2009 is an important year for the evolution of pork in defense bills.  Having expanded immensely since September 11, 2001, pork has met its first notable challenge. It came from Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who in April took a stand against some of the lowest of the hanging fruit in the Pentagon's acquisition budget.  Since then, those in Congress who seek to perpetuate the spending -- for their home states and districts -- on those very systems have been fighting back, some a lot more successfully than others. 

The fight is now coming to a head.  The last of the four congressional defense committees to act, the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC-D) has reported its version of the 2010 Department of Defense Appropriations bill to the Senate.  The bill is now awaiting consideration by the full Senate, later this week. 

The bill poses Gates and Obama with a sly and indirect response on some specific pork issues; the president and the secretary may choose not to fight them out with the committee.  In other -- much more fundamental - ways, the bill confronts them directly, but Gates and Obama appear not to have even noticed, and as a result, they have lost the most important part of the fight.

Earlier in the year, porkers on the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) attempted to take Gates on frontally.  Led by Saxby Chambliss (R-GA), they sought to stuff additional F-22 fighter aircraft down Gates' throat by mandating seven new ones in the 2010 National Defense Authorization bill.  Having provoked Gates and the White House into an open fight, Chambliss was a big loser on July 21 by a vote of 58 to 40.

The members of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees have been far more clever - by not provoking open fights with Gates, and still getting their way. 

C-17s Slip Through

The first such example occurred in May on the question of adding more C-17s, which Gates said in April he wanted no more of.  The official DOD requirement for 190 aircraft had already been exceeded, there being 205 on order.  Nonetheless, the House Appropriations Committee's Defense Subcommittee (HAC-D) added eight more C-17s (for $2.25 billion) to a supplemental spending bill to fund the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan for the rest of fiscal year 2009.  Someone -- it is not clear who -- convinced Gates that the additional C-17s were needed in Iraq and Afghanistan.   He basically waved the aircraft through, permitting his spokesman to endorse them in a public statement saying they were "in the fight" in Southwest Asia. 

Whether intended or not, it sent a clear signal: not only was the sluice gate open for more C-17s but also Gates was "negotiable" on the rest of his 50 decisions on problematic weapon programs.

The final version of the 2009 supplemental included all eight of the HAC-D's additional C-17s, and when the subcommittee met to consider the new 2010 DOD appropriations bill, it added three more.  Encountering no reason not to, the SAC-D has upped the ante in its version of the bill to 10 aircraft, costing $2.5 billion.

More F-22s?
 
The Senate appropriators even took Gates on in the matter of his big triumph, the F-22.  Unlike Chambliss and his clumsy confrontational approach, they were indirect.  They earmarked existing F-22 spending not to crash Gates' declared US production limit of 187 aircraft, but for America's allies.  Specifically, the SAC-D added a section in the bill's General Provisions title to say that DOD "may" spend money to "develop a future export version of the F--22A that protects classified and sensitive information, technologies and U.S. warfighting capabilities."  

The provision contained all the qualities that just might enable it to slip by Secretary Gates and yet also keep the F-22 production line open --ultimately not just for US allies but for the US Air Force:

• The "may" language did not confront Gates by imposing the idea on him;
• Making the aircraft available for US allies addressed a general theme President Obama has favored;
• By using existing funding already in the bill ($177 million for modifications and $569 million for research for the F-22 fleet), it didn't even add spending (right now, at least), and
• Some of the aircraft's critics, such as Lawrence Korb at the stalwartly pro-Obama Center for American Progress, have even said sales of the F-22 to Japan would make great sense.

If an important ally (like Japan) can be enticed to show palpable interest, Gates could find himself in no position to say, "No."  The program using US dollars to develop declassified techniques and materials -- sure to become a considerable added expense -- would have to go ahead.  (Should Israel express interest, the US-financed nature of the program would be even more assured.)  If a buyer were actually secured, the F-22 production line, now scheduled to close in 2011, would necessarily stay open. 

Even better, if the new "declassified" techniques found a way to address the serious problems the existing US Air Force version of the aircraft is having with its "stealth" coating, wouldn't it make the sense to permit the US Air Force to have the new and improved version?  Also, if the F-35, which is Gates' alternative to the F-22, were to encounter even more serious problems in its cost, schedule, and performance (which would surprise nobody), wouldn't it be great to have an open combat aircraft production line to fill the gap?

All hypothetic, but quite plausible -- and very slick.
 
The Veto-Bait Pork

In addition to more US F-22s, developing a second (alternate) engine for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and continuing the preposterously expensive VH-71 presidential helicopter have attracted veto threats from the White House.   The gauntlet is thrown down; the SAC-D clearly had to recognize that any frontal move in favor of those programs would provoke an open fight with Obama and Gates, very possibly with the same result as with Chambliss.

As with the F-22, the Chairman of the SAC-D, Senator Daniel Inouye (D-HI), is known to support the alternative engine for the F-35.  He was expected to include a provision in the bill supporting it, just as the HAC-D had with the addition of $560 million for both development and production.  Instead, Inouye's bill provided no money for the engine.

Similarly, the SAC-D bill did not imitate its House counterpart on the VH-71.  Instead of providing $400 million to continue fabrication of five partially built helicopters, Inouye and his subcommittee provided no money.

Is Inouye surrendering to Obama's and Gates' wishes on the F-35 engine and the VH-71, as most prognosticators seem to believe, or is he playing a more subtle game?

Veto-Proof Pork

When he goes to resolve the differences in his bill with the House version in a House-Senate conference committee, Inouye will face the choice of either insisting on the Senate position which ends both programs, or going along with that of the House, which funds both programs. 

Which way will he go?  Are there any signs?  There are indeed.  It looks like Senator Inouye is trying to make his bill veto-proof, which also implies he envisions it containing at least one of the veto-bait programs.

Traditionally, the Senate Appropriations Committee has scheduled its activities so that the full Senate debates its DOD Appropriations bill immediately after the committee reports it to the Senate.  That way, senators not on the committee do not have a lot of time to draft multiple amendments to encumber the bill...