Pyrates on Parade -- Part 1

Is King Neptune trying to mock the multinational counter-piracy mission of Combined Task Force 151 off the Horn of Africa? Just a couple of days before November 20's festivities in Norfolk, VA, where M/V Maersk Alabama's Captain Phillips thanked the skipper and crew of USS Bainbridge (DDG-98) for his life-and-death rescue from Somali pirates back in April, another band of Somali pirates attacked M/V Maersk Alabama again. Only this time, following the latest recommended shipping industry best practices, a private security detail was aboard. They drove the pirates off after a brief firefight and non-lethal noise projector barrage at 300 yards range; there were no reported injuries.

But behind these two different types of American operational successes lies a more troubling picture. In response to outside pressures, pirate mission planning and implementation have gotten more ambitious and sophisticated during 2009, especially since the summer monsoons died down. According to London's International Maritime Bureau, although a smaller percentage of hijacking raids have succeeded this year relative to 2008 - 11% compared to 17% - a larger number of attacks have occurred, 359 so far this year compared to 293 total last year. The types of ships attacked and sometimes hijacked run the gamut from oil tankers, coal carriers, container ships, and bulk cargo ships, to fishing boats and private yachts. While published estimates vary, right now Somali pirates hold captive about one dozen vessels, anchored in shallow water, and almost 300 crewmembers, most held aboard in horrendous living conditions.

Like whaling ships of old with several whaling boats each, clusters of armed skiffs supported by larger mother ship - using GPS and satellite phones - now maraud the open sea and swarm at their victims up to 1,000 miles from land. In particular, they've recently turned the Seychelles area into a prime hunting ground. With most of the 115 separate islands of the Republic of Seychelles not permanently occupied, pirates could easily turn some into forward logistical support bases - if they haven't done so already. In a different sort of troubling trend, while negotiating ransoms pirate gangs have begun demanding the release of cronies captured and detained by foreign governments. This is a tactic that was, until not long ago, used only by terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda. Too often, the imprisoned pirates were freed, proving that this new tactic works.  

There are 3 main international maritime security efforts charged to cope with what amounts to a nautical law enforcement problem off northeastern Africa. The oldest, ordered to "deter, disrupt, and suppress" modern piracy there, is the Combined Maritime Force coalition's Combined Task Force 151. With a heavy American contingent among a varying force of about a dozen ships from 10 nations, CTF 151 is now commanded by a U.S. Navy rear admiral. In late 2008, NATO dispatched a flotilla of 7 warships to the Horn of Africa counter-piracy theater.

Newest is the European Union Naval Force (about 15 warships from 7 nations, commanded by a Royal Navy rear admiral), created early in 2009 under a U.N. Security Council resolution to protect food aid shipments to Somalia and help "bring to an end" piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast. The People's Liberation Army Navy (China) has also recently sent warships to the western Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden arena, to patrol, escort, and protect merchant vessels.  Pirates recently hijacked China's massive coal carrier De Xin Hai, and a smaller fishing ship Tianyu No. 8 - a third, the 1,180 foot-long tanker Zenhua 4, evaded an attack a year ago. Russia has sent warships, too, having had a Ukraine ship with sensitive Russian military cargo hijacked and ransomed. 

Piracy remains big business for the major clans along the impoverished coast of chaotic northern Somalia. The New York Times reported on November 18 that when Spain paid $3.5 million ransom last week for the release of the fishing vessel Alakrana and her 36-member crew, numerous pirates, their family members, friends, and creditors, some of whom arrived via dozens of luxury cars, all "crowded the shore" and "clamored" to get shares of that money. To me it sounds like their brazen display of sheer greed combines with a notable lack of concern for dispersal against any sort of cruise missile attack (Sudan, 1998) or amphibious assault (Somalia '92 - '93).    

It's unclear whether the challenge of Somali piracy can be made to subside via further nation-rebuilding assistance programs ashore and continued security patrols afloat.

Joe Buff is an historian, author and contributer to Defense Tech.