McNamara Kills the Pilatus Porter

Recognizing the urgent need and the wisdom of the proposal, congressional staffs were supportive of the sole source authority, a major milestone for prompt action. Everyone seemed to recognize the need and the value of the Porter in answering the call for close air support of the brown-water Navy, at least as an interim measure.

The Navy identified the commanding officer of the first unit, modifying his career pattern to take on this new challenge, something about which he became very excited. Then-Commander Jack French was an outstanding officer, commanding a propeller attack squadron. He knew about props, bombs, close air support, and staying on station. He was beginning to finger some pilots to join in the fun. "We got the word of the Pilatus Porter, and there were 13 airframes in Hagerstown, Maryland. We . . . were to proceed with six of my pilots and transition accordingly—out of the parking lot. Very exciting." 10 It looked like a winner.

NATIONAL MUSEUM OF THE U.S. AIR FORCE

Lynn Bollinger, Helio Aircraft Corporation's president, thought his Helio Stallion would be competitive with the Pilatus Porter and wrote a "Dear Bob" letter to a friend . . . Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara.

This was not a major expensive procurement of a high-tech, exotic fighter or bomber. It was a program that had so many obvious benefits, all involved felt good, especially since the cost was relatively minor. It was a great way to get "more bang for the buck." And then, the bubble burst. Suddenly, the program was dead.

The Navy/Marine Corps officers involved in implementing the acquisition program found that all support in the Office of the Secretary of Defense had evaporated. The non-competitive program came to a screeching halt under orders from Secretary McNamara, the highest civil authority in the Pentagon. Subsequent research of the files revealed that he had received to pressure from a former associate, Lynn Bollinger, who headed the Helio Aircraft Corporation, which produced a light liaison aircraft for the Air Force. Bollinger wrote a simple "Dear Bob" letter to McNamara protesting the non-competitive aspects, contending that he had a plane under development that could do the job, and wanted support. 11 As for his development aircraft, Lieutenant Colonel Purcell went to the trouble of flying the Helio aircraft and found it completely unacceptable, a "dog" in the vernacular of combat pilots. When contacted, the former Secretary said that he did not recall the incident although he did vaguely remember meeting someone named Bollinger at Harvard in the early 1940s. He expressed doubt that such a small program would have risen to his level for a decision unless it involved some widening of the war. This one did not.

Bollinger's actions also involved traditional lobbying with Congress, and he was effective, convincing at least one congressman to question the non-competitive procurement action officially. Bollinger kept Secretary McNamara informed of his actions by phone. 12 Obviously, he reasoned that if the Navy procured the Pilatus Porter, even as an interim emergency measure, his own aircraft program would be in jeopardy for future orders. This probably was correct. He took advantage of his personal association with the Secretary of Defense to try to kill the competition, and he was successful. The official demise came in a memo to the Secretary of the Navy from the Secretary of Defense on 20 December 1967, when the sole source procurement action was terminated. 13

The Joint Chiefs of Staff continued to support the program and tried to keep it alive with a recommendation to the Secretary of Defense in early February 1968 that he "approve sole-source procurement to permit the fastest possible deployment of the OV-12A to SVN [South Vietnam] for support of Game Warden" (the brown-water Navy). 14 But sole source was denied again, and the program was dead.

Understandably, Lieutenant Colonel Purcell was perturbed. The cancellation action contributed to his early voluntary retirement from active duty, in spite of the fact that he was about to be selected for promotion to the rank of colonel. Captain Jack French, the prospective commanding officer of the planned squadron, missed out on an assignment that would have kept his career moving forward, as he eagerly anticipated command of this special unit that many believed would have made major contributions to this new kind of naval warfare. Ironically, following retirement, he spent quite a bit of time flying floatplanes in the Alaskan theater. But those were minor considerations. The real issue was the loss of a significant war-fighting capability for the PBR task force when it was desperately needed. The entire brown-water Navy lost more than 2,500 men during the Vietnam campaign. How many lives might have been saved with the implementation of this program action? To quote one leader of the brown-water Navy who commanded a Task Group in the latter phases of the war, "To think of how many of these young warriors could have been spared if we would have had fixed wing assets two years earlier just blows my mind!" 15

