H. Thomas Hayden was formerly the President and CEO of First Communications Company (FCC), Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, a joint venture between Raytheon and a Saudi Company involved in Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) Systems for the Ministry of Defense and Aviation, Saudi Arabian National Guard and Ministry of Interior. Before retiring from the US Marine Corps, assignments included Commanding Officer (CO), Headquarters and Service Bn, 1st Force Service Support Group, which deployed to the Gulf War, CO Brigade Service Support Group – 9, which deployed to Somalia and CO MAU Service Support Group – 33, which deployed to The Philippines and Korea. He was Branch Head, Headquarters Marine Corps, Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC), and Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for SO/LIC with assignments to Central America. He has participated in combat operations or contingency operations in the Republic of Vietnam, Central America, Gulf War, Somalia, and Columbia. Tom has a MBA, MA in International Relations, and a PhD candidate in Business Management. He is the author of two books and is currently writing a third: SHADOW WAR: Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict; WARFIGHTING: Maneuver Warfare in the US Marine Corps. He has published over 40 articles and has been awarded the Navy League’s Alfred Thayer Mahan award for literary achievement.
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This is not altogether a book report. This is mainly an acknowledgement from one "talking head" and columnist, that I was wrong about Gen. Tommy Franks. He is a real American hero.
History will prove that Gen. Franks ranks with the greatest American military wartime generals. His understanding and application of the theory of warfare, his dealings with his American civilian superiors, his planning and execution of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, his love for his troops, and his successes, make him one of the best.
Gen. Frank's new book, American Soldier: General Tommy Franks, answers a lot of questions for this writer as to what and why he did certain things in Afghanistan and Iraq.
In this highly recommend book, Franks takes the reader through his childhood and his military career from an enlisted man, then officer with assignment to Vietnam as an artillery forward observer with the infantry, through the Gulf War where he was Assistant Division Commander for Operations with the 1st Calvary Division, then 2nd Infantry Division command, then 3rd Army command and then US Central Command (USCENTCOM), Commander-in- Chief.
The reader is given a first hand look inside the Deployed Operations Center for USCENTCOM and all the day-to-day planning before, during and after hostilities. We learn about all the hard planning that went into the revised Contingency Plan 1003, which Franks thought was a remake of Operation Desert Storm II (which he rejected), and one of the highlights of the book is his revelation of his relationship with the Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld. Additionally, we are treated to first hand reports on the guidance and concerns from President George Bush.
In his book, with Operations Plan 1003V, I learned how he achieved a great tactical surprise with what I thought was meager troop strength, only 170,000 for the initial invasion. Also, I learned why he left the 4th Infantry Division setting on boats off Turkey even after the Turks had given a final NO to our request for transit through Turkey and the 3d Infantry Division and the 1st Marine Divisions were slogging their way toward Baghdad.
I knew 170,000 troops with total air control could well defeat the Iraqi army but though it would not do for the reconstruction and "occupation" of Iraq. Franks admits that he had a plan for Phase IV, "Post-Hostilities Operations," but he says that his expectations for Phase IV were not met with the resources he thought would be made available to him.
The initial defeat of the Taliban and Al Qaeda, was a masterful combination of unconventional forces and conventional forces. For the first time in history, both the CIA and the SOF was under the command and control of the Theater commander. During WW II, the OSS was not under Gen. Eisenhower and not until Desert Storm did SOF units come under the CinC.
In Afghanistan, Gen. Franks developed an operations plan to combined all elements of US combat power, coordinated with foreign guerillas forces and diplomatic efforts in the region, to defeat a hardcore, fanatical regime that had defeated the Soviets.
Operation Enduring Freedom, in Afghanistan, was a brilliant plan, brilliantly executed.
Planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom, while still fully committed in Afghanistan, was very difficult, to say the least.
There were four phase to Frank's Operation Iraqi Freedom: "Phase I - Preparation, Phase II - Shape the Battlefield, Phase III - Decisive Operation, and Phase IV - Post-Hostilities Operations. In Phase I, the end state included establishing an "air bridge" to transport forces into the region, without causing alarm in Baghdad, and securing regional and international support. Phase II was to shape the battlespace before ground operations would begin. Phase III was to defeat the Iraqi forces AND remove the Saddam Hussein regime. Phase IV was understood to be extremely difficult and would be measured in years and not months.
Franks understood that warfighting is part art and part science. Franks understood the art of war and he understood that just as in physics, the effects of mass increased with velocity. Many of my former Marine Corps associates would think this heresy, but I totally agree.
Franks was guided by the words of Winston Churchill; " Battles are won by slaughter and maneuver. The greater the general, the more he contributes in maneuver, the less he demands in slaughter." Franks put faith in maneuver.
In one disappointing passage, it is revealed that Franks and his staff were not prepared for the unconventional forces that had been organized by the Hussein family.
Most analysts who studied the Iraqi regime, knew that there would be four kinds of diehard Ba'athist loyalists: (1) the Iraqi Intelligence Service (Mukhabarat), (2) the Special Security Organization (Al Amn al-Khas), (3) the Republican Guards, and (4) the Fadayeen. Known collectively as the Fadayeen, they are irregular/unconventional forces, ill-trained but fanatical regime loyalists like the Al Quds, local Ba'ath militia, and even the "Lions of Saddam" (Sunni boys, eighteen and under).
Franks reveals that the staff had correctly estimated that "there might be up to 40,000 of these Fadayeen-type irregulars" who might conduct urban warfare in Baghdad: "but at no point had I though these forces would move south and fight as guerrillas."
The tenacity, ferocity and ruthlessness of the Fadayeen seem to surprise all at USCENTCOM. The Fadayeen's weapons of choice were armed pickup trucks. They attacked M-1 tanks and Bradley armored vehicles with nothing but AK-47s and RPGs. Even when they crashed into the tanks or personnel carriers, the Fadayeen would leap on the tacks and fire into the armored-glass observation positions only to be swept off the US vehicles but machinegun fire form a trailing track.
The Fadayeen are continuing today with "foreign fighters," to harass and attack Coalition positions and Iraqi police or political figures.
A surprising passage tells of an American double agent called "April Fool," who had been ostensibly recruited by an Iraqi colonel from the Mukhabarat. This officer proved very helpful in Frank's deception plan and the employment of the 4th Infantry Division.
Through out the book, Franks spells out the problems dealing with an insatiable press, even when they got the story wrong. His philosophy and attitude toward the press should be required reading for all general officers who seek high command positions.
American Soldier is filled with revelations not seen in the press or on TV. Franks speaks frankly about Intelligence shortcomings and the credible WMD threats - including 11th hour warnings from the leaders of Egypt and Jordan.
His Epilogue is worth the price of the book. Franks tells why we had the 9/11 attacks after decades of doing nothing since the Beirut bombing of the Marine Corps headquarters building and the bug out of Somalia.
Few wartime leaders reveal as much about themselves and the history they made as they walked on this earth.
