After an artillery barrage of 31,000 shells and the placement of smoke on both sides of the river, the 1st Battalion, 141st Infantry Regiment, began the Rapido River crossings with an assault upstream from Sant' Angelo at 7:05 p.m. on January 20. It was followed by the 3rd Battalion. Darkness had fallen by the time the troops began their approach, and a thick fog hung over the area. Before the 1st Battalion even reached the river it came under heavy mortar, artillery and small-arms fire.
Initial Crossings
Rumors ran rampant, markers indicating cleared paths through minefields were destroyed or lost, guides became disoriented in the fog and darkness, infantrymen refused to cooperate with the engineers, and men wandered away or were otherwise separated from their units. Enemy fire damaged or destroyed most of the assault boats on the riverbank, and the others were hit soon after they entered the water; several sank while filled with infantrymen, who subsequently drowned. Much of the bridging equipment was destroyed before it reached the river, and efforts by the engineers to construct bridges failed under a rain of enemy shells.
By 4 a.m. about 100 men of Companies A, B and C, 1st Battalion, had crossed the river by footbridge, but this solitary link was soon destroyed by shellfire, isolating them on the far bank. German artillery knocked out telephone wires, field radios were lost or malfunctioned, and engineer and infantry units were quickly pinned down on both sides of the river. At dawn on January 21, the regimental commander, Lt. Col. Aaron A. Wyatt, Jr., suspended the attack and ordered the troops on the near bank to fall back to their original positions while ordering those on the other side to dig in until help arrived. By late morning the regiment had lost contact with the troops across the Rapido.
The 143rd Infantry Regiment began its crossings at 8 p.m. on January 20, at two points about a half mile to the south of Sant' Angelo under intermittent artillery fire. By 5 a.m., Companies B and C of the 1st Battalion had successfully crossed the rain-swollen river at the northern site, but many boats were destroyed by artillery fire after completing the first round trip. With most of the regiment's boats destroyed and casualties on the far bank rising, Colonel William H. Martin, the regimental commander, ordered his troops back across the river at 7:16 a.m., a movement completed by 10 a.m.
At the other crossing site farther south, deadly accurate enemy fire and land mines inflicted an enormous toll in men and boats and caused great confusion. A crossing was not even attempted during the early morning darkness, prompting the relief of the battalion commander, Major Louis H. Ressijac. Yet the major's replacement, Lt. Col. Paul D. Carter, could not make order out of the chaos and soon gave up all hope of mounting a crossing before dawn, when more accurate enemy artillery fire could be predicted to rain down on the battalion. The unit was ordered to withdraw to its original positions at daybreak.
Trying To Advance
Determined that the crossings be completed, Keyes, under pressure from Clark, ordered Walker at 10 a.m. to conduct a new assault by both regiments on January 21, after replacement boats were obtained. But the confusion resulting from the failed assaults delayed the new attacks. The 143rd Infantry was first to attempt a crossing. Between 4 and 6:30 p.m., the entire 3rd Battalion reached the far bank and began to advance through the enemy wire, knocking out several German machine guns in the process, although with heavy losses. The 1st Battalion soon followed in the face of heavy enemy fire, crossing to the north of the 3rd Battalion.
Intense enemy opposition prevented the final battalion from crossing at the appointed time, and it was not until the early morning hours that two companies of the 2nd Battalion finally managed to reach the Rapido's far bank. Although three battalions had succeeded in reaching the far bank by 2 a.m. on January 22, every effort to construct pontoon, Bailey or footbridges to allow reinforcement by armor and infantry units was stymied by enemy fire. Darkness, heavy fog and smoke obscured vision and prevented counterbattery fire. Mines accounted for still more casualties, and demoralization and disorganization gripped most units.
