Satellite Internet Is No Longer Peripheral
Satellite internet has moved from a commercial convenience to a strategic infrastructure. That shift became impossible to ignore in January 2026, when Iran imposed a nationwide internet blackout amid mass protests. This severed mobile data, broadband, and most international connectivity to suppress dissent and limit the flow of information abroad.
During the early days of the blackout, satellite-based internet (particularly SpaceX’s Starlink) provided one of the few remaining channels for communication outside Iran’s state-controlled networks.
That window did not last. Iranian authorities reportedly deployed advanced radio-frequency jamming systems to interfere with Starlink signals, degrading service and, in some areas, rendering terminals unusable. Reports indicated severe packet loss and unstable connections consistent with military-grade signal interference rather than routine network congestion.
Security forces also reportedly confiscated satellite terminals during raids, reinforcing the state’s effort to eliminate alternative connectivity paths.
The episode demonstrated that even resilient low-Earth-orbit constellations are vulnerable to determined state interference, and that satellite internet now sits squarely within the battlespace of internal security operations.
Starlink as a Battlefield Variable in Ukraine
At nearly the same time, a different Starlink controversy emerged in Ukraine. Ukrainian officials publicly stated that Russian forces were using Starlink terminals on unmanned aerial vehicles to support long-range drone operations, including strikes against civilian infrastructure. Ukrainian defense officials confirmed coordination with SpaceX to disable Starlink access on Russian drones once such use was identified.
SpaceX has maintained that its terms of service prohibit the use of Starlink on weapons systems and that it will take technical measures to prevent misuse when discovered. Regardless of intent, the result was unmistakable: a private U.S. company made operational decisions with immediate battlefield consequences in an active armed conflict.
For military planners, this represents a structural shift. Commercial satellite providers are no longer passive enablers; they are actors whose technical decisions can shape tactical outcomes.
Why Existing Space Law Fails Here
The legal frameworks governing space were never designed for this reality. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 establishes broad principles such as peaceful use and state responsibility for national space activities, but it does not address radio-frequency jamming, cyber interference, or the denial of satellite services during conflict.
International humanitarian law requires distinction between military objectives and civilian objects, yet commercial satellites routinely serve both civilian and military users simultaneously. A Starlink terminal enabling civilians to communicate during a blackout may also support military command and control minutes later. Existing law offers no clear standard for when such systems become lawful military objectives.
The United Nations Charter prohibits the use of force against another state, but whether signal jamming or cyber interference against satellite infrastructure constitutes a “use of force” remains unresolved in international jurisprudence. No treaty squarely addresses these questions, leaving states to operate in a gray zone with little deterrence or accountability.
The Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations reflects this uncertainty, emphasizing that states disagree on when cyber or electronic interference reaches the level of a prohibited use of force and clarifying that the Manual itself is non-binding and does not create new law.
The Unregulated Power of Private Space Actors
The Ukraine and Iran cases also expose a deeper governance problem: private companies now control infrastructure essential to both civil society and military operations, yet international law primarily regulates states. When SpaceX disables access to prevent hostile use, it exercises power traditionally reserved to governments, but without the transparency or legal constraints imposed on state actors.
U.S. export control regimes govern satellite technology transfers, but they were not designed for real-time service denial decisions during active hostilities. As a result, private operators exist in a legal vacuum, guided by corporate policy rather than coherent national or international standards.
What Military Policy Cannot Ignore
The lesson is not that commercial satellite systems are unreliable. It is that they are indispensable and exposed. Future conflicts will increasingly involve attacks on connectivity rather than territory, with satellite networks as prime targets. Without updated legal norms, states will continue to jam, spoof, and interfere with space-based systems while denying that such actions cross legal thresholds.
For the U.S. military, this demands formal integration of commercial space providers into operational planning, clearer doctrine on protecting and defending space-based communications, and sustained diplomatic pressure to establish binding norms against indiscriminate interference with satellite infrastructure. Space is already contested. The law governing it remains dangerously underdeveloped.
