This article is courtesy of Soldier of
Fortune, a military/adventure publication.
The magazine specializes in first-person reporting
from armed conflicts around the globe, with
emphasis on current military activities, developments,
special units, weapons, tactics, politics
and history. Its writers include experienced
professionals, including former military and
frequent Soldier of Fortune readers.
It is often said that the Algerian War was
to France what the Vietnam war was to the
U.S. In 1954, France was still reeling from
its defeat at Dien Bien Phu when the French
Foreign Legion was deployed to Algeria.
By 1956, half-amillion French soldiers were
stationed in Algeria. A total of 1.7 million
French soldiers fought in the Algerian war:
25,000 died and 60,000 were wounded. It
is estimated that more than half - a-million
Algerians died.
The French military won the war on the ground
but lost in the political circles in France.
The public, which heard of the wide use
of torture and summary executions, launched
violent mass demonstrations. In the aftermath
of Vietnam and Algeria, France was threatened
with civil war. In 1959, French President
Charles de Gaulle decided to allow Algeria
to become sovereign. The French generals
organized a coup in 1961, demanding that
"Algeria must stay French." The coup failed.
The violent reactions in France to the unpopular
war signaled its end in 1962.
General Aussaresses’ book has reignited
the unresolved, fiery debate of the policies
of the government and military in the Algerian
war.
The stage for his book was set late 2000,
when Algerian independence advocate, Louisetta
Ighil Ahgiz, told the French journal Le
Monde of her torture in 1957 after being
apprehended by the French: She was subsequently
tortured for three months.
"I express regrets, regrets, regrets, but
I cannot express remorse. That implies guilt,”
Aussaresses told AP. "I consider I did the
difficult duty of a soldier carrying out
a difficult mission".
"Everybody knew. Everybody knew,” he
said. "We reported not directly to the government
but to the local authorities, including
to the government’s direct representative,
the governor of Algeria."
"The situation was explosive. There were
threats of bomb attacks on all sides. I
needed information, to gain time and I couldn’t
afford to hesitate. Torture is very effective.
Most people break and talk. Afterwards,
for the most part, we would finish them
off. Individual human lives count little
for me, including my own. I was tough on
my enemies, but also on myself," He said.
Prime Minister Lionel Jospin said he was
"deeply shocked" by the account. French
President Jacques Chirac was "horrified"
at the declarations of General Aussaresses
and condemns the atrocities, acts of torture
and summary executions.
Aussaresses’ Legion of Honor, the highest
honor in the French military, has been revoked.
The military is concerned that its reputation
has been smeared. The French Cabinet formally
forced him out of the army, the first time
that such a disciplinary action had been
taken in 20 years. He can no longer appear
in military uniform.
The Paris-based League of Human Rights filed
a lawsuit against the General for being
an apologist for crimes and war crimes.
International Human Rights Federation wants
the general to be charged with crimes against
humanity. An Algerian court has accepted
a suit filed by the relatives of an FLN
fighter they alleged died after being tortured
by Aussaresses. A parliamentary commission
of inquest has been established.
General Jacques Norlain wrote that "soldiers
wage war on the orders of politicians and
together with terror victims are among the
only people to die for faults they did not
commit."
Apparently, soldiers have to wage the war
in the courts and the public arena. Alone.
-- Martin Brass
By Martin Brass Soldier of Fortune Magazine
Note: This article was first published in late 2001. International Law, and French and U.S. law have changed since the Algerian-French conflict. Updates will follow in future articles.
The United States is being forced to face one of the most difficult
decisions of its relatively brief history: how to deal with terrorists
that have infiltrated not only the United States, but dozens of other
industrialized nations. Time is of the essence. Americans anxiously
wait in trepidation, hoping for the best, but expecting the worst.
That is terror. But the alternatives are equally shocking. The effectiveness
of massive military retaliation is uncertain, and civilian deaths
are inevitable. There is resistance to the United States suffering
the casualties involved in another foreign ground war.
