H. Thomas Hayden was formerly the President and CEO of First Communications Company (FCC), Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, a joint venture between Raytheon and a Saudi Company involved in Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) Systems for the Ministry of Defense and Aviation, Saudi Arabian National Guard and Ministry of Interior. Before retiring from the US Marine Corps, assignments included Commanding Officer (CO), Headquarters and Service Bn, 1st Force Service Support Group, which deployed to the Gulf War, CO Brigade Service Support Group – 9, which deployed to Somalia and CO MAU Service Support Group – 33, which deployed to The Philippines and Korea. He was Branch Head, Headquarters Marine Corps, Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC), and Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for SO/LIC with assignments to Central America. He has participated in combat operations or contingency operations in the Republic of Vietnam, Central America, Gulf War, Somalia, and Colombia. Tom has a MBA, MA in International Relations, and a PhD candidate in Business Management. He is the author of two books and is currently writing a third: SHADOW WAR: Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict; WARFIGHTING: Maneuver Warfare in the US Marine Corps. He has published over 40 articles and has been awarded the Navy League’s Alfred Thayer Mahan award for literary achievement.
There will be little mind meld with Iraqis or many other Arabs for that matter any time soon.
December 22, 2003
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Iraqi Muslim extremist who believe that they have a holy mission from God will not be inclined to listen to many Western messages let alone be amiable to persuasion to accept Western ideals.
The term "wining the hearts and minds" of insurgents was first coined by the British after World War II, in efforts to put down the insurgencies in their former colonies.
The US authorities in Vietnam picked up the term and made it a focal point of their counterinsurgency program in the Vietnamese provinces.
It usually meant that there had to be programs and projects that would help the people and win their "hearts and minds" to the government side.
In Vietnam it was attempted in many ways. One of the most popular was conducting MedCAPs (Medical Civic Action Programs). Others included protecting the harvest from the insurgents, or helping re-establish local village elections. Another measure is a large influx of civic action projects like building schools, water wells, health clinics, etc. However, any civic action program designed to win "hearts and minds" is doomed to failure without security for the population. The most successful means of doing this was through local Popular Forces and a 52-man Revolutionary Development Team.
Civic action or developmental programs goes much further with local indigenous forces rather than foreigners.
There was one case in Vietnam where the US Army would build a local school for one village and the Viet Cong would blow it up shortly thereafter. The Army rebuilt the school more than once and finally someone asked the villagers why they did not protect the school. The answer was simple - the Americans built the school, let them protect it.
A recent article in the BOSTON GLOBE, December 18, 2003, by Stephen J. Glain, reported: "A US Army study …suggests little progress has been made in winning over Iraqi hearts and minds and reveals what critics say is a rigid and backward-looking approach to US efforts to rebuild the country and introduce democracy."
While the US Army study has hit the mark in recognizing that the US has not begun to really win hearts and minds, their recommendation to resolve this problem is way off. The report recommends officials begin broadcasts of "Arabic-subtitled programming about US history and culture…"
If there is anything the Iraqis do not want is to be inundated with more US "culture." They already deeply resent the deluge of American TV shows and movies, American news domination of their TV channels, and American business conglomerates.
In one area that is absolutely correct, as reported in The BOSTON GLOBE, the study suggested that the Americans missed an opportunity to counter the insurgents' aims by not working with Iraq's tribal leaders immediately after major combat operations ended.
A major mistake in Iraq has been the US introduction of so called "exiled" Iraqi leaders such as Ahmad Chalabi.
Chalabi is now one of the appointed members of the "interim ruling council" who claims that he can lead Iraq. He is a wealthy businessman who has been out of Iraq for some time and has no connection with long established Iraqi tribal leaders or Baghdad businessmen.
Another mistake is trying to use the capture of Saddam Hussein in promoting the American message. This can easily backfire when one starts to associate one dictatorship being replaced by another - the "occupying powers."
Arab broadcast from TV stations like Al Jazeera, is making much to do about the US failure to understand Iraqi, Muslim and Arabic culture.
Al Qaeda organizers have not lost the point that the Iraqis want to make their own decisions for the future of their homeland and are gaining many supporters to fight the "occupation."
It might be important to remember that Iraq is not a homogenous nation. There may have to be three different messages to winning Iraqi support for any new government - one for the Kurds, one for the Shi'ites and one for the Sunnis. This does not imply that there has to be three individual approaches to each. There can be a particular spin that appeals to each but is directed to the establishment of one nation.
It is conceivable that a more cooperative and less overbearing "occupation" by the Coalition might have produced more Iraqi support, even in the Arab world. No one in Iraq or the Arab world was "shocked and awed" by the American military. Everyone in the world already knows that the US is the meanest SOB in the valley and all others must act accordingly. A recent Council on Foreign Relations Task Force on public diplomacy concluded: "…there is little doubt that stereotypes of Americans as arrogant, self-indulgent, hypocritical, inattentive, and unwilling or unable to engage in cross-cultural dialogue are pervasive and deep rooted."
Any overture to Iraqi leaders must begin with a realistic recognition of Iraqi skepticism of US intentions. They do not confuse the removal of Saddam with the potential impact on the Western economy from Iraqi oil.
No amount of US dialogue with Iraqis, or other Arabs, will change their opinion about the US, unless there are tangible changes in US foreign policy toward the Middle East. What is needed in Iraq, and much of the Middle East, is a fundamentally different approach to all Arabs, one that speaks with them, rather than at them; one that tries to engage and empower rather than manipulate different factions.
It is doubtful, at the present, that even Dr. Spock, from the Starship Enterprise, could help "mind meld" the US and the Iraqis in winning "hearts and minds."
