The Agency arguably is at it lowest ebb since its founding almost 60 years ago, some say in free-fall. It has declined by any measure whether stature, morale, derring-do, or as best we can tell, effectiveness against the enemies that count, including Islamic terrorists and extremists and rogue nascent nuclear states.

Some argue that the fact the U.S. has not suffered an attack on home soil since 9/11 shows US intelligence has been effective. We will hear plenty of this during the confirmation process for General Michael Hayden. This argument is specious and dangerous -- dangerous because it encourages complacent acceptance of a deeply flawed intelligence system; specious because it has been repeated ad nauseam by every security agency in Washington that has come under fire, including the Homeland Security Department itself. The truth is that aggressive offensive operations abroad have kept Al Qaeda and its affiliates at bay. Credit the U.S. military, special operations and a handful of field intelligence operatives alone and uniquely for this.

To fully understand how we came to this pass and what it means for the U.S., we must absorb two fundamental realities: First, only CIA's clandestine corps can operate effectively abroad to obtain timely intelligence on terrorist threats and plans, without which the U.S. stands naked to its deadly and relentless enemies. This is high stakes intelligence at its most difficult and exacting. It cannot be collected solely through technical means, nor by newly expanded military organizations however conscientious and motivated but, frankly, out of their depth in working against the world's hardest targets in the least favorable environments.

Because al Qaeda remains in the field, determined to strike the U.S. with WMD, CIA's eclipse puts our nation at dire risk.

Second, fundamental misanalysis of why 9/11 occurred by the 9/11 Commission has resulted in misbegotten “reforms” of U.S. intelligence impeding rather than facilitating stronger performance against the terrorist enemy.

The 9/11 attacks happened not because we didn't connect the dots, but because we didn't have enough of the right kind of dots, that is, better intelligence. With such intelligence, connecting the dots becomes almost intuitive and second nature to experienced analysts. Without them, no amount of clever collation of bits and pieces would have persuaded serious political leaders of the peril at hand.

No president will go to war or take serious initiatives on the basis of analytic judgments rather than hard intelligence.

Cowed by the brazenly outspoken 9/11 Commission, its press allies and the political calendar, the political leadership in Washington caved. It imposed another layer of bureaucracy and the inevitable bureaucratic gamesmanship on an already risk-averse agency sucking further talent, spirit and energy out of CIA.

So, because one commission guessed wrong, we were deprived of an opportunity to strengthen an intelligence institution that matters in the war on terror and, instead, poured resources, energy and expectations into the DNI bureaucracy. A year later as the DNI metastasizes and CIA further declines, we now wonder how it went so wrong.

To be sure, other factors went into the CIA crack up: over-centralization in Washington, which put more bureaucrats, lawyers and politicians in the chain of command between our political authorities and field operatives diluting the crisp commands and expectations of the former and making the latter more risk averse and cautious; disinterest and disdain for the clandestine intelligence craft by various administrations, particularly through the 90's, producing weak leadership in Langley thereby encouraging outsiders to fill the vacuum; and, more recently, some over-politicized and small-minded partisans confusing loyalty to an Administration and CIA's professional responsibilities, which has led to a destructive political cleansing at CIA.

This only further depressed morale and accelerated departures of experienced and strong officers, as repetition of wholly exaggerated tales of CIA leaking, “disloyalty,” and “softness” in national security viewpoints became a self-fulfilling prophecy. Now, Washington pundits and journalists who frankly don't know any better talk knowingly of widespread CIA leaking and anti-Bush political activism as if fact.

Some argue that CIA's reputation has always been overrated and breaking china while “reforming” the Agency is not a bad thing but necessary. The public record says otherwise. The treachery of Ames, Hanson and Howard underscored the fact that U.S. intelligence had penetrated the Soviet and Russian states to a remarkable degree during the Cold War.

We can reasonably surmise that these successes were matched elsewhere in the world. The public record gives us hints of the exploits of many legendary Agency operators: George, Clarridge, Bearden, Holm, Redmond, and Avrakatos.

The key point is these and even contemporary agency legends are long gone. Those whose valor and skill in late 2001 turned out the Taliban in Afghanistan and sent them and their al Qaeda allies scurrying into hiding -- Schroen and Berntsen in the field; Black and Crumpton from Washington -- they came out of retirement to serve, left the agency shortly after Afghan successes or have moved elsewhere in the government.

So, where do we go from here?

We will remain stuck in the mud and the nation at mortal risk if we don't first acknowledge that restoring our clandestine capability is an urgent and critically important task and that the DNI path leads inexorably to bureaucratic morass without any real gains in capability.

If we are to be stuck with the DNI, we need to rein it in and limit it to its statutory function of coordination. It has no sensible direct operational role to play in the main business of collecting and interpreting intelligence and should be prevented from doing so. The Congress should show some sense and backbone (for a change) and give voice and votes to its well-founded instincts to withhold funding from the mindless growth of the DNI enterprise.

Most important, we need to get the DNI bureaucracy, not to mention Washington's legions of intrusive lawyers, bureaucrats and politicians, off the backs of the clandestine operators and analysts who belong on the front lines of the nation's struggle against terror unfettered and spared from staring in the rear-view mirror.

But, the rebirth and strengthening of the clandestine service is job one. No one should underestimate how difficult and how long this will be. It has taken decades to diminish CIA's clandestine capability, and it will take at least a decade to restore it. This is a people business, and neither money nor technology -- while helpful - provide short cuts to fielding a corps of capable, self-confident and reliable officers. It takes recruiting the right people, training them, supporting them and deploying them to gain valuable field experience. With luck and patience, this can produce a fully capable clandestine service officer, but only over time. Donald Rumsfeld's eager beavers at Defense apparently have yet to learn this, but they will.

National and political leadership must sign up to this, fund it, support it and then get out of the way especially when the inevitable missteps in high risk intelligence operations embarrass Washington. Trimming the sails of the DNI would be a useful first step to signal seriousness. Another would be to bring back the many agency veterans who have left in sadness and/or disgust to help mentor newcomers.

All this will take leadership of a kind and at a level sadly lacking at CIA....