Once more SOF dares to tread in what may appear to be unspeakable
territory — looking to history to see how one modern country, faced with
terrorist attacks against its citizens, dealt with the situation.
In Morocco in 1942, an air force officer, Captain Delmas,
had warned Paul Aussaresses: "Do you know what you
risk in entering the special services?"
"Yes, my captain, I risk being killed."
"My poor sir, when you are killed, you are
relieved, because you may be tortured before
you are blown away. Torture, you
see, is less merciful than death."
Captain Paul Aussaresses subsequently
was briefed by the Chief
of Police of Algiers, in 1955.
"Imagine for an instant that you
are opposed to the concept of torture and you
arrest someone who is clearly implicated in the
preparation of a terrorist attack. The suspect refuses
to talk. You do not insist. A particularly murderous attack is
launched. What will you say to the parents of the victims, to the
parents of an infant, for example, mutilated by the bomb to justify
the fact that you did not utilize all means to make the suspect talk?"
"I would not like to find myself in such a situation,”
Aussaresses responded.
"Yes, but conduct yourself always as if you will, and you will
see which is the most difficult: to torture a confirmed terrorist
or explain to the parents of the victims that it is better
to allow dozens of innocents to die, than to make one who is
culpable suffer."
After a moment of meditation, Aussaresses cast aside his
last reservations, concluding that no one had the right to
judge him, even if his responsibilities forced him to conduct
disagreeable actions, and he would never have any regrets.
Aussaresses, then 35 years old, was the intelligence official
in charge of liquidating the Front Liberation Nationale
(FLN). The FLN was conducting a savage insurrection that
targeted the French colonists (Pied Noir) in Algeria. Many
Pied Noir had already been terrorized, assassinated, or
mutilated.
Algeria, a colony of France for 132 years, was explosive.
Terror reigned. "I will not allow negotiations with the enemy
of the nation. The only negotiation is war," Francois
Mitterand, Secretary of the Interior, had declared November
1954.
In a book published 3 May 2001, Services Speciaux,
Algerie 1955-57, Aussaresses graphically details the wide use
of torture and summary execution of the members and supporters
of the FLN by the Algerian police and French military
during the Algerian revolution.
The French government ordered the liquidation of the
FLN and to suppress the rebels by "any means, any possible
means," Aussaresses emphasized.
The Algerian police were not equipped for such a mission.
Nor was the regular French army. The French Government
ordered the French Parachutists to Algeria and gave them
carte blanche to destroy the FLN.
The situation in Philippeville, a city of 21,000 inhabitants,
in the sector Nord Constantinois, where the FLN was headquartered,
was about to ignite. Hundreds of thousands of
French colonists (Pied Noir) remained in Algeria.
The Philippeville police maintained that torture was the
most effective method to elicit information from an uncooperative
terrorist, who, in the name of an ideal, was willing to
shed the blood of the innocent. Timely information could
save dozens of lives.
The police made no apologies. Nor does Aussaresses.
SOF met with the 83-year-old General Aussaresses in a
Parisian hotel that had been a contact point for the Nazi party
during the Nazi occupation of Paris in World War II. Cold
War intrigue still hung in the air. Aussauresses appeared to
be "neither an executioner, nor a monster, but an ordinary
man." And that is also how he characterized the Algerian
police who trained him in torture techniques in 1955.
"You admitted to torturing and killing 24 men yourself.
Why torture?" asked SOF.
"The FLN were involved in a savage terrorist movement,"
Aussaresses said. "My role in Algeria was a struggle against
unbridled terrorism — blind attacks against the innocent.
The conflict was not Algerians vs. French. The fight was not
a political one nor was it an ideological one. That holds no
interest for me. Most Algerians, as well, were not interested
in political problems. They only wanted to be able to go out
on the streets and live in peace.
"I, who judge no one … often ask, considering what happens
in a city [French] today — with those blind attacks
which decimate the innocent — why someone does not
understand within a few weeks that the high authorities must
utilize all means in order to put an end to the terror?"
