Misdirected Email Doomed Convoy

Four years ago today, an unarmored, undermanned convoy of fuel trucks was erroneously sent directly into some of the fiercest fighting Iraq had seen. When the smoke cleared, nine Americans lay dead, 17 were seriously wounded and two missing in action. One still is.

An Army after-action report obtained exclusively by Military.com shows it all could have been avoided but for grievous errors made when accuracy mattered most - from pre-mission assessments of how dangerous the route was to a misdirected email that would have stopped the convoy before it ever left the base.

The 280-page report calls for a deeper investigation into the botched e-mail and other errors running up to the tragic events of April 9, 2004. But despite numerous queries, the Army won't say whether such an investigation has or will take place -- and the military hasn't announced any disciplinary action for the mistakes leading up to the ambush.

It took nearly four full years to account for the whereabouts of every Soldier killed that day, and a contractor who was working for Kellogg, Brown and Root remains MIA but is presumed dead.

Staff Sgt. Keith "Matt" Maupin was a private first-class when he was captured during the ambush. He was promoted several times while he was missing for nearly four years. His remains were located northwest of Baghdad in late March of this year.

One other civilian contractor, Timothy Bell, is still unaccounted for.

Driving into fire

When the 24 Soldiers and 19 contractors pulled out of the gate at Logistical Support Area Anaconda near Balad, Iraq, on that April morning, they had no idea that more than half of them would be killed, captured or wounded that day.

The after-action report, which was part of a command-requested inquiry, shows that communication breakdowns had terrible consequences.

A battalion tasked with tracking dangerous conditions on supply routes was so mixed up that its Soldiers were reporting three different threat levels for the route the convoy took.

Originally prepared to head north, the convoy had its destination changed to Baghdad International Airport - south - just a few hours before it was set to hit the road that day. Next, and only minutes before it was set to depart, the convoy's route to the airport was changed; code named Alternate Supply Route "Sword," it was to take them to the airport's north gate. Then, just before the doomed line of vehicles pulled through the gate to leave, an e-mail intended to halt the convoy was sent to the wrong address.

The Army report, written by a major working for Col. Gary Bunch, the commander of 172nd Corps Support Group, states: "The information that was not forwarded had a direct influence into the outcome of this convoy. If the information was properly sent to subordinate units, action could have been taken to potentially minimize impact of hostile engagement with the 724th [Transportation Company] convoy."

These costly mistakes sent 19 unarmored fuel tankers driven by civilian contractors and guarded by a single platoon from the 724th, a Reserve company out of Illinois, down "IED alley" and into a battle between the 1st Cavalry Division and hundreds of insurgents.

By the end of the attack on the convoy, every vehicle was damaged and more than half were destroyed.

According to interviews with Soldiers and the Army report, the fuel convoy was hit just outside the airport by one of the largest coordinated ambushes any coalition force had faced in Iraq to date - with the fighting covering a five-mile stretch.

"There is no way to exaggerate what was happening and what it looked like," recalled Spc. Jarob Walsh, who was riding shotgun in a Kellogg, Brown and Root fuel tanker. "The most horrible thing you could imagine is what it looked like. Bodies everywhere, trucks on fire and exploding."

The seven vehicles that escorted the fuel convoy included armored Humvees and 5-ton gun trucks with heavy machine guns. Some of the 5-tons' "armor" consisted of three-quarter-inch plywood, according to one Soldier. None had ballistic windshields.

The color of danger

According to the report, the route that the convoy traveled was on that day classified as black - the most dangerous of all conditions. But that information may never have gotten to those who planned the route that morning. After the attack, Soldiers of the 49th Movement Control Battalion's Highway Section told investigators Alternate Supply Route Sword was rated black, the report states, but on the morning of April 9 the section's secure Web site indicated the route was red, less dangerous. Meanwhile, the officer in charge of the 152nd Movement Control Team at Anaconda recalled in the report that he thought the status of ASR Sword was amber.

However you want to color it, the route had a reputation as dangerous.

An unidentified Soldier with the 49th said in the report that the route to the north gate was rarely used and had always been a hot spot, adding: "The route had been tagged IED alley."

The route the convoy originally was supposed to take was Major Supply Route Tampa, and the Army's report shows that a fuel convoy that left Anaconda just 30 minutes later and took that route arrived at the airport unscathed.

Didn't get the email

The investigation shows that the 13th Corps Support Command's G-3 section mishandled a critical e-mail that should have stopped or redirected the convoy. The G-3 first sent an e-mail to the 172nd's operations section at 9:54 a.m., saying the 724th convoy was to be redirected through ASR Sword to the airport's north gate. It is unclear where this order originated.

Three minutes later, the same G-3 Soldier sent another e-mail to cancel the redirection down ASR Sword.

"Sorry, it looks like Sword is closed until further notice. I am trying to deconflict," the e-mail read.

But the only person to receive that second e-mail was the Soldier who sent it. He accidentally addressed the e-mail to himself only. The sender's name was blacked out in the edited version of the report.

Less than 10 minutes later the convoy was rolling toward the ambush.

The Soldiers killed in the ambush were Sgt. Elmer Krause, 40; Spc. Greg Goodrich, 37; and Maupin who was 20 when captured. The contractors killed were Steven Fisher, 43; William Bradley, 50; Steven Hulett, 48; Jack Montegue, 52; Jeffrey Parker, 45; Tony Johnson, 47; and presumably Bell, who was 61 at the time.

The Army called the recovery effort of Maupin "Operation Trojan Honor" after the mascot of his Cincinnati high school, Glen Este. A tip from an Iraqi citizen led to the recovery of Maupin's remains March 20 in the Abu Ghraib area- about 12 miles from where he was captured.

Although the Army finally found its last Soldier from the disastrous mission, many questions remain for families and those who were on the convoy.

"Really, the public hasn't been told what we did that day," said Sgt. Matthew Bohm, a gunner in the 724th who was in the rear of the convoy. "The full story needs to come out."