Marines Deliver in
Mountain Storm
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U.S. MARINE CORPS (KEITH MILKS)
Commanding officer of the 22d MEU(SOC), Colonel Frank McKenzie, and his
interpreter confer with Jan Mohammed Khan, governor of Oruzgan Province
prior to the MEU’s arrival.
The 22d MEU designed a four-phase operation that capitalized on MAGTF
strength while leveraging joint and national assets. Phase I (25 March-24
April) consisted of shaping operations. Based from Kandahar, the MEU
executed a series of five, long-range, overt patrols into Oruzgan Province.
Moving in high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles (HMMWVs) and locally
procured vehicles, the MEU capitalized on support provided by Special
Forces teams operating in the area and used its Maritime Special-Purpose
Force as the main effort. These initial operations were designed to
study the terrain, select a a site for the MEU forward operating base
(FOB), begin contacts with the local populace to help identify Taliban
leaders, and establish a working relationship with the Oruzgan provincial
governor, Jan Mohammed Khan.
The MEU commander accompanied Marines
on one of the operations and spent two days with Mohammed at his gubernatorial
headquarters in Tarin Kowt. After the initial contact, a Marine field-grade
officer equipped with secure communications was assigned to the governor’s
entourage. The value of these liaison efforts in the subsequent phases
of Mountain Storm cannot be overemphasized.
Phase II (25 April-10 May) was devoted to securing the Tarin Kowt bowl.
After arriving in the province, the MEU concentrated on establishing
its FOB near Tarin Kowt. A strategic imperative of the Taliban was to
ensure that Oruzgan Province remained isolated from the rest of Afghanistan,
thereby affording safety to Taliban operations and support.
Establishment of the FOB was critical to the MEU’s concept of sustainment
and combat power projection. Named after Marine Colonel John W. Ripley
of Dong Ha fame, the base would feature a 6,000-foot runway, a complete
helicopter fueling and rearming point, and 13 helicopter landing pads.
The MEU command-and-control center was set up in the middle of the Oruzgan
bowl. Until the airstrip became operational, however, all equipment
and resupply had to traverse the 85 miles from Kandahar over Route Tiger,
a two-day trip on primitive, vehicle-destroying roads ripe with ambush
sites.
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U.S. MARINE CORPS (KEITH MILKS)
MEU Service Support Group 22 transported more than 25,000 personnel
and 1,973 short tons of cargo in 90 days. The area of operations
was characterized by unimproved roads, harsh conditions, and obstacles
such as this swollen stream. |
Two combat operations served as a shield behind which MEU Service Support
Group 22 and the command element deployed to FOB Ripley. The MEU air
combat element, Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 266 (Reinforced),
helilifted two reinforced rifle companies into AOs Georgia and Alabama;
a third company was landed in AO North Carolina. The air assaults attacked
Taliban elements in areas they viewed as safe and provided cover for
movement of the six large convoys that carried the bulk of the MEU’s
logistical support infrastructure to Ripley.
While these operations netted large weapons caches—especially in AO
Georgia—the greater effect was to directly challenge the Taliban’s ability
to continue to isolate Oruzgan. Establishment of the command-and-control
center at FOB Ripley ended Phase II. The 22d MEU had positioned itself
right in the Taliban’s backyard.
Phase III (11-31 May) featured intelligence-driven operations aimed
at facilitating voter registration. Oruzgan Province had long been denied
to U.N. voter registration workers because of well-founded concerns
about personal safety. To this end, Phase III operations focused on
clearing Taliban forces from southern Oruzgan, improving the security
environment, and—most important—initiating voter registration.
In early April, the MEU commander and key staff officers met with Southern
Region UNAMA officials in Kandahar to discuss the way ahead. There was
consensus that the most important step would be to create the visible
perception that the security situation would allow voter registration
to proceed unmolested. Agreements were reached between the MEU and UNAMA
to provide area security for voter registration sites, action plans
for countering attacks, and medical evacuation support. An overarching
plan was crafted for initiating and expanding voter registration throughout
Oruzgan Province.