I have been called a murderer, a monster, a communist …
I am a patriot. I take full responsibility for my actions. I do not
seek to justify my actions but simply try to explain that from
the moment when a nation demands of its army to fight an
enemy that terrorizes the population and
forces it into submission, it is impossible for
the army not to resort to extreme means.
"In the profession I chose, I had killed.
I had often thought that I would be tortured
some day. But I never imagined that I
would torture.
"Having opted for a military career and
for Charles de Gaulle, I became a special
agent. In the interest of my country I had
clandestinely carried out operations unacceptable
to the ordinary moral standards,
had often circumvented the law: stolen,
assassinated, vandalized, and terrorized. I had learned how
to pick locks, kill without leaving traces, lie, be indifferent
to my suffering and to that of others, had forgotten and
made others forget. All for France.
"I had interrogated prisoners, but I had never tortured,"
Aussaresses said. "I had heard that such procedures were utilized
in Indochina, but only in exceptional circumstances.”
"Each time I jumped in a clandestine mission at night," he
recalls, "I imagined that I might be tortured, burned to death
by the enemy, or have my fingers or teeth torn out, as was done
to a comrade ... I imagined the firing squad. I would never
accept a mask on my eyes. The door of
the plane would open and I would only
see the silence and the emptiness.”
"I never tortured or executed the
innocents or children — only the terrorists
who had made a choice and
were implicated in the attacks. For
each bomb, there was one who manufactured
it, one who transported it —
maybe twenty persons at a time. For
each the responsibility was overwhelming
even if they were simply
links in a long chain."
Torture
Aussaresses recalls his transformation
into an intelligence officer in
Philippeville.
"It is good that you come from the
special services. I have need for an
intelligence officer," Colonel
Cockborne, who commanded the unit
in Algeria, welcomed him.
"I also am pleased with such a coincidence,"
Aussaresses smiled, in
return. "Except there is one problem."
`What is that?”
"You have been misinformed. I am not an intelligence specialist.
My background is in Special Operations.”
"I know perfectly well your experience and I am sure you
will adapt swiftly. As for action, I guarantee you plenty.
Although the town is calm, the countryside is aflame. Our
battalions are fighting, the rebels attacking the villages and
isolated farms, pillaging and assassinating the pied-noir."
General Jacques
Massu (left).
"I had lost a number of friends on the battlefield in Dien
Bien Phu and I had no desire to revisit that nightmare,”
Aussaresses told SOF. In Indochina, he had been a member
of the 1st regiment of Paras, which at first consisted of three
battalions. The second battalion, of which he had been a
member, had been so decimated — 70% losses — that it had
been dissolved. The French base at in Dien Bien Phu, composed
of 16,000 men, had fallen 7 May
1954 after a fierce resistance that
marked the beginning of the end of the
French intervention in Viet Nam. The
two remaining battalions were deployed
to Philippeville, Algeria, in 1955. A third
battalion of French Foreign Legionnaires
reinforced them. Aussaresses was
ordered to join them.
The terrorist attacks accelerated. On
18 June 1955, seven bombs exploded
simultaneously. A colonist walking down
the street was axed to death by a Moslem
he knew. He identified his assailant
before he died. Ausauresses attempted to
extract information from the murderer to
prevent further attacks. He tortured for
the first time.
"I thought of nothing. I had no
remorse for his death. If I regretted anything,
it was that he refused to talk before
he died. He had used violence against a
person who was not his enemy. He got
what he deserved. Had his victim been
military personnel, I would have understood.
I had neither hate nor pity. The situation
was urgent ..."
The methods employed were always the same: beatings,
electricity, water. Beatings often sufficed. Le gengene consisted
of torture with electricity. Electrodes were applied to the
ears or the testicles with increasing intensity. Or, water was
poured over the face until the prisoner spoke or drowned.
Some prisoners spoke freely. For others, several beatings
were sufficient. It was only in the event that the prisoner
refused to talk or tried to conceal evidence that torture was
utilized. The officers tortured personally so the young soldiers
would not get their hands dirty. Many were incapable.
