The number of articles and speeches on “How to Win in Iraq” are no match for the negative reports in the US news media. A number of recent articles have called for a “National Counterinsurgency Plan.” Unfortunately, it is much too late for a national counterinsurgency plan and trying to win anything is out of the question.

First, let us understand what we have in Iraq. We do have a small number of insurgents but we have a far larger resistance to the occupation whose ranks are filled by former Ba'athist political leaders, Fayadeen (irregulars formed by Uday Hussein), unemployed and unemployable former military, particularly Republican Guards, and Islamic Jihadist (Iraqi and foreign).

The majority of the anti-Coalition combatants in Iraq are resistance fighters. First and foremost is the fight against the US led Coalition occupation, and that is what is drawing more and more local recruits every day. They fight for resistance, revenge and the “holy war” – the jihad.

Would anyone call the French Marquis in World War II an insurgency movement? Not to compare the US military in Iraq to the German army but think of the French Marquis and its resistance movement against German occupation. Does anyone think the German army ever considered winning many “heart and minds” in Vichy France with a national counterinsurgency plan?

If all we had were an insurgency against the established government, it would be a simple matter to conduct a counterinsurgency campaign. The US was very successful in its counterinsurgency campaign in Vietnam even though most would not know it by reading and/or listening to the uninformed, including many current national military and political leaders. The victor in Vietnam was not a peasant, guerrilla war of national liberation; the victor was the North Vietnamese Army. There is no war of national liberation in Iraq.

There are simple explanations of what went wrong in Iraq:

1. We didn't have enough troops to occupy and “pacify” the belligerents in 2003.

2. Disbanding the entire Army and the police was a big mistake.

3. Failure to keep employed the Iraqi civil servants was a mistake.

5. Failure to work from the start with the local religious and tribal leaders was a mistake.

6. Failure to have a post-conflict and reconstruction plan was the biggest mistake of all.

An often-overlooked mistake is not to remember that we had double-crossed the Shi'ites after the Gulf War. We encouraged them to revolt and then did nothing to help them and stop the Saddam Hussein retributions. They know that America cannot be trusted, just as the Vietnamese, Lebanese, and Somalis know, and the Shi'ites have never been our friends since then and never will be. They know that Iran is their only avenue to total religious freedom and independence.

Then there is the simple fact that we never conquered the Sunni triangle in 2003. They never knew that Iraq was totally defeated. They never saw US troops until months after "Mission Accomplished." They have been fighting American occupation ever since. And by the way, the Sunnis think they are over 50% of the Iraqi population. Perception often has nothing to do with reality.

I disagree with anyone who says that Saddam and his leadership had a plan to revert to irregular warfare after the US defeat of the regular army. The Faydayeen was a creation of Saddam's son Uday as a planned counter-balance against his father. Uday knew that his father was not going to let Uday succeed him and this was his way to prepare for a possible coup. It was a ready made force for RESISTANCE and REVENGE after the US took Baghdad and the massive unemployed Republican Guards and Ba'athist party leadership were only too eager to help. The jihad came later.

This type of para-military is not uncommon in the Middle East - note the Saudi National Guard or the Jordanian Bedouin Palace Guards, etc., select forces to counter-balance the regular armies.

Too many American political & military analysts and political pundits have only one reference point – Vietnam. However, Iraq is nothing like Vietnam.

The success of the December 15 elections aside, there is more or less a growing consensus that as the Coalition continues to hand over security responsibilities to the Iraqi security forces, there must be a US and Coalition draw-down in Iraq in 2006.

The US has already turned over more than 22 forward operating bases to Iraqi forces according to the Associated Press in a 28 November news report and it is reported that there are currently 220,000 Iraqi soldiers and police that are trained and equipped for police or military operations. Most military analysts, not uninformed political pundits, agree that there is sufficient leadership to deploy 120 army and police battalions of various degrees of readiness.

If you wait for the readiness reporting system by the US Army there are only two or three battalions up to speed with a US Army infantry battalion. However, if you think in Arabic terms, there are over 36 battalions that are trained well enough to undertake security operations without American supervision. Some wise military thinker once said that a plan 75 percent ready today is better than a plan that is 100 percent ready next week.

Every day these Iraqi battalions undertake more operations. Iraqi officers and NCOs are gaining more and more practical experience and confidence as they conduct raids, cordon and search, and clear and hold operations. As was the case in Vietnam, each Iraqi battalion has a team of up to ten American “advisors,” who help train and advise the battalions – these advisors do not run the battalion. The Americans help with training, planning, logistics, communications, air strikes, MedEvacs, etc.

Another important item is the training of Iraqi NCOs, which has always been a major weakness with any Arab army and was particularly so with the Saddam Hussein Iraqi army. Training Iraqi NCOs for a leadership position is a first for an Arab army.

The best book on how to fight militants, resistance fighters, insurgents, or what ever you want to call them, is Militant Tricks: Battlefield Ruses of the Islamic Insurgents by H. John Poole. Even Poole calls the Jihadist “insurgents” but he has a keen insight to the Islamic combat tactics and how they wage jihad in all its forms.

It seems that we can prevail on the battlefield but we cannot win a war of words in the US news media when there are so many reporters and political opponents opposed to the President no matter what he does.

US politics has turned against the war in Iraq, thanks mainly to the negative press and the politicians on both sides, and it is time to realize that we will not be allowed to win no matter what we do. Therefore, it is time to turn the security operations over to the Iraq military and police forces and stop wasting time trying to superimpose a US concept of a national counterinsurgency campaign plan on something that is far past its time.

Resistance will not stop until there is a movement to withdrawal. However, there had better be a planned Iraqi and US agreed withdrawal and the anti-Bush “at all cost” crowds had better understand the potential for international repercussions for a precipitous withdrawal.