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January 6, 2005
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Editor's Note: The following are excerpts from a special briefing
at the Pentagon on Jan. 4, 2005 on the tsunami relief operations,
by U.S. Pacific Command chief Adm. Thomas Fargo.
Adm. Thomas Fargo: It's fair to say that the Southeast Asia earthquake
and the follow-on tsunami on Sunday, the 26th of December, will
necessitate one of the most complex humanitarian disaster-relief
efforts of recent history. Striking nearly all shores of the Indian
Ocean, millions of people, multiple countries faced unimaginable
destruction in a brief period of time.
At the U.S. Pacific Command, we began a planning effort in the first
24 hours of this catastrophe. On Monday [Dec. 27, 2004] we communicated
directly with our ambassadors in the region and the senior military
leaders in several of the worst-hit countries. Our goal was to understand
how our capacity and supply could best be used to help regional
neighbors in need. A joint task force, under the command of [III
Marine Expeditionary Force commander] Lieutenant General Rusty Blackman,
was ordered stood up at the same point in time.
Damage assessment teams were ordered to Indonesia and to Thailand
and Sri Lanka within 48 hours to let us know the dimension of this
catastrophe, and at the same time provide the immediate relief that
we knew was going to be required, like water and medical aid. To
the greatest degree possible, we wanted to begin moving resources
simultaneously with our assessments.
We ordered the USS
Abraham Lincoln Carrier [Strike] Group to proceed at best speed
from Hong Kong toward Indonesia. We then ordered the USS
Bonhomme Richard Expeditionary [Strike] Group from an area that
was just south of Guam toward Indonesia also at best speed.
USS Abraham Lincoln operating off the coast of Aceh Province on
Jan. 3, 2005
We knew from our recent disaster response in the Philippines, and
our 1991 response to cyclonic flooding in Bangladesh - which was
Operation Sea Angel - that immediate needs were going to be drinking
water and shelter and food and medical support. A key lesson from
all of these events was the value of helicopter vertical lift.
The ability to rapidly apply needed capabilities in response to
a crisis reflects well, I believe, on our force posture and investment
in the Asian Pacific Region. The speed with which we will bring
forces, and have brought forces such as the carrier and expeditionary
groups, as well as P-3s and C-130s to bear for immediate employment,
is critical in a region characterized by vast distances of time
and space.
As I mentioned earlier, we stood up initially Joint Task Force 536,
now redesignated as Combined Support Force, or CSF - and that's
led, once again, by Lieutenant General Rusty Blackman. And this
was important to manage the magnitude of this crisis operation.
Our Combined Support Force will help coordinate the contributions
of our military, other nations and other organizations.
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| USS Abraham Lincoln
operating off the coast of Aceh Province on Jan. 3, 2005. Photo
courtesy of DOD |
Our strong ally Thailand quickly responded to our request to allow
us to center General Blackman's operations in Utapao, thus strengthening
the capacity of U.S. forces providing relief in the region. From
that hub location, he's ensuring close coordination of all elements
on the ground and at sea while synchronizing multiple efforts in
the region to support nations as they best see fit.
It's important to point out that this likely could not have happened
without our ongoing security cooperation efforts designed to strengthen
our alliance with Thailand and all the countries of this region
and the fact that we've been able to build enduring habits of cooperation
over a long period of time.
We should all be proud of our service members as well as the other
governmental and nongovernmental organizations, all of who are responding
quickly with great energy and compassion. They're putting an extraordinary
humanitarian face on a particularly large undertaking.
There's an important point that I'd like to reiterate. We see our
job as one of assistance. Many organizations - international, national,
governmental and nongovernmental - have joined together to help.
We've coordinated closely with the State Department and with USAID,
and we're in support to the host nation, who's responsible for its
citizens. So U.S. Pacific Command and the Combined Support Force
bring unique capacity quickly to support these dedicated volunteers.