His commander, Colonel Cockborne, was one of those who
"were more fragile than the victims." After Aussaresses had
been in Algeria for some time, Cockborne called Aussaresses
in to question him regarding the use of torture.
"Are you sure there are no other means to make
men speak?”
"More Rapid?"
"That is not what I meant”
"I know, my colonel, what you mean. More proper.
If I shared your point of view, my colonel, I
could not accomplish the mission that you have
given me. I cannot think in terms of morals, rather
need to think in terms of efficiency. Blood flows
here daily.
"And what do you do to your suspects?”
"After they talk?"
"Exactly?"
"If they are loyal to the terrorists, I assassinate
them."
"But you must consider that the entire FLN is
associated with terrorism."
"I agree."
"Would it not be better to remit them to the justice
system before executing them? One cannot
eliminate all the members of an organization.
That’s crazy."
"The French government has decided, my colonel.
The FLN are too numerous. The justice system is efficient in
times of peace. We are in Algeria and there is a war. You wanted
an intelligence agent? You have one, my colonel. ... our
mission demands the use of torture and summary executions.
It has only just begun.”
"It’s a dirty war. I don’t like it".
Colonel Cockborne did not last long in Algeria. He was
replaced by Colonel Mayer, a former Para in Indochina.
The Battle Of Philippeville
Aussaresses explained how he had learned to recruit
informers from the civilian populace while in Indochina, during
the war that was also called "the people’s war."
The Algerian police were faced with a mission impossible
as they lacked the intelligence, the capabilities, the organization
and the means.
Terrorist acts continued to escalate in Philippeville.
Aussaresses liased with the local intelligence service, the
gendarmerie, and the police. He enlisted the help of judges
and other government officials, politicians, intellectuals,
merchants, businessmen, attorneys, journalists, patrons of
the brothels, cafes and nightclubs. And often members of the
FLN ratted on each other.
Feverishly, Aussaresses made a list of all prominent people
and mandated a census of the population, sleeping only a
few hours a day, in a race for time.
Mid July 1955, Aussaresses had learned from the police
that there was a concentration of 3-5,000 guerillas in the
woods surrounding Philippeville. An Arab grocer informed
Aussaresses that he previously had sold a sack of flour every
three days. Now he was selling two tons at a time and was
paid in cash. That only meant that a large number of men
were gathering close to town in the hills and required large
amounts of food. His informants revealed that FLN agents
had infiltrated the city.
After a successful operation,
Ier REP troopers assemble small
arms captured from rebels.
A pharmacist informed Aussaresses
that an individual had purchased several
dozen bandages. His informers alerted
him to the fact that 20 August 1955
at noon the FLN would launch a massive
frontal attack of several thousand
strong against Philippeville. Zighoud
Youssef, 34 years old, chief of the FLN
in Nord Constantinois, had decided to
launch a spectacular, bloody action on
the second anniversary of the exile of
Mohamed V, sultan of Morocco. Youssef
sought world-wide attention and sympathy
in the wake of a UN resolution
promoted by seven Afro-Asian countries
including India, in favor of the
independence of Algeria.
Aussaresses was able to determine
the precise date, the hour, and the
operational order of the upcoming
attack.
Convincing his new chief Colonel
Mayer that the forewarnings were real
was another matter. Mayer did not
believe a word, yet did not dare to halt
a preemptive attack.
Aussaresses determined that the
FLN commandos had concealed themselves
in the basements and cellars.
"To be burdened for two days with
the prospect that there are hundreds of
murderers in town laid heavy on my
mind" Aussaresses said. His four hundred
men faced several thousand
rebels. The civilians were unsuspecting.
"Do not change any of your normal
routines. They will become suspicious."
Aussaresses told his men. "But at five
minutes before noon, everyone is to be
at his post, fingers on the trigger. When
the attack commences, open fire. Don’t
spare the ammunition. All weapons will
be locked and cocked. I will provide
reinforcements. When the frontal attack
has subsided, eliminate the guerrillas in
the cellars. No quarter will be given.”