The late Admiral Thomas Moorer was the Chief of Naval Operations at the time. A hallmark of his career was his intense concern about "his crew." He preached that with authority comes responsibility and the first responsibility of one with authority is to "take care of your crew." He knew about the Pilatus Porter program and when it was cancelled, he sent for Lieutenant Colonel Purcell, asking for a detailed debrief of the case. Then he asked for a written report, to be delivered directly to him, not through any chain of command. The report was delivered as ordered. On 21 March 1968, Admiral Moorer sent a memorandum to Secretary of the Navy Paul Nitze, appealing the case and recommending procurement of the OV-12A. 16 Admiral Moorer was the highest military authority in the Navy, destined to become the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and yet he could not reverse the combined action of the civil authority in the executive and legislative branches of the government for an interim emergency procurement requiring an outlay of $3 million. It is a sad chapter in the civil/military authority history of our armed services, particularly when compared to the authority vested in Admiral Ernest King during World War II.

U.S. NAVY

Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara—at right, watching carrier operations with President Lyndon Johnson—effectively ended the Navy's Pilatus Porter program.

Facing the denial for sole-source procurement, the Navy struggled on with its existing helo assets. Eventually, a larger fixed-wing close-support aircraft, the OV-10 Bronco, arrived on the scene, but long after the Pilatus Porter opportunity had been negated.

In spring 1972, almost five years after the emergency had come and gone, the Air Force completed a competitive evaluation of the Porter, then termed the Fairchild AU-23A "Peacemaker" and the Helio Aircraft's AU-24A "Stallion." Both aircraft were rejected because they did not meet the needs of the Air Force, which were certainly different from those of the brown-water Navy. Eventually, the few military Peacemakers acquired for test and evaluation went to Thailand under the Military Assistant Program, for use in border surveillance and counter infiltration roles. The Stallions went to Cambodia for a similar mission. 17 The Porter remains in production, with many in service around the world performing a multitude of missions. 18

There are still naval persons alive who will never forgive the civil authority for the cancellation of this program. It did not improve the relations between some naval aviation leaders and the civil authority in the Pentagon. But even so, those leaders would undoubtedly fight to preserve the traditional civil authority concept. After all, not all members of the civil authority in the Pentagon and the Congress have turned their backs on military judgment, especially in time of war.

1. Robert S. Greeley, "Stringing the McNamara Line," Naval History , August 1997, p. 60. back to article
2. Project Trim: the coupling of an experimental target detection system with the aging Lockheed P2V Neptune aircraft. back to article
3. Cdr. David G. Tyler, USNR, "Seawolves Roll in across the Mekong Delta," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings , January 2002, p. 46. back to article
4. Tyler, "Seawolves . . . ," p. 47. back to article
5. CinCPac Message 022329Z to the JCS dated 2 December 1967. back to article
6. Tyler, "Seawolves . . . ," p. 47. back to article
7. Tyler, "Seawolves . . . ," p. 47. back to article
8. U.S. Air Force Museum Internet Web site: http://www.wpafb.af.mil/museum/research/attack/attack/a6/a6-41.htm. back to article
9. E-mail to author from Capt. Allen Weseleskey, USN (Ret.), dated 3/16/03. back to article
10. E-mail to author from Capt. Jack French, USN (Ret.), dated 1/14/03. back to article
11. "Personal" letter from Lynn Bollinger, Chairman of the Helio Aircraft Corporation, to Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, dated 6 December 1967. back to article
12. Memo of 15 December 1967 by Mr. Lynn Bollinger to "Bob," (McNamara) referring to "our telephone discussion this evening." back to article
13. Secretary of Defense McNamara Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy, dated 20 December 1967. back to article
14. Memorandum JCSM-79-68 of 2/3/68 from the JCS to the Secretary of Defense. back to article
15. E-mail to author from Capt. Jerry Wages, USN (Ret.), dated 3/21/03. back to article
16. CNO Memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy, dated 3/21/68. back to article
17. U.S. Air Force Museum Internet Web site: http://www.wpafb.af.mil/museum/research/attack/attack/a6/a6-41.htm. back to article
18. Internet search "Google," then "Pilatus Porter" for a review of current status. back to article

Vice Admiral Miller, a frequent contributor to U.S. Naval Institute publications, was involved with naval aviation requirements for six years during the Vietnam War.