All of us are working together to lend a hand, mindful that we do
so in a way that meets the request of our host governments, and
we join with many to provide assistance and relief.
It's hard for us to comprehend the devastation suffered by so many.
And over the next days, weeks and months, we'll push forward to
provide aid and comfort, responding with the team of dedicated countries
and organizations, and we'll continuously improve our efforts as
we go.
Q. Admiral, how many Marines from the Bonhomme Richard group are
going to be going ashore? And where are they going to do that? And
what will their duties be?
ADM. FARGO: I think it's hard to say what the numbers that will
actually go ashore are. It will be very dependent on the specific
priorities and tasks that are laid out. Obviously, a number will
go ashore to provide helicopter lift, because Bonhomme Richard has
both H-53s and H-46s. And their lift capacity, they're carrying
capacity exceeds those of the H-60s that we currently have in Indonesia.
There will also be medics. I suspect there will be engineering capability
from the Bonhomme Richard that also goes ashore.
So it will be dependent on the task. Some will remain ashore for
significant periods of times, but others will use the sea base as
a point to provide support.
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Q. Admiral Fargo, you mentioned the critical role that helicopters
have played in the relief operations. According to the account we
were given this morning, there were something like 46 U.S. helicopters
in the region. My question is, how much difference is that number
of helicopters making? Wouldn't, say, double the number of helicopters
be twice as good, or is there a logistical limit on how many helicopters
you can operate? And are there any more plans to send any more helicopters?
ADM. FARGO: Well, there are plans to send more helicopters. Right
now we've got the [USS] Fort McHenry under way from Okinawa with
six H-46s. We also have the [USS] Niagara Falls under way from Guam
with additional helicopters. And some of our partner nations like
Singapore are going to add additional helicopters. Fundamentally
helicopters are a tremendous advantage because, of course, they
don't have the same restrictions as fixed-wing aircraft in terms
of how many you can have on the ground at a time.
You asked the question, is double the number of helicopters better,
does that produce twice as much? Maybe pretty close to twice as
much, and so it will remain a priority in terms of this relief effort.
…
Q. Are the U.S. operations in Afghanistan
and Iraq
in any way limiting the U.S. ability to provide more aid, particularly
in the areas of helicopters or other -
ADM. FARGO: None whatsoever.
Q. Why not?
ADM. FARGO: Well, fundamentally we had these assets in the Pacific,
and we're employing them for an array of other operations. And you
know, we have a certain capacity that we always maintain in the
Pacific. So we haven't had to detriment those capabilities in Afghanistan
and Iraq.
Q. Admiral Fargo, two quick questions, sir, if I may. One, do you
plan to send the [USNS] Mercy,
the hospital ship? And two, distribution is now perhaps the most
pressing problem; stockpiles of supplies are building up at airfields
and elsewhere, but there is just no proper way now to get them to
the needed in a hurry. Did you consider, or is it still a possibility
that you would consider, airdropping MREs and bladders of water,
or have you ruled it out?
ADM. FARGO: Let me answer the first question on Mercy. We're looking
very carefully at deploying Mercy. In fact, we've got her on sea
trials today to make sure that she's ready to go. We haven't made
that decision yet, but if we do we're going to deploy her in an
imaginative way. Of course you know that these hospital ships were
normally used for trauma in combat, but we think that there may
be an opportunity to configure the Mercy with a humanitarian assistance
crew - what might be staffed significantly by nongovernmental organizations
and people that have significant medical capability and can provide
relief in other forms. So we're looking very closely at this, and
this may be an opportunity to use Mercy in a very creative way.
Q. Is the distribution in the airdrop of MREs and water bottles?
ADM. FARGO: We're looking at an airdrop. Airdrop requires very close
coordination, as you know, on the ground. That means we have to
have people into these regions before we can conduct that. But that
is one of the courses of action we're examining.