That morning he took his scheduled
jump at 0300 then took breakfast on the
streets in his favorite bistro, ordering
his usual menu: espresso, fried eggs and
wine. The African sun was sweltering.
The radio frequency and telephone
lines were monitored by the FLN.
Captain Thomas’ second battalion six
kilometers south of Philippeville was
on high alert.
The police commissioner, Filiberti,
the number-two man of urban security,
arrived flanked by two bodyguards. "I
need your vehicle. Two of my men must
make an arrest at Acarriere, 2 kilometers
south of Philippeville close to the
second batallion."
Impossible. The clock was ticking.
The attack was to start in one hour.
The Commissioner insisted: "An hour
is plenty."
Aussaresses relented. He sent his
subordinates and ordered their immediate
return. Half an hour later Filiberti
returned. Aussaresses’ men, Issolah,
Misiry and the other two, were overrun
by a 500-man rebel unit. Fliberti flew
out of the car and gave the alarm.
A hundred meters away, a truck reeking
of gasoline was transporting Molotov
cocktails. Destination: the attack on
Philippeville. One of Aussaresses’ men
destroyed it with a grenade.
The encounter with the five French
troopers alerted the 18/2 Paras who
wiped out the entire rebel unit.
Unfortunately, the rebels had used
their own women and children as
human shields.
At noon, hell broke loose in the center
of Philippeville. Rebels and countryfolk,
poorly armed and members of
the FLN, well armed, advanced like a
parade. Although many of the 20 thousand
inhabitants of Phillipville were at
the beach, a catastrophe was imminent.
The rebels, who had been hiding
in the cellars and basements for two or
three days, attacked. The French
returned fire. Aussaussares and his
men came under machinegun fire by
FLN emerging from a hotel opposite
where he was located in his tactical
operational center in a bistro. The
assailants, surprised by the French
return fire, retreated to the hotel, still
firing. The paras were caught in crossfire
from the hotel across the street and
from rebels moving down the streets.
Aussaresses and Misiry blasted
rounds through the door. Cries were
heard from inside. Aussaress and
Misiry retreated to their TOC in a hail
of fire. The sound of hundreds of
bursting bottles in the bistro added to
the deafening gunfire.
The rebels returned to their hideouts,
still firing. "Don’t be heroes!,"
Ausaresses commanded his men. It
would be impossible to dislodge the
rebels with a frontal attack without
large losses. Aussaresses threw two
grenades into the FLN position, setting
the building on fire. Twenty men
emerged from the flaming cellar and
all were gunned down. As the battle
raged on a group of militant communist
party members ran, leaving 50
FLN behind.
As the FLN advanced down the main
street, the legionnaires picked them off
one after the other. When a rebel fell,
his comrades charged without searching
for cover. None retreated: 134
cadavers lay in the streets, along with
hundreds wounded. The demi brigade
gathered them up. A medic was killed
in searching for the wounded.
A rebel was treated in the hospital
without anesthesia. The pentethol
injected had no effect. Nor did the second.
The surgeons discovered that the
assailants were smoking kif.
By 1300 hours the battle was over.
The peasants who the FLN had recruited
were high on hashish, which
explained their bizarre suicidal attack.
"Their deaths meant no more to their
chief, Zighoud Youssef, than the French
civilians he had massacred.”
Aussaresses recounted.
The cadavers had been transferred
to a municipal stadium, where photos
were taken by local journalists. The
American journalists in Life magazine
explained that 134 poor prisoners were
executed by the "dastardly French
paratroopers.”
General Jacques Massu,
Commander of the French forces in
Algeria, received an extensive briefing
on the battle. Amazed that only two of
Aussaresses men had died while the
rebels lost 500 men, Massu recommended
promotion for the officers. His
supervisors in Paris did not share his
sentiment as the French public was
horrified by the killing. There was no
reward for the men of the second
brigade. Though they had saved thousands
of civilians from a disaster, the
Republic did not recognize them.
