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    Proceedings Article Index

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    Marines Deliver in Mountain Storm

    Colonel Kenneth F. McKenzie, Major Roberta L. Shea, and Major Christopher Phelps, U.S. Marine Corps
    Proceedings, November 2004



    U.S. MARINE CORPS


    In its deployment to Afghanistan earlier this year, the 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) highlighted the contributions Marine air- ground task forces make to joint commands and validated the effectiveness of hard predeployment training.

    In winter 2004, the U.S. Central Command committed its theater reserve, the 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU[SOC]), into central Afghanistan to serve as the main effort of Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 180’s Operation Mountain Storm. The operation was designed to preempt a long-anticipated Taliban “spring offensive” and help set the conditions for successful voter registration and national-level elections.

    The operational concept developed by CJTF-180 planners called for the 22d MEU to enter Afghanistan through the southern airfield of Kandahar in March 2004. The physical and logistical challenges were daunting. Located in southern Afghanistan, Kandahar airfield lies just ten miles southeast of the former Taliban capital, Kandahar City. The ship-to-shore movement to Kandahar airfield required the MEU to traverse southern Pakistan’s Baluchistan region, one of the most rugged and remote lands in the world. Avoiding the 8,000-foot ridges with rotary-wing aircraft lengthened the transit to 420 miles.

     
    U.S. MARINE CORPS
     

    Difficult Terrain

    After force closure at Kandahar, the MEU struck north 80 miles to operate in the Oruzgan Province area. By way of bone-jarring routes leading north from Kandahar City, there are only two main passes that afford operational access to Oruzgan Province. They cut through the 8,000-foot ridgeline that separates Oruzgan from Kandahar Province and were to occupy much of the MEU’s attention as it transitioned to Tarin Kowt, the capital of Oruzgan.

    Oruzgan Province stretches about 130 miles north to south and 95 miles east to west. With poor unpaved “roads” and deep, narrow passes, Tarin Kowt was home to Mullah Omar and his family during the Soviet occupation in the 1980s. The province, long considered a Taliban stronghold, is suited ideally to insurgency because of its geography and isolated populace. It is dominated by some of the most hardline ethnic Pashtuns in the country—people who reflect the rugged mountains around them.

     
    Marines of Battalion Landing Team 1/6 search for enemy personnel and weapons in an Oruzgan Province village during Operation Mountain Storm. (MARINES ROBERT STURKIE)  

    At the heart of the MEU’s area of operations (AO) was Tarin Kowt, a small town of 17,000. The lush vegetation that follows several watersheds leading down to the town contrasts sharply with the steep, arid mountains that surround it. At the bottom of the Tarin Kowt “bowl” (at 4,400 feet) was an old abandoned dirt airstrip that became the centerpiece of the 22d MEU’s air-ground operations.

    Mission Analysis

    Before forces began to move, MEU planners and subordinate commanders visited Bagram twice to conduct detailed planning with the CJTF-180 staff, the core of which came from the Army’s 10th Mountain Division. [1] The task force staff incorporated the 22d MEU’s staff in all facets of operations plan development. Thus, the MEU clearly understood the joint task force (JTF) commander’s intent. Two early decisions by CJTF-180 were key to effective operations: the MEU was to function as a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) and was assigned its own AO, with attendant freedom of movement.

    Based on analysis of the campaign plan, 22d MEU planners developed a mission statement:

    Commencing 25 Apr 04, 22d MEU(SOC) conducts combat operations to defeat anti-coalition militants (ACMs), secure major population areas, and support civil-military operations (CMO) in AO Linebacker to create a secure and stable environment in order to facilitate United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)-sponsored voter registration and elections.

    The MEU’s primary task was to set the conditions for a safe election process leading to establishment of a secure and stable government in Afghanistan. This entailed finding and defeating anticoalition forces, securing major population areas, and supporting civil-military operations across the MEU’s AO—with the emphasis on voter registration.

    • Develop a bottom-to-top intelligence architecture capable of identifying locations of anticoalition leaders and enablers, areas of sanctuary, and infiltration lanes. The intent was to gather and fuse intelligence at the MEU level without being entirely dependent on higher sources. The previous work of Special Forces and other agencies in the AO was most helpful in this regard.
    • Provide a visible security environment for voter registration.
    • Capitalize on MAGTF flexibility to conduct intelligence-driven combat operations against enemy forces.
    • Aggressively link combat and civil-military operations to achieve long-term security.
    • Take advantage of existing CJTF-180 capabilities and work closely with higher, adjacent, and supporting units.
    • Develop the infrastructure and logistical capability austerely so as to fight the MEU without detracting from support to frontline forces.
    • Because the fight will be carried by noncommissioned officers, tailor combat support and combat service support to meet their requirements.

     

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