Q. Admiral, I'm wondering if you're satisfied with the level not
just of helicopters, but the overall level of assets that you have
there and whether or not you plan to increase them. And second of
all, the United States Navy was very early on the scene doing assessments,
doing aerial surveillance. I'm wondering, have you done your own
damage assessments? And I'm wondering, if you have, whether you
can share them with us in terms of your own assessments of dead/injured
and the economic damage that's been done?
ADM. FARGO: Well, I can't speak to the last part of that. You know,
we'll have to allow experts that can do economic assessments in
a proper way.
We have done some assessments that primarily looked at things like
infrastructure, what ports and airfields would be usable, where
the bridges and roads were out. For example, we know along the south
and east coast of Sri Lanka, there are - some 29 bridges are gone.
And we know from looking at the west coast of Sumatra that the devastation
is significant and the tsunami went well inland in terms of its
level of destruction. So, you know, we have assessments. We also,
you know, worked very closely with the rest of these international
organizations to combine and fuse their assessments together such
that we can provide a comprehensive effort to address the priorities
that we'll develop from those assessments. …
Q. Could you address the first part of this question, about your
satisfaction -
Q. The overall level of -
ADM. FARGO: Yeah, I think - I think we're fine right now. I mean,
we're moving things into theater to increase the capacity, and certainly,
you know, we're looking at other capability in the continental United
States that might be specific to this. But there are other pieces
that are moving. For example, the Marine prepositioning ships we're
moving toward the area because they have a tremendous water-making
capacity, and in addition to that they also have significant engineering
capability on board. So, you know, those are capabilities that are
particularly important. We're moving environmental preventive medicine
units into the area because we recognize that disease could be a
factor and we want to get a head start on this. So we're looking
at a wide range of capabilities. …
Q. Admiral, do you have any preliminary cost estimates of the U.S.
military relief effort here, and any idea where the money's going
to come from?
ADM. FARGO: Well, I can't give you any definitive cost estimates.
I mean, we know what it costs to operate a battle group at sea and
an expeditionary strike group at sea; about $2.5 million a day.
But that includes the people and the training and the entire investment.
A lot of these costs, of course, have taken place already; I mean,
a lot of these funds have already been expended for deployments
to provide the presence and deterrence in the Western Pacific.
I think one of the things that comes to mind immediately is, you
know, the American taxpayers made an investment in a very solid
and robust military capability that has a wide range of uses, and
we're demonstrating the value of that investment today. …
Q. Could you give us - a logistical question. You've mentioned several
of the ships that are already there. It sounds like there are a
lot more coming. Yesterday at PACOM I think they said there are
about 13,000 folks in theater or on the way there. What's your glide
path? How many ships will you have there, how many people will be
there at the height of what you're currently planning?
ADM. FARGO: Well, I think the 13,000 number is a pretty good number.
And I'd probably break it down right now to say we've got about
a thousand people in Thailand; between 100 and 200 at any given
point in time in Indonesia and Sri Lanka and Malaysia; and then
about 11,000 - almost 12,000 at sea. As we bring ships like Fort
McHenry and Niagara
Falls into play, and other units, these numbers will increase
by 10, 15 percent.
I'm not nearly as worried about numbers as I am making sure that
we have targeted the right capabilities to the problem. So, you
know, we're going to stay in close coordination with the relief
professionals to make sure that we're providing both them and the
host nations what the host nations ask for. …
Q. You mentioned earlier that the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan
were not a hindrance to what you're doing, and that Pacific Command
has enough resources. However, on a day-to-day basis, those resources
have an important job deterring and dissuading possible adversaries,
defeating them, if required to do so.
ADM. FARGO: Sure.
Q. In that first 24 hours, what kind of risk analysis did you undertake
to make sure that the national security mission is not hindered
by the relief mission?
ADM. FARGO: Well, you know, this is almost a continuing process
at PACOM. Every time we evaluate a deployment order, every time
we look at moving force structure even north to south or east to
west, we do a risk assessment as to how it impacts our ability to
deter.
