The following is a guest column, written by a reserve NCO with Special Forces, Mark Sexton.  It is based on his personal observations in Afghanistan.  It represents his analysis only, not any position taken by DOD, the U.S. Army, or any other agency of the U.S. government.  In my opinion, it represents exactly the sort of intelligence analysis we need but seldom get.

A current method used by Taliban in Afghanistan to gain control of an area deemed of strategic interest to the Taliban leadership operating from safe havens in Pakistan or within Afghanistan is to identify and target villages to subvert. The Taliban have recognized the necessity to operate with the cooperation of local population with the modus operandi being to gain their cooperation through indoctrination (preferred) or coercion (when necessary).

Village Nodes of Influence

For a non-Afghan or foreigner to understand how the Taliban can subvert a village, we can use a simple social structure model to identify the key nodes of influence within a typical Afghan village. A village can be divided into three areas that most affect how daily life is lived. These areas generally fall under political and administrative, religious, and security. These three areas can be considered key nodes of influence in every Afghan village. Of the three nodes the one that is the most visible to outsiders is that of the Malik and village elders. The Malik and village elders represent the political aspects of the village. A second key node of influence is the Imam. The Imam represents the religious node of influence within a village. A third Local node of influence is the individuals and system of security found within a village. Security is traditionally conducted by the men of each individual village. If one of the parts or nodes of influence is controlled by either the Taliban or the Afghan government in each village, then they heavily influence or control villages and the area.

Taliban Control of Village Nodes

The Taliban look for villages and areas which they can operate within and use as a base against US and Afghan forces. Areas with little US presence or Afghan police or army are prime areas the Taliban will initially seek to subvert and hold.  The Taliban build networks by getting a fighter, religious leader, or village elder to support them.  Whichever one or more are initially used will be exploited by tribal and familial ties.  The village politics administered by the elders and represented by an appointed Malik are the most identifiable node of influence of any particular village.  The Taliban will attempt to sway those Maliks who are not supportive by discussion and if necessary threats, violence, or death.  In villages where the locals say there is no Malik it is usually described as a convenience to the village as "no one wants the position", or sometimes "the elders cannot agree on a Malik so it is better there is none".  In these cases it is most likely the Taliban have neutralized the desired representative of that village.  When locals are pressed for a representative they will give you a name of a person who has come to represent the village. This individual will also most likely be in support of and supported by the Taliban. The Taliban will try to install a Malik or "representative of the village" by coercion or force.

A "sub-commander" will be established in the village to keep those in line who would resist the Taliban or their Malik, who will be supported by limited funding. The sub-commander will generally have 2-5 fighters under his control.  The fighters will often be armed only with small arms and rocket propelled grenades. They may or may not have an IED capability, and if not will coordinate IED activities for the defense and when possible offense against US and Afghan forces. These fighters may stay in the village but preferably are not from the village. Locals can sometimes be pressed into service to fight when needed but the Taliban tend to use fighters from different villages so that when threats or physical violence is utilized it won't be kinsman against kinsman.

The Imam and local mosques of villages are often visited by the Taliban.  This is not generally opposed by villagers as it is expected that even the Taliban must be allowed to perform and express their Islamic duties.  These mosque visits afford the Taliban opportunities to gage village sentiment and to build and establish contacts within localities.  Village religious leaders also serve to educate children in villages where the Taliban have either closed or destroyed the local school.  The mosque and Imam serve as an education center for the Taliban while still presenting an opportunity for village children to be "educated."  This presents a solution to the unpopular notion of schools being closed.  A constant and recognized complaint from the Afghan people is the lack of opportunity because of poor education.  The Taliban will supplant the local Imam if needed by supplying their own to a village.  A village with no Imam will receive one and the Taliban will establish a mosque.  This mosque will serve as a meeting place for Taliban, storage facility, and indoctrination center.

Sympathetic locals are used as auxiliaries to provide food and shelter.  One way to do this is for known supporters to place food and blankets outside their living quarters or in guest quarters to be used by Taliban in transit or operating within a village.  This gives the resident supporter some cover of deniability.  When US or Afghan forces arrive all that is found are the blanket, possibly clothing, footprints and other signs of their visit.  The Taliban have blended into the surrounding village.

Taliban Can Control With Few Fighters

The Taliban method requires relatively few of their own personnel. Its strength is in the local subversion of the most basic levels of village organization and life. It is also a decentralized approach. Guidance is given and then carried out with commanders applying their own interpretation of how to proceed.  The goal is to control the village, and at the local level the only effective method, which must be used by all commanders, is to control what we have termed the nodes of influence. Form fits function, an Afghan village can only work one way to allow its members to survive a subsistence agrarian lifestyle, and the Taliban know it well. 

To control an area the Taliban will identify villages that can be most easily subverted. They will then spread to other villages in the area one at a time, focusing their efforts on whichever node of influence seem most likely to support their effort first.  Using this model the Taliban could influence and dominate or control a valley or area with a population of 1000-2500 -- of ten villages with 100-250 people (100-250 compounds) -- with only between 20-50 active fighters and ten fighting leaders. The actual numbers may be more population and fewer fighters.

When US or Afghan security forces enter the area they are presented with what appears to be a docile agrarian community, until they are attacked by insurgents. Locals will deny involvement and claim to be simple farmers, showing their soiled and weathered hands as proof.  The fighters in different villages will call one another on their ICOM radios to try to attack by setting up ambushes (swarming tactic) with small arms and Improvised Explosives along roads and paths.

The Taliban will have an elaborate network to support their fighters in areas they control or dominate.  They will have safe houses, medical clinics, supply sites, weapons caches, transportation agents, and early warning...