Without Aussauresses’ intelligence,
the populace of Philippeville would
more than likely have suffered the
same atrocities in d’El-Halia, where
Aussaresses had not anticipated an
attack.
d’El-Halia
Twenty-two kilometers east of
Philippeville, an isolated iron mine
complex had also been targeted by the
FLN. In the adjacent village of d’El-
Halia, two thousand Moslems lived
alongside a hundred and thirty
Europeans. Zighoud Youssef, local
head of the FLN, ordered all European
civilians killed. The goal was to terrorize
the French, who would initiate a
draconian repression against the
Algerians. That in turn would weld the
Moslem population against the
colonists and would ignite internation
al opinion against French repression.
The town was off guard.
Aussaresses did not believe the rebels
would attack a town where the
colonists trusted their Muslim comrades
implicitly, smoked kif with them,
and shared in all of their activities. Two
groups of rebels attacked and massacred
children and women tranquilly
having lunch. One citizen had alerted a
nearby military camp where rifles and
machine guns were kept, but tragedy
was in the making. The soldier who
had the key where the arms were
stashed was bathing at the beach.
Two miners escaped and alerted
Aussaresses. He immediately led a
reaction force which inflicted heavy
casualties on the rebels and captured
60 of them.
"Why did you kill your neighbors?"
Aussaresses asked one of them.
"Someone told me there would be no
risk. A representative of the FLN told us
that the Egyptians and Americans have
arrived to help us. They told us that it
was necessary to kill all the French. I
killed whomever I found.”
"I do not know what Allah thinks of
what you have done — you must go and
explain to him. You have killed the innocent
women and children. You also must
die. That is the law of the parachutists.
Aussaresses ordered their execution.
"I was indifferent.” He said, "I
was obliged to give the orders myself.
They had to be killed. That is all. And
we did it. We then pretended to leave
the mine area but in fact set up a wellconcealed
ambush. The fellaghas, as
expected, returned, and we took them
under fire. We took a hundred prisoners
who were killed at once.
Aussaresses surveyed the site several
days later. Babies had been crushed
against the wall. The women had been
raped, disembowled, and decapitated.
Aussaresses thought that he had forgotten
what pity was. The innocent
were killed by their neighbors with
whom they drank and smoked kif.
Other massacres occurred in El
Arouch, L’oued, Zenatti, Catinat,
Jemmapes in the same time frame.
Youssef, the FLN leader, was still at
large and Aussaresses learned that the
guerrilla chiefs were four nationalists
that had escaped from prison in 1952.
Police suggested publishing information
and photos of FLN guerilla chiefs
in French and in Arabic. A price was
put on the head of the principals —
seven names including Zighoud
Youssef and Petit Messaoud. The
leaflets with photos were dropped by
air. The campaign was met with great
success.
One suspect was apprehended.
Without torture, he spilled information
for three hours, attempting to describe
the location of the cave near the burned
forest where Youssef was hiding out.
Ground units could not determine the
precise location. An observation plane
targeted the general location of the
guerilla position outside of
Philippeville.
Aussaresses and his men immediately
mounted an operation with the
limited intelligence. They walked in
search of the camp for hours. One pretentious
Legion captain got fed up:
"Tell me, seargeant, your phony tip
is truly shitty. For hours we have been
on a wild goose chase with no results
How long will this circus continue?”
"A little patience my captain. The
informant is good. I’m sure.”
Shortly thereafter, they saw a rebel
scurrying through the woods. One of
the men fired. The rebel stopped and
raised his one arm. The other had been
shattered. His capture proved to be the
stroke of luck they were waiting for.
The prisoner led them to a cache of
arms: 150 Italian rifles, several
Mausers and miscellaneous hunting
rifles. Later, Youssef walked into an
ambush by the Senegali legionnaires
west of Phillipeville. Neither he nor his
comrades came out alive.