I also stay in very close contact with folks like General Leon LaPorte
in Korea. And in this particular case we talked about Korea in some
depth, and I was very comfortable with the movement of our forces.
So it's an ongoing process. We did a solid risk assessment and I
am comfortable with our posture. …
Q. You mentioned that the long-standing military relationship with
Thailand helped ease the way toward getting things started. Can
you contrast that to the situation in having to deal with the Indonesian
military and the Indonesian government, where you didn't have that
kind of history?
ADM. FARGO: I don't want to - Thailand is - you know, is a treaty
ally and they have been very helpful, but I don't want to give you
the impression that Thailand is the only one that stood up right
away, because all the countries of the region have. You know, we've
put together this Combined Support Force headed by General Blackman,
and of course the basis of that, the basis of their effort is a
multinational standard operating procedure that has been worked
through by 31 countries in the region. So this isn't something that
just comes together at a moment's notice; it's based on an investment
of time and effort collectively of all the countries in the region.
And very frankly, the reason we have the access we do, the support
we do and have been able to move with the kind of speed is because
we made an investment in these relationships in theater security
cooperation in the past over many years.
Q. Does that include Indonesia?
ADM. FARGO: It includes Indonesia, obviously, to a lesser extent
because of some of the restrictions that we've had, but we have
worked hard to build that relationship with Indonesia over the last
two years.
Q. Admiral, can you tell us about any particular challenges that
the pilots of the helicopters are facing as they're going and delivering
the relief supplies and then in turn picking up some of the injured
when it comes to finding villages, finding specific destinations,
because the tsunami in some cases changed the landscape so dramatically?
Can you discuss if that is at all a problem and how they're managing
to grapple with that?
ADM. FARGO: I think that's probably a better question for General
Blackman and the folks on the scene, and maybe even [Rear] Admiral
[Doug] Crowder, [Commander, Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group]
who, of course, is working those helos into specific locations.
But just from a generic standpoint, of course you've got to find
a landing zone, and sometimes we'll go over and try to do some reconnaissance
in advance to find a good, clean landing zone that you can get the
helicopter down. And then of course coordination on the ground is
important too to make sure that you don't injure anybody in the
process of moving the helo in. Those are probably the biggest considerations,
just the safety of the operation.
But, you know, our folks are well-trained at this, and those air
crews on the helicopters have some significant experience of moving
into places where maybe they haven't had an opportunity to train
before, and they're doing it very successfully. …
Q. Admiral, you talked about some previous humanitarian missions
that PACOM had run. Had you planned for or even envisioned anything
on this scale or to this magnitude in your, you know, previous planning?
ADM. FARGO: Well, it's hard to say you've ever planned for anything
on this magnitude because, frankly, you know, we haven't seen anything
of this size before. But I would say that, you know, Cobra Gold,
which is our large multinational exercise that we conduct every
year in Thailand, is specifically pointed toward humanitarian assistance,
disaster relief and peacekeeping, and of course it brings a large
number of the nations of the region together to work in this same
manner. So you can't point yourself toward a specific catastrophe
like this, but you can put in place the basic training, the habitual
relationships, and as I pointed out the standard operating procedures
that apply to a wide range of contingencies and crises. …
Q. Sir, to come back to the question … of cost, do you foresee a
point where the cost of having all these different groups working
on this might start to be a problem? This is something that's going
to be going on for a long time. At what point does the money start
to become a worry?
ADM. FARGO: Well, I think, you know, the international community
has stepped up magnificently in terms of funds for this, and certainly
the cost piece of this thing is not something that is significant
to my planning right now. And I'd like to reiterate once again that
one of the reasons we're able to do this is because we've already
made this investment in carrier battle groups and the expeditionary
strike groups and the C-130s and the P-3s and the training. So we
have a lot of this available and we use it for multiple purposes,
and right now we're using it for humanitarian assistance and disaster
relief.
Q. Admiral Fargo, on the subject of particularly Americans who are
still unaccounted for, does the U.S. military's mission include
particularly helping to account for Americans and to identify remains
of Americans?