Yet amid the confusion and heavy enemy fire, many soldiers performed incredible acts of bravery. Staff Sergeant Thomas E. McCall, from Viedersburgh, Ind., serving with Company F, 143rd Infantry, commanded a machine-gun section providing fire support for riflemen crossing the river. Exposing himself to the deadly enemy fire that swept over the flat terrain, McCall, with unusual calmness, welded his men into an effective fighting unit. He led them forward across barbed-wire entanglements and personally placed the weapons of his two squads in positions covering the battalion's front. A shell soon landed near one of the positions, wounding the gunner, killing the assistant gunner, and destroying the weapon. Even though shells were falling all around, McCall crawled forward and rendered first aid to the wounded man before dragging him to safety. In the meantime, the crew of the second machine gun had also been wounded, leaving McCall as the sole effective member of his section.
The sergeant picked up the last operating machine gun and ran forward with the weapon on his hip. He reached a point 30 yards from the Germans, where he fired two bursts, killing or wounding all the enemy soldiers and putting their gun out of action. A second enemy machine gun soon opened fire, and he rushed that position as well, firing again from the hip and killing four of the crew. A third machine gun, located 50 yards to the rear, then began delivering a tremendous volume of fire. McCall spotted its position and went toward it in the face of overwhelming fire, shooting from the hip. He was severely wounded and captured in this last attack, but his actions helped stabilize the battalion's position, and he was later awarded the Medal of Honor. Despite such individual acts of courage, however, by 12:40 p.m., January 22, the second crossing attempt had failed and the badly mauled battalions on the far bank were ordered to withdraw.
Withdrawal
The efforts of the already battered 141st Regiment were even less successful. The 2nd and 3rd battalions crossed the river at 9 p.m. on January 21, and although they searched the far bank under intense enemy fire, they could find no survivors from Companies A, B, and C, stranded the night before. Immediately after the two battalions crossed the river, the engineers began constructing a Bailey bridge, but enemy artillery halted their work at 9:45 a.m. and construction was never resumed. The remaining footbridges either washed away or were destroyed by artillery.
Meanwhile, the troops in the bridgehead were unable to move forward more than 600 yards and endured a merciless pounding through the seemingly endless daylight hours. By 6 p.m., January 22, all officers except one were casualties, and enemy snipers with automatic weapons had moved to within yards of the American positions. Soon all boats and bridges were destroyed, communications were out and the units were cut off.
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After the debacle at the Rapido River, the survivors regrouped, then continued to advance up the Italian peninsula. Here, 36th Division infantrymen march through Tarquinia, north of Rome. (Real War Photos)
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As the 143rd Infantry completed its withdrawal downstream, the Germans counterattacked, concentrating their efforts on the stranded men of the 141st. Except for 40 soldiers who managed to swim back across the river, all others in the two battalions were killed, wounded or captured.
At division headquarters, General Walker resisted new orders from Keyes to commit his last regiment, the 142nd, in a third and final attempt to establish a bridgehead late on January 22 or at the latest on the following morning. Walker knew that the battle was over, and he managed to convinced Keyes of the same. As the demoralized survivors fell back from the river, all sounds of firing from the far bank ceased at 9:40 p.m. The 141st and 143rd Infantry regiments had suffered 2,128 casualties in 48 hours, including 155 killed, 1,052 wounded and 921 missing or captured. Nearly all officers and NCOs, battalion commanders, members of the battalion staffs, company commanders, platoon and squad leaders were killed, wounded or missing. One company of the 141st Regiment, under Captain Zerk Robertson, was reduced from 187 to 17 men, most of whom were wounded. For all practical purposes, the 36th Division was no longer an effective combat unit.
Sacrifice
German losses were negligible, and scarce reserves were never committed. Indeed, it was later learned that the reserves that the crossing was supposed to have drawn south had already been committed to the Garigliano front to contain the earlier British crossing. Kesselring could not have sent any units to reinforce the Rapido front even if the need had existed.
Ironically, the American attack had failed so dismally that neither the Tenth Army commander nor the enemy soldiers who repelled the assault were ever aware that the 36th Division was launching a major offensive. In their reports, enemy commanders referred to the attack as nothing more than a reconnaissance in force.
