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September 15, 2005
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By Raymond Perry
The Los Angeles-class nuclear submarine USS Philadelphia ( SSN 690) recently collided with the M/V Yaso Aysen, a Turkish merchant ship. The collision occurred at about 2 am on the morning of September 5 about 30 miles off the coast of Bahrain, a tiny Arab island emirate in the Persian Gulf near Saudi Arabia. Damage initially was reported as minor, with both ships remaining seaworthy. After a brief delay the Philadelphia continued on to her scheduled port call in Bahrain, Navy officials confirmed.
It is the second time the Philadelphia has been involved in a collision. On September 29, 1977 at Groton, Conn. the Philadelphia and the submarine USS Archerfish ( SSN 678) collided stern to stern at slow speeds at the Groton Submarine Base, with minor damage reported. The Philadelphia is the third of her class to be ordered and the first to be delivered to the U.S. Navy submarine fleet when she was commissioned by the Navy on June 25, 1977, Navy records show.
The New London Day newspaper reported September 10 that the ships were entangled by the collision and took over an hour to separate. Initial reports after the accident indicated that damage to both vessels was minor. Note that prudent seamanship calls for two ships entangled after a collision to remain together until their damage assessment assures that separation won't result in one, or both, sinking.
The later reports indicate that the Yaso Aysen approached the USS Philadelphia from the submarine's port quarter and overrode the submarine, damaging the screw and rudder, the sailplanes, a periscope and denting Philadelphia's hull.
The dent in Philadelphia's hull required no small force and probably indicates that the Yaso Aysen did not slacken her speed prior to impact. This impact likely induced a roll to starboard in the Philadelphia. The periscope damage appears curious, but given the severe impact probably occurred during Philadelphia's snap back from the roll of the initial impact.
Yaso Aysen reportedly sustained damage under water and a slice from Philadelphia's sailplane.
Clearly, damage to both ships is significant, the latest reports indicate.
As best can be determined the Yaso Aysen was overtaking the Philadelphia. Under the Rules of the Road by which vessels at sea govern their operations, this placed the responsibility for avoiding collision on the Yaso Aysen.
At the same time, these rules place responsibility to remain on course on the Philadelphia. Only when collision became nearly unavoidable could Philadelphia legitimately alter her course. Although submariners routinely maneuver early on to ensure that a collision won't occur.
So, what will be the impact on the Philadelphia and her crew?
Will this end her Skipper's career? This depends on the judgment of the investigators on Philadelphia. There is potential for the Philadelphia's captain, CDR Stephen M. Oxholm, to survive the potential blow to his career.
Perhaps the real question is how a large ship like the 625-foot, 52,000 ton vessel like the Yaso Aysen could get so close to a submarine without any maneuver to prevent collision?
Maybe it was because it gets awfully dark at sea on some nights and ships are normally almost silent. My suspicion is that Philadelphia was not using her radar in order to make identification as a US submarine more difficult for those that would do her harm. Philadelphia's sonar should have detected the Yaso Aysen and shown a constant bearing, a clear caution to Philadelphia.
I have observed many merchant vessels operating in a clearly unsafe manner. They will steam right through a group of small ships or boats expecting them to get out of the way. The small ships always do. This "small boat" didn't. Instead, Philadelphia observed the Rules of the Road.
In the "open ocean," merchants frequently don't have anyone on the bridge, the steering is on autopilot, and unless the radar alarm indicates another ship is within a few miles, no one is looking. Whether Yaso Aysen thought she was "open ocean" remains to be seen, but the nature of damage causes the inference that Yaso Aysen did not slacken her speed and therefore was not watching carefully, consistent with "open ocean" piloting.
Would Philadelphia have displayed her Submarine Identification Beacon? This is sometimes not done since it also identifies the ship as a submarine. After all stealth is the raison detrè of a submarine, even while surfaced.
One news article addressed the lights that are required to be displayed by Philadelphia, her "running lights". These might have been an issue. Sometimes such lights don't work after a long time underwater.
If Philadelphia's lights were an issue, this might shift responsibility from the Yaso Aysen to the Philadelphia, but then, these lights are well designed and usually work. In any event, if running lights were working properly on Philadelphia, the collision could, and should, have been avoided. If Yaso Aysen were not showing running lights, that would clearly place liability on her.
Philadelphia's Officer of the Deck, the one man immediately responsible on the sub for avoiding collision, will likely take a hit. It depends on what the investigation shows of his actions. There might also be a subordinate on Philadelphia that might share direct responsibility with the Officer of the Deck.
The one element that will affect CDR Oxholm's future is the Submariner's Professional Ethos, which tells submarine skippers to maneuver early on to avoid collision regardless of the rules of the road. This is because a submarine is always more vulnerable to damage than a surface ship.
Thus, depending on what the investigating team discovers, CDR Oxholm's superiors might take a dim view of his ship colliding with another. Yet, unless the investigators discover some kind of culpable negligence or an intentional act that flies in the face of prudent seamanship, I believe that CDR Oxholm will ultimately survive.
©2005 DefenseWatch. Lt. Raymond Perry
USN (Ret.) is a DefenseWatch Contributing Editor. He can be reached
at cos1stlt@yahoo.com.
Please send Feedback responses to dwfeedback@yahoo.com.
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