ADM. FARGO: I would say that the primary lead on that belongs to
the State Department and the chief of mission in country, and we're
responding to their requests.
Q. How about forensics teams? Are you expanding the number of forensics
teams you're sending?
ADM. FARGO: We are providing forensics teams. As you know, I have
the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command that is resident in Hawaii
and part of the Pacific Command, and they have significant expertise
in this area.
Q. I have a follow-up on another question. You mentioned that in
[Indonesia's] Aceh Province you obviously haven't had much experience
there, mainly because of the conflict that's been going on. Can
you talk about the conflict there as well as in Sri Lanka - what
you see on the ground, how the disaster has affected things on the
ground? Do you see that as a potential problem, particularly in
Aceh Province, of getting aid to people and in terms of just protecting
U.S. forces -
ADM. FARGO: Well, we haven't seen it as a problem in terms of aid
distribution or relief. And I would hope that this catastrophe,
as awful as it is, might provide an opportunity for these different
factions to move closer together.
Q. Admiral, I apologize for belaboring this question, but … I'm
having a little trouble understanding this. I know you mentioned
that more helicopters are being sent and you outlined a couple …
I think a dozen or so. But since they seem to be so important and
so valuable, why aren't you sending significantly larger numbers
of helicopters? Is it that they're not available? Is it that they
can't be used? Is it that they're not really needed or -
ADM. FARGO: I think we are sending significantly large numbers.
You know, we're taking - we're going to use medevac helicopters
out of Korea. As I said, we're taking helicopters out of Guam, the
helicopter detachment we have there. And I think that's going to
answer the mail in terms of the capability that we need in these
countries. You also have to understand that there are helicopters
on the Singapore ships - the LST, that is there. The Japanese are
going to provide an LST; they're going to have vertical-lift capability.
The Indians have significant helicopters in play also.
Q. Do you have any idea how many U.S. military helicopters will
be deployed eventually?
ADM. FARGO: Well, I would say probably double the number that we
have right now. That's a rough order of magnitude just based on
the flow that I've looked at. And if we find that we can't, you
know, address those concerns with what we have, then we'll reach
farther. But my sense is that the other thing that's going to come
into play here is there's a great deal of international work being
done by professional relief and aid agencies - NGOs, if you will.
And, of course, as I said, the international community has been
very generous with their funding. So some of this capability in
the very near future will be contracted, too, and that will get
money into the economies, and that will be helpful also.
Q. Admiral, one quick follow-up. … It doesn't have much to do with
the humanitarian efforts. But you're using, I think for the first
time, the WestPac Express, this high-speed vessel out of Okinawa.
… Is this in effect - it's a long distance. Is this the longest
distance she's traveled? And is this kind of a shakedown cruise
for the future, perhaps, for the type of naval vessel?
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| Experimental 'Westpac
Express' ship is ferrying helicopters to disaster area. Photo
courtesy of DOD |
ADM. FARGO: Well, I can't tell you whether this is the longest
distance that the - this is the high-speed vessel we're talking
about, the WestPac Express [named the HSV 2 Swift] that the Marines
have been leasing for the last year and a half. And we've found
it provides tremendous utility. The reason I can't answer the specific
question is the WestPac Express has been almost everywhere in the
Pacific over the last 18 months, including down to Australia. But
I think the message is, is that high-speed vessels of this nature,
vessels that can move 40, 45 knots, that can carry a great deal
of cargo - in this case she's actually moving helicopters - are
going to be a big part of the future. …
Q. Admiral, when you said double the number of helicopters, can
you give us a figure for the current? What figure should we double?
ADM. FARGO: I think the fact sheet you have right now currently
says we have about 45 actually in the theater now. And that number
could double. But I would also add that we're not doing this in
isolation, and we will look at the contributions that are being
made by the wide range of militaries in the region and make sure
that the aggregate can handle the problem.
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