When Flirting Meets Classified Information

A retired Army colonel who worked as a civilian employee at U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) in Tampa, Florida, Kevin Charles Luke, received a 24-month federal prison sentence after admitting he sent classified national defense information to a woman he met online. The U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Middle District of Florida announced the sentence on February 11, 2026. 

What Happened In Tampa

The government’s account is straightforward and damning. In October 2024, Luke texted the woman from his personal cellphone, telling her he was giving her “a peek” at what he did for work, then sent a photograph of a classified email displayed on a computer screen. The email described a then-future U.S. military operation and included operational specifics. 

Luke pled guilty on October 7, 2025, and the government emphasized that he had long understood the rules around safeguarding classified information, including signing a Standard Form 312 nondisclosure agreement multiple times. 

What The Photo Allegedly Revealed

The sentencing release describes the image revealed targets of a planned U.S. military operation, the future date of the operation, the means of executing the operation, and the goal of the operation. The email carried Secret-level markings Luke himself had added, and the government stated that releasing the information could be expected to cause “serious damage” to U.S. national security.

The Air Force Office of Special Investigations publicly confirmed the same basic facts, including that the photo disclosed timing, targets, method, and objective for a planned operation, and that the investigation was conducted jointly with the FBI. 

Why A Texted Photo Can Trigger Espionage-Act Liability

The press releases repeatedly use the phrase “unauthorized communication of information relating to the national defense.” That phrasing tracks the core language of 18 U.S.C. § 793, a section of the Espionage Act that, among other things, criminalizes certain unauthorized transmissions of “information relating to the national defense” to people not entitled to receive it. 

This case also shows why the method matters less than the act. The government did not describe a sophisticated exfiltration scheme. It described a personal phone photographing a screen and sending the image by text. The legal theory does not require a flash drive or a covert drop if the defendant knowingly transmits protected national defense information to an unauthorized recipient. 

The facts also highlight a recurring operational security point: classification controls presume not only secure networks, but disciplined humans. A single photo can bypass the entire ecosystem of classified email, controlled terminals, and audit logs. That is why the government framed the disclosure as an abuse of trust rather than a one-off mistake with no consequences. 

The Sentence And The Government’s Framing

The court imposed 24 months in federal prison. The DOJ release identifies the sentencing judge as U.S. District Judge James Moody, Jr., and it states Luke’s plea agreement included an admission that he abused a position of public trust. 

The investigation and prosecution posture signals how seriously the government treated a disclosure that, on its face, involved no foreign handler and no money. The DOJ release credits AFOSI and the FBI for the investigation and lists both an Assistant U.S. Attorney and a National Security Division trial attorney as prosecutors, an arrangement often reserved for cases with broader counterintelligence implications. 

Why This Story Matters 

The sensational framing writes itself: a seasoned officer and cleared civilian risks his career to impress someone online. The harder, more useful story sits underneath. This is a cautionary tale about the post-retirement pipeline into sensitive civilian billets. 

Luke’s career path of active and reserve service ended in 2018 and was followed by civilian employment at CENTCOM with continued access. This matches a common workforce pattern across the national security state. 

It also underscores that an “insider threat” is not synonymous with ideological extremism or espionage tradecraft. It can look like validation-seeking, loneliness, poor boundaries, and a phone camera. 

What Comes Next

Luke has been sentenced, so the case is no longer hypothetical about charging decisions. It is a concrete reminder that a single unauthorized image can trigger felony exposure under national defense information statutes, even absent espionage motives.