship to take it to sea. When the ship, CG-47, finally was ready, those same people cried, "Why are you asking for taxpayer dollars to take these obsolete computers to sea?" Without a ship to focus disparate efforts, the Navy and industry will continue to assign low priority to littoral systems.
A Potential Leap Forward
The Littoral Combat Ship is the first step in a new shipbuilding concept that is as important to the health of the Navy in this century as the aircraft carrier was in the last. Spiral development offers an opportunity to break with shipbuilding business as usual—if the Navy puts its money where its mouth is. The Navy needs to move out now on the Family of Ships, and the LCS is the necessary first step.
LCS will be a fast, stealthy, shallow-draft core vessel with an open combat systems computing architecture. Using a "system of systems" approach, it will include networked sensors, modular mission payloads, a variety of manned and unmanned vehicles, and an innovative hull design. Modular mission capability is the cornerstone of the LCS design and what sets it apart from every other class of U.S. surface combatant. Small groups of tailorable Littoral Combat Ships, able through ForceNet to call on the entire range of joint sensors and weaponry, will provide combat capabilities to counter antiaccess threats and to support Marine Corps, Army, and joint special operations forces offensive operations ashore. As a focused mission ship, LCS will complement other multimission members of the surface combatant Family of Ships as an integral element of a carrier strike group or expeditionary strike group.
In terms of hull design, LCS will balance mission payload capacity, maneuverability, stealth, and survivability. With a draft of 20 feet or less, an innovative hull form and propulsion system will enable LCS to operate at economical loiter speeds and to conduct high-speed sprints up to 50 knots. LCS will be able to transit in advance of other forces and quickly reposition in response to operational requirements. Proven signature management technologies to minimize infrared, acoustic, and magnetic emissions and limit its radar cross-section will be employed.
The use of plug-and-play—or, more appropriately, plug-and-fight—modular mission payloads will provide a long- needed vehicle to introduce emerging technologies in antisurface, antisubmarine, and mine warfare to the fleet. Modern intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems will combine with capability modules to allow Marine Corps or joint special operations forces greater littoral mobility. Indeed, LCS can act as a mobile command and support platform for offensive naval and joint special operations ashore.
As for cost, the LCS is targeted at $220 million per hull, about one-fourth the cost of a destroyer. Collaboration between the Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard Deepwater program and with allied nations with experience in littoral operations will help keep costs down. Because of the imperative to counter littoral threats, the Navy's plan to begin construction on LCS no later than fiscal year 2005, with the first unit operational in 2007, does not get it to the fleet nearly fast enough. Recent management initiatives and the introduction of streamlined acquisition processes at Naval Sea Systems Command have defined the LCS program and given it its own budget line in 2003, the first major wicket for any Navy program. This momentum needs to build into an even more accelerated time line.
LCS Is a Linchpin to a 21st-Century Family of Ships
The Family of Ships is really a 21st-century version of the high-low mix of the 1970s, which provides the Navy with a valuable experience base and lessons learned across all shipbuilding issues. In particular, there always are powerful forces, both in the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill, that view the low-mix ships as a fig leaf for not procuring the high-mix ships. This line of thinking has serious ramifications. In the case of LCS, the fundamental assumption is that these ships will operate with larger members of the family. Because the Navy has invested heavily in land-attack capabilities such as the Advanced Gun System and land-attack missiles in DD(X), there is no requirement for LCS to have this capability. Similarly, LCS does not require an antiair capability beyond self-defense because DD(X) and CG(X) will provide area air defense. Thus, if either DD(X) or CG(X) does not occur in the numbers required and on time, the Navy will face two options: leave LCS as is, and accept the risk inherent in employment of this ship in a threat environment beyond what it can handle (which is what it did with the FFG-7); or "grow" LCS to give it the necessary capabilities that originally were intended to reside off board in DD(X) and CG(X). Neither option is acceptable.
As for the high-low mix, it failed for three basic reasons. First, the low-mix ships, i.e., the Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7) class, became too expensive. Second, the high-mix ships were not procured in the numbers needed to provide the protective umbrellas for the low mix. Third, the communications and surveillance requirements to tie the two mixes together could not be met with the technology of the time. All these pitfalls can be avoided today, provided the Family of Ships is correctly managed and fully funded. The opportunity is here. The technical problems are bounded by the laws of physics. The bureaucratic problems, however, relate to leadership and inside-the-D.C.-beltway acumen. The Navy must address both bureaucratic issues.
Industry Can Build LCS Faster
Spiral development will bring LCS to the fleet quicker than traditional shipbuilding methods, but the present plan still is too slow. The LCS can be a catalyst for a new approach to design to enable rapid modernization and to put more ships at sea at a faster rate. The Navy must do better than 2007 for the first LCS. Industry is capable of delivering the first ship by the end of 2005.
The Navy knows enough about the candidate hull designs at this point; it just needs to choose one, perhaps even lease the first hull as a way to minimize expenses and get on with it. As for mission modules, there are systems on the shelf right now that are ready to go to sea, such as remote mine-hunting devices and vertical take-off unmanned vehicles armed with antiship missiles. Emerging technologies such as high-frequency sonar and distributed fields of small, networked sensors allow greater visibility into murky coastal waters, giving a two-for-one payoff in both mine and littoral antisubmarine warfare. Department of Defense transformation initiatives that encourage an aggressive "rewrite the rules as you go" spirit offer the Navy a tremendous opportunity, but old acquisition mind-sets die hard. It is ironic that Navy inertia and second-guessing are keeping the LCS program from reaching its top speed, instead of DoD slowing Navy initiatives.
The LCS program will require a firm commitment from the Navy, and that means dollars. The Navy must make a substantial investment in research and development and shipbuilding funds, commensurate with the priority ascribed to LCS in the Chief of Naval Operations' "Sea Power 21" vision, and protect those funds during annual budget food fights to maintain momentum and foster commitment from industry. The LCS will bring Navy shipbuilding into the 21st century. All of the revolutionary and transformational concepts of "Sea Power 21"—modularity, force netting, unmanned vehicles, and projecting defense—will move from brochuremanship to the real world of metal cutting. Moreover, the LCS production time line must equal the art of the possible as defined by industry and bounded by realistic costs. Why should the Navy settle for less?
All Ahead Flank
The Littoral Combat Ship is a sound concept. It has bona fide and much-needed warfighting capabilities. It is an innovative, cost-effective, timely way to introduce these capabilities to the fleet, and it provides the management model to bring Navy shipbuilding in line with modern business practices. In particular, it addresses head-on the issue of introducing new technology quickly and at minimum expense, which has been the stumbling block of so many surface combatant modernization plans.
LCS is but the first element of the integrated surface combatant package. Delays or reductions in capabilities to DD(X) or CG(X) will unravel the entire package and undercut the Navy's ability to fight as envisioned by "Sea Power 21."
Without LCS as a ship on which to sea base new capabilities, industry simply will not enter the littoral warfare arena in any enthusiastic or sustained manner. The LCS offers the Navy its last opportunity to retain control of its shipbuilding destiny. It has been 20 years since a successful new start in surface combatant construction, and the Navy has two strikes against it—the Arsenal Ship and DD-21. Unless the Navy is prepared to turn over the reins of its surface combatant requirements and procurement procedures to outside agencies, it has to have a win. LCS must be built, and built now, even faster than the current plan.
The Authors:
Admiral Mustin commanded Second Fleet and is a former Deputy Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral Katz commanded Naval Forces Central Command, now Fifth Fleet, and is a former Commander, Naval Surface Forces Atlantic.
