'Farther and Faster' in Iraq
Lieutenant General James T. Conway, U.S. Marine Corps
Proceedings, January 2005
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According to the commander of the I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF)
for 22 months of planning for and fighting in Operation
Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the war’s two segments thus far have proved
very different. In 2003, OIF I was comparatively less difficult, with
Marines
fighting mostly against Shia in the south. In OIF II against Sunni tribes
in the west, “our vision to win hearts and minds was met squarely with
a 300% increase in the number of attacks in our sector,” he says, which
translated into casualties (right) in “the turbulent city of Fallujah.”
Operation Iraqi Freedom unfolded in four distinct phases: a deployment
phase, a shaping phase, a decisive operations phase, and a reconstruction
phase. During January and February 2003, the Marine Corps flexed its
expeditionary muscle, with 60,000 Marines and sailors and their heavy
equipment deployed to Kuwait in 45 days. Operation Iraqi Freedom, just
as Operation
Desert Storm more than a decade before, was a logistical victory.
No other nation on earth even could have attempted such a monumental
transfer of men and materiel, to a moonscape on exactly the opposite
side of the globe, in preparation for an attack.
Our organization for combat remained dynamic throughout phases I and
II. The I Marine Expedionary Force was assigned to the Third Army, where
we joined with V Corps as the ground force. This would be the main attack
force in a fast-moving sweep across mainly desert terrain southwest
of Baghdad. We would be the supporting attack, crossing rivers and other
poorer avenues of approach. Our role was to look like the main attack:
pick a fight with anybody who would engage us, and yet keep battlefield
geometry so we were abreast or even slightly in advance of V Corps.
Both forces were to focus like a laser on Baghdad. When Turkey closed
its borders to Coalition forces, the entire British First Armored Division
was assigned to the MEF. Marvelous troops and leaders, with first-rate
equipment, they swelled our ranks to just short of 90,000 Marines, soldiers,
and sailors. I told the colorful British formations that there was a
time in our country when the phrase, “The British are coming,” was used
to scare children. In this instance, however, U.S. Marines in Kuwait
were glad to hear it.
The all-volunteer force has provided an amazing quality of Marine and
sailor. Bigger, stronger, and faster than their namesake of decades
past, they also are more informed, and therefore more opinionated and
inquisitive. My commanders and I constantly spoke to the troops in their
training bases in Kuwait to provide information and squelch rumors.
Their number-one question was: “Is the country behind us?” They had
read or heard about large antiwar demonstrations in the United States
and elsewhere and wanted assurances. We told each formation not to worry
about it; just do their jobs. American citizens were mature enough in
their beliefs that even if they didn’t support the war, they would still
support the troops.
In what had become a predictable pattern, a U.S. air campaign was planned
to precede the ground attack. What had been 40 days was reduced to 16
days, and that was cut in half to an 8-day period of “shock and awe”
by the air planners. Increasing reports of explosives being moved into
the southern oil fields, however, made it apparent that air attack could
be the signal for Iraqi forces to demolish the oil platforms in a calculated
act of senseless destruction. Since rapid and intact seizure of the
southern oilfield production was a MEF mission, we were early advocates
of launching the ground attack before an air campaign. For a time, the
best we could do was launch them simultaneously. But there is an old
adage, well remembered, that “the enemy gets a vote.” Without warning
or provocation, on 20 March, Saddam started destruction of the fields.
Our attack was moved forward initially 24 hours, then 8 hours more.
It’s okay to delay an attack, as long as you rest the troops. Moving
an attack forward is very much another matter. That said, I could not
have been more pleased with the response of my commanders, air and ground,
as we thundered across the international border a full 32 hours ahead
of plan.
Our intelligence offered different analyses of enemy strength and intentions,
and where he would use his chemical weapons. We faced three Iraqi Corps
in our sector—two Regular Army and one Republican Guard, consisting
of nine total divisions. We were led to believe major portions of some
of those divisions would capitulate, the division most likely to collapse
being the 11th Infantry division around an Nazariah. We found the opposite
to be true. Some intel experts thought Saddam
would unleash his chemical weapons as soon as we crossed the Kuwaiti
border; others thought it would happen when we crossed the Euphrates
River. My own view was, they would hit us with chemicals as we approached
the Republican Guard divisions anchored on the Tigris River southeast
of Baghdad. Taking no chances, we crossed the line of departure in our
bulky chemical suits and stayed in them for two and a half weeks.
(continued)
© 2004 The Naval Institute. All rights reserved.
