A March 14 Washington Post story written by embedded reporter Rajiv Chandrasekaran claimed that senior commanders in Afghanistan are miffed that the Marine Corps contingent sent to southern Afghanistan seems to be executing a strategy separate from that of overall commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal. The argument centers on recent assaults against Marjah and Now Zad and whether they are strategically relevant to the overall goal of protecting the population from the Taliban. One official wondered why the Marines weren’t squeezing Kandahar instead of desolate outposts deemed of little value to higher ups in Kabul. But Marine commanders cite their strategic success in al Anbar, Iraq, and claim that going the doctrinaire route dictated by Kabul “isn’t going to cut it.”

The Tank asks the experts:  "Does the ‘rogue’ Marine brigade in Afghanistan need to be reined in?"

Bing West (author, former assistant secretary of defense, and combat Marine who has made two dozen extended trips to Iraq and Afghanistan)

Best counterinsurgency practices were applied in Marja. Shuras were immediately held wherever US forces went. Nicholson talked with hundreds of elders and reached out to the mullahs. The PRT came in with millions in projects. "A government in a box" -- meaning Afghan officials chosen and briefed beforehand -- was brought in.

"We reach out and talk to everyone," Nicholson said. "The battalions report shuras as well as TICs (Troops in Contact)." But we have to be clear-eyed in our expectations about counterinsurgency in different locales. Since 2006, Marja was the tenth major operation in Helmand alone. The Taliban recovered from the first nine ops. So the question of regeneration, or sleeper cells, is vexing. What's going on here?

Basically, Pashtuns do not betray their cousins who are fighting with the Taliban. Beginning in Anbar in Iraq in late 2006, the inter--related Sunni tribes began to rebel against Al Qaeda. Tribesmen betrayed locations and identities. General Petraeus was able to pay 100,000 Sunni "Sons of Iraq" to act as armed militia and to drive Al Qaeda out of their neighborhoods. Nothing resembling that armed swing of the Iraqi tribes has happened among the Pashtuns in Afghanistan.
The notion that we provide security to a Pashtun population that is not excessively oppressed by the Taliban, and that in return the population informs on the Taliban in their midst remains an unproven theory. Equally troubling, in nine years of war DoD has never developed a concept and a device for the biometric identification of the male population on a large scale. Our soldiers and marines -- and the Tajik askars -- have no way of knowing whether the man they are questioning comes from where he claims, or where and when he was last questioned.

Rarely is a Talib body recovered after a firefight. Given the ranges of most engagements, it's not clear how many are really killed versus those reported shot. Even fewer are captured and sent to prison to do hard time. The police fall under the National Directorate of Security. Estimates are that for every ten actual Talibs detained at the substation level, only one will eventually stand trial, be convicted and sent away under the NDS system. There is leakage and corruption at every level. Afghanistan on a per capita basis has fewer criminals (including insurgents) in prison than does Sweden.
On the other hand, Talib recruitment is low. They haven't attracted large numbers of followers, even when they have been in charge for years, as in Marja.

But if you are not killing or capturing the enemy in significant numbers, it's hard to win a war.

Dave Dilegge (Editor in Chief of Small Wars Journal)

Absolutely not, and it's not a “brigade” it is a Marine Air Ground Task Force that has a ground element of roughly the size of a traditional brigade – an integral part of this MAGTF is it’s aviation and combat service support elements, and along with the normal attachments and innovative initiatives (like the Female Engagement Teams) the MEB is tasked organized to deal with the situation at hand in their area of operations.

It’s all about “the sum is greater than the parts”. BGen Nicholson is employing all those counterinsurgency principles laid out in FM 3-24 – which encourages innovation and independent action – to include not accepting a one size fits all template. COIN is all about decentralized command and control – we’d like to think we could do this down to the squad level.  In this case, let’s hope we can at least do it down to the one-star level.

Peter Brookes (Heritage Foundation senior fellow, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, and Navy veteran)

It makes sense to do some experimentation at the edges of your strategy to see if you can find new ways to be more effective/efficient with your resources with an eye to bringing the war to a swift and decisive end in your favor. 

This article is just one reporter's take, but I think this quote by Brig. Gen. Lawrence D. Nicholson, the top Marine commander in Afghanistan is right: "If we're going to succeed here, we have to experiment and take risks...Just doing what everyone else is doing isn't going to cut it." The challenge is to see when your experiment is no longer reaping benefits and it's time to move on - not forgetting to take the lessons learned with you.

Andrew Lubin (author and embedded journalist with numerous trips to Afghanistan, Haiti, Iraq)

The article’s title is misleading and offensive. Gen Larry Nicholson’s strategy of engaging the villagers has pacified the Helmand River Valley, re-opened Now Zad after three years of Taliban rule, and stability is already returning to Marjah - all in only nine months. Only ISAF would consider this a failure.

COIN is effort-intensive and must be conducted fact-to-face. This is the same strategy that the Marines used successfully “pre-Surge” in Ramadi and Anbar in 2006-2007. By pacifying and transforming the villages and countryside surrounding Kandahar, 2MEF is enabling the locals and “small-t” Taliban to see there is an option to Taliban rule. The MAGTAF, where the Marines retain use of their own air and artillery remains essential in view of the Army’s shocking refusal to support Marines-in-contact at Gangegal, leading to 5 unnecessary deaths.