Conclusions

These raids on what Gates and others should regard as priority spending in the defense budget are nothing new; they have been going on for years.  They almost make Gates' and Obama's objections to the veto-bait programs (the F-35 engine and the VH-71) look superfluous.

Gates and Obama may or may not win on the systems that have attracted a veto threat.  But even if they do win each of those battles, they still lose on the broader pork war.  Billions of dollars for earmarks for large and small programs will remain in the defense budget, and they will be paid for by reducing spending in other parts of the bill, most notably the account that supports key elements of military readiness. 

By not objecting, Gates and Obama will have succumbed to, even enabled, it all. 

These behaviors have been occurring for years, and still no one does a thing about them.  Until someone does, the pork system on Capitol Hill, and in the executive branch, will remain alive and well.  The trophy for 2009 will go to Senator Inouye and the other congressional porkers.  They may have lost a few games, but they won the match.

Winslow T. Wheeler is the Director of the Straus Military Reform Project at the Center for Defense Information.  He is also the editor of the anthology "America's Defense Meltdown: Military Reform for President Obama and the New Congress."

Endnotes

1.  The Air Force's C-17 transport, made by Boeing, is no bargain for those who seek to support the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan with long range, air transport.  At $327 million per copy (counting all procurement and development costs), it delivers too little cargo at too much cost.  A more fuel-efficient Boeing 747-8 freighter costs 10% less and hauls 85% more cargo for 85% longer range. The Air Force claims that the C-17 was designed to be able to land on "unprepared" landing strips.  That claimed ability is rarely, if ever used, but it imposed major payload and cost penalties on the design. When it does deliver to "unprepared" landing strips, it takes weeks to prepare the landing strip!  It virtually never directly supports troops in contact with the enemy, such as those in isolated bases in Afghanistan, and even Iraq. In short, the C-17 is no bargain either as a strategic or a tactical air-lifter.  Gates was entirely right to seek the end of its production.
2.  See Section 8056 of the bill; find the bill at the GPO website at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_bills&docid=f:h3326rs.txt.pdf.
3.  See "Multiple Benefits if Japan Buys the F-22," Lawrence Korb and Peter Juul, Atlanta Journal Constitution, September 3, 2009, at http://www.ajc.com/opinion/multiple-benefits-if-japan-130789.html.
4.  On August 17 at the Veterans of Foreign Wars in Phoenix, President Obama promised an end to "the special interests and their exotic projects that are years behind schedule and billions over budget," and he reaffirmed that he is killing off the F-22 fighter, the second F-35 engine, and the presidential helicopter.  He finished saying "And if Congress sends me a defense bill loaded with this kind of waste, I will veto it."
5.  The SAC-D was hardly alone in raiding O&M to pay for pork.  The SASC, HASC, and HAC-D did also; the only variations are in the details.  Find a discussion of the SASC/HASC/HAC-C raids in an information paper at http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=4535.
6.  47 is an incomplete listing of the earmarks in the O&M account.  It is simply the total number of earmarks listed at the end of the committee report, as required by Senate rules; see pp. 274-295 of the committee report at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_reports&docid=f:sr074.111.pdf.  Other, unlisted earmarks occur in other parts of the committee report.  For example, there is $16 million added for an "Asia Pacific Regional Initiative," very probably with Senator Inouye's full support.