In the aftermath of the assault, Walker confided in his diary that the division had been sacrificed for no justifiable end. He "fully expected Clark...to 'can' me to cover his own stupidity." Yet "Clark," Walker wrote, "admitted the failure...to cross the Rapido was as much his fault as anyone's." Walker never appeared to understand, however, that the Fifth Army commander's admission of failure was not an admission of error. Clark steadfastly maintained that the attack was part of Alexander's overall offensive plan and not the result of Clark's own initiative, and that had the British crossings of the Garigliano been more forceful and more successful, the Rapido attack would have succeeded as well. Clark also believed that the operation succeeded in tying down German forces during the Anzio landings as intended. He held that "some blood had to be spilled on either the land or SHINGLE [Anzio] front, and I greatly preferred that it be on the Rapido, where we were secure, rather than at Anzio with the sea at our back."
Why?
The attack on the Rapido had failed for many reasons. The assault was hampered by poor weather and terrain conditions that hindered the movement of men and materiel, especially boats and bridges, and prevented the efficient use of air power, artillery and armor. The Americans had selected a poor crossing site, as Walker knew, where their flanks were exposed, where the enemy positions were well prepared, and where the available bridging equipment was inadequate for the job. In addition, any element of surprise that the 36th Division might have enjoyed was squandered by the many patrols the Germans spotted along the river in the days prior to the attack.
Yet of all the factors cited for the failure of the 36th Division crossing, the one reason most veterans focused on during and after the war was the poor tactical judgment shown by the higher command, especially Clark, in carrying out Alexander's orders. Indeed, the major complaint was not Alexander's basic plan or the orders given for the attack, but Clark's allegedly poor judgment in carrying out the assault at the chosen point and time. To most, launching an attack across a rain-swollen, heavily defended river, for a drive up the center of a valley where the heights on both sides were still under enemy control, was faulty judgment bordering on negligence and incompetence.
Under the circumstances, the Rapido assault should never have been launched after the failed British and French drives, regardless of the situation at Anzio. On March 2, 1944, Texas Independence Day, with memories of the disaster still fresh, a group of 25 officers of the 36th Division met in an Italian farmhouse and vowed to do everything possible to prompt a postwar inquiry into the Rapido fiasco.
Afterwards
The 36th Division remained in the line for a month after the Rapido assault, dug in on the slopes of Mount Cairo behind Cassino and the Castellone Ridge, which fringed the town. The unit continued to serve with distinction in the advance on Rome in May, and was responsible for capturing Mont Artesmisio, a crucial position vital to breaking the German defenses before Rome. Following the liberation of the Italian capital, the division moved north, fighting its way 240 miles up the peninsula before being pulled from the line on June 29, 1944, after 11 months of campaigning and 11,000 casualties.
The division next took part in the Operation Anvil landings in southern France in August, followed by the dash up the Rhone Valley. The 36th then battled the Germans in the Vosges Mountains and elsewhere in Alsace-Lorraine, including the Colmar Pocket, a German holdout position on the west bank of the Rhine River. In the spring of 1945, the division entered southern Germany in pursuit of enemy forces falling back to the rumored Alpine Redoubt, and ended the war in the Austrian Tyrol. In five campaigns, the 36th Division suffered the third highest number of casualties of any unit in the European theater: 3,974 killed, 19,052 wounded and 7,317 missing.
The survivors of the Rapido disaster managed to have their grievances heard on Capitol Hill in 1946. In an investigation that critics called a "politically inspired, vindictive, but indecisive effort to fix blame," testimony was heard from many veterans, including General Walker. General Clark, who never referred to the Rapido River disaster in any public utterances after the war or in his memoirs, was not required to testify and never officially responded to any of the charges leveled. When all was said and done, however, the statements of the War Department and the secretary of war carried far more weight than those of the 36th Division veterans appearing before Representative May's committee.
The congressional panel accepted the Army view that "the attempt to cross the Rapido was a legitimate if difficult operation" where Clark "exercised sound judgment in ordering the attack." No further inquiry was deemed necessary, and the failed Rapido attack became just another bloody battle in a long and costly campaign.
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