already active in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army says.

L: Stryker wheeled armored personnel carrier designed initially for a low intensity "peacekeeping" role. Subsequently the Army decided to change its intended mission to infantry support, where it fights in an environment it was never designed to survive in. As a result the Army was forced to attach improvised "bird cage" armor to defeat rocket propelled grenades frequently sent its way in Iraq. Photo: US Army

In that "low intensity" arena hard pressed soldiers and Marines currently mired in an ostensible FourthGen quagmire against a stateless – albeit well funded - rabble fighting a battle that so far offers the initiative to the enemy. Almost daily the Army and Marines' remarkably vulnerable armored vehicles are set upon by zealots inflicting the death of a thousand cuts on the most  technologically superior army the world has ever seen. FCS - because it is so much better - is touted to prevent that, the Army says. And it should, its legions of critics say, if for no other reason than its costs so darn much!

At the heart of the FCS manned vehicles is a common chassis sharing many mechanical and armor components, the Army says. The infantry carriers are bigger than the old 11-ton M-113 that still holds allure in some quarters and smaller than the Bradleys and huge Abrams. Somewhere between the old and new is the Stryker wheeled armored personnel carriers introduced in February 2002 when the Army formally named its new "Interim Armored Vehicle" after two infantrymen posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.  The Stryker is the "vehicle of choice" for the Army's Interim Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) intended to equip the Army's new "modular" force while FCS gestates.

Readers who play in their alphabet soup know IBCTs are intended to cover the "near-term capabilities gap" between the Army's "Legacy Force" heavy and light units (old stuff) and FCS (new stuff), the Army says. Never made clear by the Army is why the Pentagon planners didn't elect to simply keep the old stuff – supposedly the best equipment in the world - until it figured out how to make the even better new stuff. Despite repeated requests for information the Army declined to comment on this story.

NLOS-C Demonstrator firing its 155mm automated cannon. Photo: US Army

The new stuff is nifty. Generals enamored with gadgetry particularly admire the $332 million NLOS-C (artillery) concept because it is so slick. It has become the poster child of the FCS family and a familiar portrait for public consumption. As one Pentagon wag put it, "that is because [NLOS-C] that is the only thing so far that actually moves on its own."

The computer-aimed and operated 155 mm cannon intended to arm the beast has already proven it can hit targets as far away as 30 km with a two-person crew doing what currently takes five soldiers to accomplish, BAE says. The NLOS-C system was until very recently required to weigh less than 20 tons and be C-130 deployable as well, the Army said. The $332 million United Defense was awarded to develop the vehicles has so far produced only the "NLOS-C System Demonstrator" intended to convince skeptics it will work.  Hopefully it won't be deja vue all over again!

The Army probably hasn't forgotten the M-247 Division Air Defense Gun (DIVAD) fiasco that reportedly occurred when the unfortunately named "Sgt. York" - after the deadeye World War I Tennessean - confused an unoccupied outhouse with a hovering helicopter during a firepower demonstration. It was just one of four air defense systems including the MIM-46 Mauler, the Air Defense Anti-Tank System (ADATS), and the joint German-American Roland anti-aircraft missile the Army spent $8.7 billion trying to develop before it gave up. 

Perhaps the NLOS-C and its siblings will have better luck. The NLOS-C System Demonstrator is a 23-ton, 155mm self-propelled system adapted from the amazing complex and obese 40-ton Crusader artillery program that BG Cartwright once worked on and Rumsfeld cancelled for being too fat. In November 2003 the Army announced the demonstrator successfully completed an 8-round fire mission at a rate of more than 6 rounds per minute at Yuma Proving Ground. Since then it has fired more than 1,000 rounds at Yuma, according to official press releases.

BAE Systems calls its NLOS-C prototype a "proof-of-principle test-bed" that will demonstrate the practicality of building "a fully automated, 20-ton, high-caliber, self-propelled cannon system" by 2010 - maybe. Apparently somebody forgot to tell the Army the 20-ton target weight of the final product is a bit much to fulfill the high mobility role it is designed for. A C-130 can't lift 20 tons and never could despite the Army's requirement and Boeing's assurances for six years that the NLOS-C would be C-130 deployable. Nobody has said whether Rumsfeld knows and approves of the sudden change of heart. For the moment the transition is an all-Army show.

Implicit in Harvey's announcement is the question of whether the NLOS-C was ever really intended to be forward deployed via Hercules aircraft along with its infantry support cousins. For that matter it is questionable whether the infantry adaptations of the vehicle were ever really C-130 capable either. One senior officer who talked to DW in a backgrounder recently said the issue for several years hasn't been whether any of the FCS vehicles would ever be C-130 lift capable, but rather how to announce that they never were.

Harvey told his appreciative audience last month that a recent "evolution in thinking" produced a "real requirement" mandating at least three FCS ground vehicles must fit aboard C-17 Globemaster II heavy lifters instead of one per C-130 as previously envisioned. Apparently once the vehicles reach the theater of operations they will drive themselves to the FEBA or be transported by truck and trailer just like the heavyweights that preceded them.

That about covers evolutionary thinking!

The infantry support vehicles and command and control tracks are not as far along in development, BEA reports. A witness to the September 21 demonstration put on for Harvey told DefenseWatch a mockup on the common chassis roared around for awhile but it didn't have any of the gizmos it is supposed to come with.

"It is bigger than I thought," he added.

Communications and computer software glitches, unanticipated development snags, corporate reorganization and command changes have seen to that. Meanwhile the Army and Boeing produce bushels of grandly prepared PowerPoint presentations, press kits, brochures, and handouts that promise a great product just as soon as all the research and development is completed.

Macgregor isn't so sure. He said the Army goal of an air transportable armored force was merely another unattainable goal in a long history of failed programs. He said he was not at all surprised by Harvey's announcement to scrap the notion to make the FCS lean and mean.

"It didn't make any sense," he said. "Inside the Beltway we call it data free analysis. Generals got into a room and made a decision. Like I said, if you are four-star, active or retired, you are so accustomed to being indulged by members of Congress without any military experience or background that you actively engage in data-free analysis [that] supports analysis-free decision making."

Based on those flawed decisions the Perfumed Princes in the Pentagon who manage the...