Smarter Security for Smaller Budgets
By Captain Bruce B. Stubbs, U.S. Coast Guard (Retired)
Proceedings, August 2005
What will the shape of tomorrow's Navy and Coast Guard maritime security ship look like? Will it be the littoral combat ship (below)? Or one—or more—of three other ship designs?
Despite great commonality in how maritime security missions are conducted against terrorist threats, the Navy and Coast Guard are headed in different directions to provide this capability. The Navy plans to adapt its sophisticated low-end warship, the littoral combat ship (LCS), for the maritime security mission while the Coast Guard is building purposely designed ships for the same goal. In an era of great emphasis on inter-service jointness along with the reality of austere defense procurement budgets, there are growing concerns that the nation cannot afford this bifurcated approach to its maritime security. Specifically, is the Navy's LCS option for a maritime security role a prudent choice, or should the Navy consider embracing the Coast Guard's high-end cutter?
Two Solutions for One Goal
The Navy and Coast Guard share a common approach for all terrorist and civilian threats—detect, intercept, and board civilian ships in the ocean expanses and littorals. For both services, whether intercepting weapons or drugs, the operations include the need to conduct, at long range and for long periods of time, a number of low-level sea-control/denial missions. Their security capabilities share the same ship design parameters—endurance, sea-keeping for multiple small boat and helicopter operations, and self-sufficiency for independent operations. Additionally they share the need for broad area coverage, rapid reaction, less capable combat systems, and austere self-defense suites. 1 Endurance and self-sufficiency for independent operations are especially important because these ships will operate without a dedicated logistics train and far from the battle group. Such similarities raise the issue of common ships and systems for savings through economies of scale and elimination of duplication.
Navy's Approach
The Navy plans to adapt a future combatant for maritime security duties by altering its new, special-purpose littoral combat ship, which is being designed in two variants—one at 340-feet, 1,500-tons and the other at 430-feet and 3,000-tons. Both will be fast and designed primarily to perform focused missions—neutralizing mines and defeating submarines and fast attack craft—along the enemy's coastlines in relatively shallow waters. The LCS hull, optimized with stealth, the latest command-and-control technology and self-defense capabilities, will give a maximum speed of 40 to 50 knots, with a 21-day endurance and a 4,500-nautical mile range at 22 knots, or approximately a 1,500-mile range at high speed. It will use modular plug-and-fight mission payload packages for each mission. In October 2004, the LCS was considered for employment in homeland security missions. Since then it has become apparent that the U.S. Northern Command expects to use the LCS in homeland security missions. 2 The Navy wants to modify LCS and not use common ships with the Coast Guard because it believes the ship's modularity concept lends itself to maritime security duties. Service leaders have consistently stated that the LCS program is their number-one budget priority. 3 Moreover, given the close relationship between the Navy and the Coast Guard's programs, with two Memoranda of Understanding put in place to ensure collaboration, some see the LCS as the answer to the Coast Guard's high-end maritime security cutter needs.
 The National Security Cutter (NSC), top, and the Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC), bottom, have both been designed specifically for the maritime security role but differ primarily in endurance capabilities.
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Coast Guard's Approach
Two new types of maritime security ships are part of the Coast Guard's Integrated Deepwater Project. The high-end National Security Cutter (NSC) is 421-feet long and displaces 4,200-tons. With its 12,000-nautical mile range, 60-day endurance, and 29-knot sprint speed, it can patrol the world. The smaller Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC), at 350-feet long and 3,200-tons displacement, has a 9,000-nautical mile range, 45-day endurance, and top speed of 28 knots. It can service the majority of the U.S. maritime domain and also deploy to forward areas if needed. The Coast Guard is currently planning to purchase 33 of these ships; eight NSCs at about $280 million each, and 25 OPCs priced at $200 million each. In late January 2005 the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) approved a revised Deepwater mission needs statement that incorporated homeland security and defense requirements. 4 The two classes will have improved capabilities to defeat terrorist attacks, engage in opposed boarding, and conduct operations in a chemical, biological, and radiological environment. 5 The Coast Guard Fiscal Year 2006 budget reflects the administration's support for more capable, responsive, and survivable ships to perform maritime security operations.
The Navy and Coast Guard are well aware of each other's efforts in regard to maritime security capabilities. They are focusing their coordination efforts not on hulls, or mechanical and electrical systems, but on common C4ISR systems and interoperability. Both want their ships to be able to make use of each other's systems when they are working together. Undoubtedly their approach is reasonable given the different origins and time lines associated with LCS and Deepwater, however, this de facto joint Coast Guard-Navy approach is not mandated or overseen by Congress.
Questions for the Navy
While there is little doubt that the LCS could conduct the Navy's maritime security role, questions exist whether other non-LCS options that place greater emphasis on maritime security capabilities may be more suitable, effective, and affordable. Unfortunately there is no analysis of multiple concepts to draw upon for evaluating the LCS's role in maritime security missions, which some analysts and observers have decried. 6 The Navy needs to consider if the LCS places sufficient emphasis on maritime security capabilities for regional acceptance of its presence, international engagement and operations, and the security environment of the next two to three decades. Conversely, the Navy must consider if the LCS has too much capability for homeland security duties.
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