Hand in hand with voter registration was initiation of a broad array
of civil affairs projects designed to show a credible alternative to
the negative path offered by the Taliban. Under the MEU’s direction,
numerous civil affairs projects were initiated in Oruzgan and northern
Kandahar Province, and extensive medical and dental outreach programs
were initiated.
Underwriting these long-term projects were combat activities. Operations
Thunderball in AO Tennessee and Bladerunner I in AO Kentucky were directed
against enemy elements operating in southern Oruzgan. These HMMWV- and
MTVR-mobile actions were built around heavily reinforced rifle companies
and the battalion mobile command post. Contact was light throughout
these operations because the enemy chose to withdraw rather than face
Battalion Landing Team (BLT) 1/6.
As the MEU progressed through Phase III, it became clear that the threat
to Tarin Kowt did not lie in the villages and bottomland of the Oruzgan
bowl. Instead, anticoalition elements were concentrated in the distant
highlands that ringed the bowl: Dey Chopan to the east and Cehar Cineh
to the west. In the narrow valleys and almost completely inaccessible
high ground of the two areas, Taliban sanctuary had been persistent
and arrogantly self-confident. When voter registration began in earnest
in Tarin Kowt and started to spread to he outlying districts, MEU planners
focused on the high ground to the east.
Phase IV (1 June-13 July) built on earlier operations that had created
the necessary logistical infrastructure, established security for voter
registration and civil affairs work, and identified the rough foundation
of the Taliban presence. Decisive combat operations against Taliban
concentrations and sanctuaries would force the enemy to respond to the
MEU’s activities in Oruzgan.
On 1 June, BLT 1/6 embarked on Operation Asbury Park to directly target
the Taliban stronghold in the Dey Chopan highlands. This proved to be
one of the most effective operations in Afghanistan since coalition
forces entered the country in October 2001.
For two weeks, moving exclusively in HMMWVs and locally procured Toyota
Hi-Luxs and Land Rovers, the BLT engaged Taliban forces eight times.
Reinforced with Afghan Militia Forces and accompanied by Governor Jan
Mohammed, the Marines employed every available platform for close air
support: AC-130s, B-1Bs, A-10s, AV-8Bs, and Marine and Army attack helicopters.
During this sustained operation, 85 Taliban were killed; another 40
probably were killed in closed-up caves or inaccessible high ground.
The fighting ranged from air strikes to intense close-range infantry
engagements. In a testament to the leadership, fighting skills, and
tactical acumen of small unit leaders, no Marines were killed and only
14 were wounded.
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Based largely on the success of Asbury Park and supporting operations,
the combatant commander extended the 22d MEU’s Afghanistan deployment
by 30 days. On receiving this decision, CJTF-76 put the 2nd
Battalion, 5th Infantry (2-5) of the
Army’s 25th Infantry Division (Light) under the tactical control
of the MEU. Now with two ground maneuver battalions, the MEU developed
a plan to exploit the success of Asbury Park.
Commencing Operation Thunder Road, BLT 1/6 moved quickly into the Cehar
Cineh area, accompanied by the governor and Afghani forces. Located
in the western part of AO Linebacker, the Taliban had yet to surrender
Cehar Cineh to conventional forces. Concurrently, in Operation Asbury
Park II, 2-5 Infantry relied extensively on its organic rtillery and
mortars and exploited the success of BLT 1/6 in the Dey Chopan area.
Both operations continued to dislodge enemy combatants from sanctuaries.
While many weapons caches were uncovered, it soon became apparent that
they had no more stomach for fighting. With Taliban authority effectively
neutralized, the MEU took advantage of the two battalions’ offensives
by reinforcing security, accelerating civil-military projects, and initiating
voter registration.
