The seizure of Marja in Helmand Province was the largest operation in the Afghanistan war, conducted by approximately 2,500 American and 1,500 Afghan troops versus 400-800 insurgents. Chris Chivers of The New York Times moved with Battalion 3-6, Mike Phillips of The Wall Street Journal with 1-6, Rajiv Chandrasekaran of The Washington Post with 1-6 and with the brigade headquarters. I went up to Now Zad, began the operation with 1-6 and spent most of the month in southern Marja with Task Force Commando, comprised of 40 Marines and Special Forces and 400 askars and police. Marja marked my third embed with MEB units.

The basic question is whether the seizure of Marja was sui generis, with few techniques of general applicability, or was an example, like Talafar in the Iraqi war, with wider implications.

Let’s look at: 1) what happened; 2 why; and 3) what carries forward?

1. What happened.  In February of 2009, the top commander in Afghanistan, General David McKiernan, decided to send a Stryker Brigade to Kandahar and a Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB) to Helmand, where ten of the twelve districts were under Taliban control. The MEB mission was to control the southern and western districts and to seize Marja, the Taliban headquarters and the hub of the drug trade. Helmand accounted for 70 percent of the world's illegal opium and heroin production, with the Taliban taking between $40 and $100 million per annum. If Kandahar was the symbolic capital of the Taliban, then Helmand was their breadbasket.

The MEB commander, BG Larry D. Nicholson, who had commanded a regiment in Fallujah, was familiar with the complexities of fighting, assassinations, corruption and politics. He had handpicked his staff from Fallujah veterans, earning the nickname The Poacher.

McKeirnan and Nicholson agreed that taking Marja first made no sense since there were no Afghan forces to hold it. So when MEB arrived in June, the battalions spread out along the narrow Green Zone of the Helmand River south of the province capital of Laskar Gah, allowing the overextended British troops to consolidate to the north. The farmers in the south proved surprisingly receptive to the Marine presence that consisted of 20 outposts per each of three battalions, generating an average of 60 patrols a day per battalion. By mid-July, the Taliban had relinquished control of the Green Zone and pulled back to a picket line defending the Marja enclave, a few dozen kilometers west of the Helmand River.

Initially the ratio of marines to askars in Helmand was 9:1, and the local police were an impediment.  As success with local shuras increased, General Stanley McChrystal pressured the bureaucracies to send more Afghan forces to Helmand. Once LtGen William Caldwell took command of Afghan training, Helmand was put on the fast track for receiving askars. Nicholson set up his own school to train police.

Marja was planned for months. The objective area comprised about 20 by 20 kilometers of canals and irrigation ditches holding several thousand farm compounds, generally set about 300 to 600 meters apart. Nicholson and the Governor Gulab Mangal assured everyone that the attack was a certainty, in order to persuade the insurgents and druggies to leave and thus avoid large-scale destruction. The leaders did leave town. Nicholson also met with dozens of elders to set the scene for bringing in the first Afghan government in three years, working to isolate the former Afghan governor and former police chief who were seen as malign influences profiting from the drugs.

The assault began on 13 February with the night landing by helicopters of three companies, with askars attached to every squad, in central Marja. They attacked from the center out, aiming to link with two battalions moving in from the northwest and the east. Thus once the attack began, no politician could call it off. (A Fallujah lesson.) To the south, Task Force Commando – one ODA team, one kandak, a marine engineer platoon and air controllers from ANGLICO - attacked north. Police and DEA came in at about D+3.

Mines were everywhere. At noon on D-Day, I talked with the EOD sergeant who was disarming an IED beside our MRAP. "This is my ninth today," he said. Basic movement was by platoon bounding, with snipers and the occasional PKM encountered by every platoon usually once or twice a day for the first week. The askars did well, considering they were fresh from boot camp.

Air support was problematical, requiring extended discussion between the pilot, the JTAC and the ground commander about the exact nature of the confirmed target and the degree of danger the friendly forces were facing. There had been a tragic miscalculation with a ground-launched rocket on the first day that killed 12 civilians, and after that everyone was super cautious.

Battalions 1-3, 3-6 and 1-6 had some good shoots when Talibs made the mistake of closing to within 300 meters. After about the fourth day, the Talibs fell back to their usual ranges of 400 – 800 meters. There were a few good snipers intermixed, but on the whole the insidious danger were the damn mines. It was really cold a few nights, with enough rain and mud to damp down the presence of the mines.

The Talibs had no coordinated battle plan and gradually ex-filtrated, or picked up hoes. The Talib line was that the marines raped and killed. The farmers didn’t buy into that, but insisted the Talibs would return. They remained very skeptical that the new sub-governor or the Afghan troops would remain.

Two Marine battalions will stay in the area for the next two months. Then there will be a turnover of US units. On the Afghan side, a new corps is standing up. The cops were trained at the brigade school and Nicholson had hand-picked their leader. The PRT has ample money.

The next stage will be the poppy harvest in late April and early May. Marines and DEA are intermingled with police, making it tough to export drugs via the main roads. Odds are the Taliban have taken a large hit in finances, because they won’t be able to organize the purchase and export of wet opium, let alone refine it inside Marja. Instead, many small-time dealers will resort to smuggling small amounts over the back roads, fracturing Taliban control and reducing the profit margin.

2. Why did Marja fall quickly?  The 400 or so Talibs were overwhelmed. Their leaders had left town. That had to affect morale. The rifle companies attacking out from the center prevented internal lines of defense, permitting nothing resembling Fallujah to occur. Once the companies  linked up with the battalions coming in from the outside, it was over.

Air surveillance played a huge role. No Talib could cruise around on his motorbike, set up a checkpoint or move ammo without fearing the Big Eye in the Sky. Firefights were limited usually to ten or 15 minutes. Once rotary wing comes overhead, things quiet down. All Afghans hold our air in awe and attribute to it capabilities not even seen in Star Wars.

Canals became the equivalent of the concrete barriers in Iraq. Once outposts were set up at intersecting canals, the Talibs left before they were trapped inside.

3. What carries forward?

a. Small Advisory/Combat Task Forces. Looking forward a year, the concept behind Task Force Commando holds great promise. Nine Special Forces soldiers in the ODA provided the combat core for two platoon patrols every day. The ODA were supported by a 30-man Marine engineer platoon (in OPCON) that swept the roads, threw up the outposts and provided firepower and back-up for the ODA. In addition, four Marines from ANGLICO with extensive experience calling in air was also OPCON to the ODA. Everyone got along so well that the ANGLICO Cobra pilot served as...