An Unlikely Location
By
Commander Henry J. Hendrix II, U.S. Navy
Navy History, August 2005
The style and execution of Theodore Roosevelt's diplomacy were on display at the Portsmouth Navy Yard in the autumn of 1905.
President Theodore Roosevelt stands between the leaders of the Russian (left) and Japanese delegations.
The impetus for peace began at sea. The Japanese victory at Tsushima Strait had not been wholly unexpected, but the magnitude of the defeat of the Russian Baltic Fleet on 27-28 May 1905 exceeded even President Theodore Roosevelt's active imagination. "No wonder you are happy!" he wrote Baron Kentaro Kaneko, a Harvard-educated Japanese diplomat. "Neither Trafalgar nor the defeat of the Spanish Armada was as complete. . . . "
Later that same day, as the full implications of Japan's success sunk in, President Roosevelt wrote Secretary of War William H. Taft: "It seems to me this country must decide definitely whether it does or does not intend to hold its possessions in the Orient. . . . If we are not prepared to build and maintain a good sized navy . . . and . . . establish a strong and suitable base . . . in the Philippines, then we had better give up the Philippines entirely." 1
Roosevelt desired a peace settlement between the two combatants, and the sooner the better. Japan's mounting victories threatened the fragile balance of power in Asia, and Roosevelt was determined to establish a new status quo before U.S. long-term interests in the region became threatened. Within four months of Japan's victory, Roosevelt would mediate a peace conference that resulted in a treaty that would also garner him a Nobel Peace Prize.
Treaties often carry the name of the city of their negotiation. Theodore Roosevelt, a traditionalist in nearly every aspect of his diplomacy, chose a navy yard near Portsmouth, New Hampshire, as the site of his of crowning diplomatic achievement. 2 Why? Even against the backdrop of his use of Navy and Marine Corps units to resolve previous diplomatic crises, this decision seems eccentric and odd. What reasons drove the venue selection, and what do those reasons tell us about Roosevelt's broader style of diplomacy?
Roosevelt had hoped to head off war between Russia and Japan. His administration approached the Japanese and then the Russians to propose mediation as a way of settling their differences. The Japanese responded that they would regard any "attempt at mediation as unfriendly," perceiving the move as an avenue that would allow Russia more time to "perfect her preparations." Tsar Nicholas II's government, for its part, stated that mediation was beneath it, and that any such diplomatic overture was incumbent upon Japan. 3 Throughout the conflict T.R. maintained a steady interest. Repulsed by Russia's previous overbearing attitude, he privately cheered Japan's early military success. 4
As Marines present arms in the background, Rear Admiral William W. Mead leads the Japanese representatives ashore at Portsmouth Navy Yard.
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As Japanese land victories inexorably mounted, however, Roosevelt's attitude began to incrementally shift as his appreciation of the potential of Japan's growing power increased. In June 1904, he confided to his British friend Cecil Spring-Rice: "The Japs interest me and I like them. I am perfectly well aware that if they win out it may possibly mean a struggle between them and us in the future…" 5 Roosevelt perceived that the war had gone too far and that the fragile balance of power in Asia was tipping too far in Japan's favor. Their victories over an established Western power appeared to be emboldening their nationalistic pride, and the president's correspondence began to focus on the need to "put our naval and military preparations in such shape that we can hold the Philippines against any foe." 6 Recognizing that the U.S. Navy was only halfway through its modernization process, Roosevelt wished to avoid conflict in the Pacific for the present. Diplomacy then, would be his path with regard to the war, and the United States needed to be ready, if necessary, to "play our hand alone." 7
As Roosevelt's luck would have it, Japan's minister to the United States approached him within days of the Battle of Tsushima Strait to ask that he offer to act as a mediator for peace, but that the initiative, for the sake of Japan's honor, should appear to be his own. Consequently, on 8 June 1905 a confidential cable from the State Department moved across the globe requesting that the warring parties meet at the Hague. 8 The two nations decided to meet face to face to settle their differences without outside assistance. Russia sidestepped the Hague and suggested Paris; Japan responded by suggesting the city of Chefoo in China. In the end, the only mutually agreeable location was Washington, D.C., setting the stage for the first major international peace treaty to be mediated on the North American continent. 9 Realizing that the time period for the negotiations, early August, would overlap the U.S. capital's hottest and most humid period of the year, Roosevelt set out to find an alternate site, preferably near his summer home in Oyster Bay, New York. 10
As early as 15 June, Roosevelt established some parameters for the negotiation's location, stating that he sought a place "where the conditions will be agreeable, and there will be as much freedom from interruption as possible." 11 The State Department began its search immediately. Additional requirements included ample access to communications, and the ability to make the negotiators comfortable. Government officials reviewed the advantages and disadvantages of locations all over the Northeast, prompting political leaders from all over New England to publicly lobby for the honor of hosting the event. 12
New Hampshire Governor John McLean sent a delegation headed by his own secretary of state to Washington to lobby for a conference at Bretton Woods, high in the White Mountains. But the delegation emerged from its meeting with Acting Secretary of State Herbert H. D. Peirce with a clear indication of the administration's interest in hosting the conference at the Navy Yard in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. The leader of the delegation immediately departed for Portsmouth and reported back that the site was in fact suitable for the conference. 13 The town was small in comparison to others in the region, having a population just under 11,000, but the Navy Yard made all the difference. On 10 July, the surprising official announcement appeared in the Portsmouth Press Herald . 14 The newspaper had a story, but it was not the story. The real story of the site's selection is found in the correspondence of the yard's commander, Rear Admiral William W. Mead.
Mead, a naval officer with more experience ashore in support facilities than he had on board ships, had been flying the flag of a rear admiral in front of his headquarters for only ten days when he received a letter from Acting Secretary of the Navy Charles Darling instructing him to provide Peirce with "such aid and . . . such courtesies as you are able." 15 Mead's correspondence during the subsequent 23 days shed a great deal of light on both the logic behind the selection of Portsmouth for the negotiations as well as several underlying themes of Roosevelt's diplomacy, which can be summarized under the banners of security, communications, and protocol.
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