Application of MAGTF doctrine and concepts was of prime importance
to the MEU. Simultaneously leading two maneuver battalions and as many
as five separate company/platoon teams required detailed planning and
careful application of resources—especially given highly mobile operations
and missions as diverse as providing security for women’s health clinics
and applying artillery, air, and theater intelligence assets to attack
the Taliban. In addition, being weighted as the CJTF’s main effort gave
the MEU tactical and logistic support that a MAGTF is well equipped
to employ.
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U.S. MARINE CORPS (KEITH MILKS)
Effective air support was critical
to the success of Mountain Storm. The 22d MEU’s aviation combat
element, Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 266 (Reinforced), consisted
of 28 rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft. Here, CH-46 Sea Knights overfly
a forward position. |
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Results
In the short term, the security environment in Oruzgan Province improved
dramatically. Thousands of ordnance systems, weapons, and other combat
implements were destroyed. The MEU was in contact 32 times and confirmed
101 enemy killed and another 50 probable kills, including several key
Taliban leaders. Attacks against coalition forces declined to nearly
zero in Oruzgan and northern Kandahar provinces. Most significantly,
attacks also declined to the south in and around Kandahar City and the
ring road to Kabul. These were decisive and measurable military effects—but,
as with everything in Afghanistan, only time will tell if they have
long-term benefits.
Nonetheless, it is clear that improved security permitted the introduction
of programs that will have the greatest effect on long-term security.
The MEU’s operations permitted the introduction of UNAMA voter registration
teams; 58,357 Afghan citizens were registered in Oruzgan between 1 May
and 10 July. These efforts represented more than 44% of UNAMA’s provincial
goal and helped overcome the initial hurdle of demonstrating to the
populace that safe elections were possible in Afghanistan. Voter registration
went hand in hand with 108 civil-affairs projects that provided long-range
hope for Afghanistan: for example, well digging, establishment of schools,
and road and infrastructure improvement. An aggressive medical and dental
outreach program cared for 2,000 patients, many of whom received assistance
for the first time.
Conclusions
The early decision by CJTF-180 planners to employ the 22d MEU in accordance
with MAGTF doctrine was the foremost reason for the MEU’s strong performance.
Its high degree of air-ground-logistical integration was of inestimable
value to the kind of operations required in Oruzgan Province. (In addition
to a full plate of complex tasks, the ACE furnished AV-8B sorties for
use in other parts of the CJTF AO.) The MEU’s organic firepower and
mobility, ability to execute operations rapidly, and the dedicated effort
to fuse intelligence from below and above proved decisive.
The grit and determination of the individual rifleman shone in an extremely
harsh environment. Marine noncommissioned officers were the most effective
weapons in the MEU’s arsenal. Small-unit leadership was tested in excessive
elevations, heat, and dust—and it passed with flying colors. Marines
remain the masters of small-unit actions.
The predeployment training provided to the MEU as part of the standard
workup package proved to be a sound basis for operating in Afghanistan.
In particular, the rapid response planning training provided by the
II Marine Expeditionary Force Special Operations Training Group enabled
the MEU to focus on time-sensitive targets with great effect and had
a most positive effect on all other decision making and staff operations.
CJTFs-180 and -76 were supportive and eager to employ the MEU. They
arranged a true “plug-and-play” joint environment and worked constantly
to enhance the considerable intelligence capabilities of the MAGTF.
In every way, they were dedicated to the effective application of individual
service capabilities. Their leadership and support were essential.
The 22d MEU’s deployment to Afghanistan demonstrated the inherent capabilities
of the MEU(SOC) program in every measurable category. It traveled inland
more than 500 miles to some of the most inhospitable terrain in the
world and proved to be an expeditionary and exceptionally lethal force.
It used combined arms in intense firefights while concurrently conducting
civil-military operations. The MEU’s successful integration into a joint
command served to reinforce the merits of the Marine air-ground team
and demonstrate the value of its integration with a joint force.
Strategic results of the deployment still are being assessed, but recent
peaceful elections—even in former Taliban sanctuaries—are nascent signs
of long-term success. And, in Oruzgan Province, they result directly
from the 22d MEU’s determined march into the storm.
