President Bush's recent trip to India and Pakistan represented a daring gamble for the Bush/Condoleezza Rice foreign policy. In India, Bush entered into an agreement, concerning India's development of nuclear weapons. Regardless of whether the agreement is correct as a matter of foreign policy, it constitutes a breach of United States commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Under the NPT, the United States has promised not to assist other countries in developing nuclear weapons. It has also supported the related principle that only countries that have their nuclear facilities under international safeguards, which India does not, should benefit from trade in civilian nuclear technology. This new agreement with India permits that nation to import nuclear fuel and technology despite its avowed purpose of using those materials and technology to develop nuclear weapons.

In justifying this deal, Bush pointed to the strong democratic character of the Indian government, which is undeniably correct. He also pointed to its long and abiding friendship with the United States, which has varied depending upon Indian perceptions of its own self-interests and United States' policy toward India's avowed enemy, Pakistan.

This agreement could not come at a worse time in terms of U.S. antinuclear proliferation efforts. We are engaged in an intense effort to persuade, cajole and threaten North Korea and Iran into not developing nuclear weapon programs. By not only permitting India to go this route, but easing its path, the United States has now made it much more difficult to advance its policies with respect to North Korea and Iran. I recognize that there is an old expression: consistency is the hobgoblin of small minds. However, inconsistency can also rise to the level of hypocrisy. Permitting those nations perceived to be America's friends at any given moment to do whatever they want is a dangerous foreign policy. It does not produce respect for the United States among other nations.

Then there is the matter of Pakistan, a bitter rival of India. Military rule by General Musharraf is anything but democratic. Elections are rigged. Notwithstanding all of this, Pakistan is a critical U.S. allay in the war against terrorism and most importantly in the hunt for Osama Bin Laden and his Al Qaeda colleagues.

Though efforts were made to conceal Pakistan's unhappiness with Bush's agreement with India, the anger in Islamabad was visible. Recognizing the stakes, Bush made this risky personal trip to Pakistan where the chances of an assassination attempt were substantial. Photographs of the President playing cricket in Pakistan didn't dampen the angry mood. Moreover, Pakistan probably with help from China will no doubt expand its own nuclear weapons program.

Thus, the negative results of this agreement with India are two-fold. It adversely affects our efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. And it has a negative affect on the war on terror by weakening Pakistan's help. These are substantial downsides. The question is why did the President risk them. The answer is simple: containment of China. Growing military power in China increasingly alarms the Bush administration. Fearful that nation's leadership will be unable to control hawks in its military from an aggressive policy such as retaking Taiwan by force, the United States is developing a policy of encirclement. In the last couple of years, the U.S. has encouraged renewed militarism in Japan with the idea that Tokyo, with all of the animosities it has toward China, could step in militarily in the event of an attack against Taiwan. In the India deal, Bush wishes to block China's expansion in the south and in the west.

This policy with Japan makes sense. Those two nations have not resolved their historical and World War II differences. With India, it is dubious at best. The Indians, if not threatened personally by China are likely to look the other way regardless of what Beijing does in Asia.

All of this harm may be for naught. The agreement with India is subject to congressional approval. Given the current mood in congress, as reflected by the U.S. ports acquisition by a UAE company, Bush will have great difficulty gaining an approval from Congress.