Another rebel that was terrorizing
Philippeville was a 23-year-old,
Gharsallah Messaoud. Of small stature
and a carefree, juvenile demeanor, was
nickname Petit Messoaud. He was
courageous, ambitious, vigorous, and
ruthless. He had mobilized a group of
young fanatics who were positioned in
an observation post in a cliff near
Phillipville that was immune from
bombardment.
A petty criminal who had been
recruited by Petit Messaoud begged the
police to put him in prison for his safety,
confessing that he had been recruited
by Messaoud and was too cowardly
to face the Paras.
Aussaresses requested that the judge
arrest the deserter. He refused without
cause. Aussaresses enlisted him as an
informer and positioned him as a chauffeur.
He lost his head, blabbed to his
former FLN comrades, and was killed.
In Philippeville the police commissioner
was attacked by a commando.
The commissioner informed the
Captain and everyone was prepared to
receive the assaillants who were none
other than Petit Messaoud and 12 of
his men. There was a furious battle.
The villagers cooperated, wanting to
expose Petite Messoud: "He lives with
five prostitutes" "I hate him" "he’s in
the mountains.” "Little Massoud will
attack.” Little Massoud, chief of a small,
active powerful group in the mountains
was "silenced," thanks to the photo
attack.
Aussaresses had trailed the suspects
"with the most blood on their hands."
Those he captured were not heroes, just
brutes, he said.
The insurrection the FLN planned
for November had failed. By spring it
had fizzled out. Then the FLN radically
changed their tactics. The FLN focused
on terrorizing civilians, specifically the
Europeans which the Muslims labeled
as "friends" of France. The FLN easily
terrorized the countryside. The cities,
however, were much more difficult to
penetrate, and became the primary targets.
The situation continued to degenerate.
The new Faure government, with
Maurice Bourges Maunoury, secretary of
the interior who had replaced Mitterand
and Robert Schuman minister of Justice,
decided to escalate the French response:
60-100,000 French soldiers were
deployed. Severe retaliation, including
bombardment was authorized.
Attacks were increasing to more
than 12 a day, particularly in Algiers
where the FLN focused the majority of
their efforts. The city was largely inhabited
by pieds-noir. The FLN goal was to
terrorize them into such desparation
and fear that they would flee. The
Casbah, in old town with its narrow,
winding streets and stone houses with
interior courtyards and terraces offered
the rebels an impregnable fortress.
It was a different game in Algers,
with different players.
The director, Larbi Ben M’Hidi, who
had inherited fortunes, aimed to escalate
terrorism to such a crises that
France would be forced to abandon
Algeria. Bombs in the Milk Bar and the
Cafeteria frequented by the young
Algerians killed four and mutilated 52.
On 13 November 1956, three bombs
were launched, one on an autobus that
left 36 victims, the other in a grand
market which gravely injured nine, and
the third in a train station. On 28
November, three bombs detonated in
the same hour. It became apparent to
Aussaresses that a strong, well funded
organization had mobilized thousands
of supporters including informers, suppliers,
bomb manufacturers, and those
who provided food, medical care, and
safehouses. The next month, Christmas
Eve, a bomb in a school bus killed the
child passengers. The anxiety of the
pied-noir was rapidly being transformed
into psychosis.
Aussaresses was ordered to report to
Colonel Mayer, who told him General
Massu wanted someone who could perform
unusual operations — clean up
the Casbah of the rebels.
"I was given a far dirtier job than
Philippeville. I wasn’t born to clean up
the Casbah,” I told Mayer. I refused. "I
hate it! I hate it! I hate it!”
The plan was to create two adjuncts
— the first was lieutenant Colonel
Roger Trinquier, with whom
Aussaresses had worked and trained in
Indochina with the paratroopers.
Trinquier’s mission had been to operate
behind the Viet Minh lines and gather
intelligence for subsequent airborne
operations. Trinquier was appointed to
head up intelligence, and Aussauresses
operations, for Algiers.
"Either I accepted or I quit the army.
Quitting the army is to quit special services;
to renounce an ideal. That is to
become a traitor. I got in my Jeep and
left for Algiers."
