there was even GAO analysis to substantiate that assertion.  With GAO cited as the source, who would question the actions?

Indeed, it is correct that one of the congressional defense committees cites GAO analysis as the justification for many of their O&M cuts.  The SASC stated "According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the military departments had $1.2 billion in average yearly unobligated balances for fiscal years 2004 through 2008 [in O&M accounts]."[14]  The HASC cited $841 million in O&M reductions labeled as "Unobligated Balances Estimate" (but does not attribute the analysis to GAO).[15]  The HAC was more opaque; it labeled many of its O&M reductions variously as "excess Working Capitol Fund cash," "average underexecution," "unexecutable growth," and "undistributed Excessive Growth of Civilian Personnel," not listing GAO as the source.[16]  The explanatory information, if any, in the committees' reports is extremely sparse, and only the SASC makes GAO's role explicit.  Congressional staff have nonetheless been adamant that the reductions are based on GAO's analysis.

There are indeed GAO work products that the defense committees use to justify their reductions in O&M.  However, the nature of these GAO products raises some interesting questions. 

First, the GAO "issue papers" are unpublished.  GAO's letter of March 27, 2009 addressing unobligated balances is addressed to "Congressional Staff Members," and it is not available at GAO's website;[17] nor do the committees make them available to the public.

Second, the products do not meet standard GAO criteria for reliable and valid audit and evaluation work.  That standard is the ability to assert that the analysis was done in accordance with "Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards" (GAGAS).  A GAGAS statement assures that certain professional standards for independence, ethics, objectivity, quality control, and competence were met.  The GAO issue paper explicitly states "we did not conduct this work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards, which would have required more extensive testing and analysis of the reliability and validity of the data related to the President's budget request and the agencies' justification of estimates."[18] 

When the author worked in GAO in its Program Evaluation and Methodology Division from 1987 to 1996, it was standard practice for all division work to be performed according to GAGAS standards; draft reports that did not meet them and that could not make a "GAGAS statement" were considered seriously deficient; most would never make it to publication.

Third, the congressional committees appear to be seriously misusing the analysis that GAO, apparently willingly, gives them.  GAO did not report to the congressional staff members specific amounts it had found to actually be available as unobligated balances; instead, it reported annual averages for the years 2004-2008.[19] Also, GAO pointed out that although O&M funds are typically appropriated for just one fiscal year, they do not expire and become available for return to the federal treasury for another five years.  It is reasonable to conclude that an amount found to be a running average should only be acted on when specific funds are actually identified as excess to DOD's needs.  If they are available for that additional five years, it is reasonable that DOD may find appropriate uses for them, especially in the O&M account, considering the serious readiness problems in our armed forces.  Instead, the GAO work provides an unsubstantiated estimate that is then immediately used to fund pork. Finally, if DOD can find no appropriate use for the funds, it would be far more appropriate to return the money to the federal Treasury, rather than use it to pay for pork.

But there is a more fundamental problem with the funds deemed excess.  Other than verify that the numbers used in GAO's analysis were indeed the numbers given them by DOD, GAO did not validate the data.[20] The DOD data used for the GAO analysis were not tested or analyzed for reliability and validity in any meaningful manner.  For a run-of-the-mill federal agency that might not be a big deal.  Most federal agencies can and do verify their balances using normal financial accountability standards and techniques; DOD does not; DOD cannot. 

DOD's financial transactions cannot pass an audit; in fact, they are so chaotic that they cannot be audited, let alone pass one.  Put simply, that means that DOD is unable to track and account for what it does with the billions of dollars appropriated to it by Congress.  The numbers given to GAO and by GAO to the congressional staff members are what DOD thinks might have happened to the money, but cannot be sure.  No one checked; no one was able to.

GAO put it more formally in the letter to the congressional staffers: "GAO has designated DOD's financial management area as high risk due to DOD's pervasive financial and related business management and system deficiencies that continue to adversely affect its ability to control costs; ensure basic accountability; anticipate future costs and claims on the budget; measure performance; maintain funds control; prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse; and address pressing management issues."[21] 

Clearly, GAO feels that it is justified in providing the analysis to Congress;[22] however, it is also clear that the work GAO provided can be neither verified nor audited.  The ultimate effect of the numbers GAO gave to the congressional staffers was to apply the patina of legitimacy to raids on DOD's readiness accounts to pay for members' of Congress parochial interests.

However, let's assume for the sake of argument that all of the excess funds that GAO and Congress' pork-interested members and staff declared in the O&M accounts were truly justified by valid, reliable, and auditable data and analysis.  Why would any politician genuinely concerned about military readiness - the ultimate form of "support the troops" - want to divert money away from O&M?  In-air pilot training time is now well below the levels of the "hollow" years of the 1970s; tank driver training miles are now set at a standard well below what the Clinton Administration used; a few years ago when Army combat readiness ratings were made public, not one major active duty combat formation in the US was deemed fully ready for the combat scenarios it was supposed to be able to face.[23] If it is correct that amounts in the O&M accounts are genuinely excess (which has not been reliably demonstrated), that the money can be well used in training and other readiness activities would seem indisputable.  Otherwise, it belongs back in the federal Treasury.

Most in Congress have other priorities.  One can find them published at the end of defense committee reports in the scores of pages listing the hundreds of earmarks by all but a very few members of Congress.

In no case will anyone find a specific earmark identified in the committees' reports as paid for by any particular reduction in O&M or any other account.  In fact, the SASC report did not even specify how Senator Chambliss paid for his F-22s (that information came to us from the text of the Levin-McCain amendment to take out the funding).  Members of Congress leave no obvious trails to show us just how they pay for their pork.  But the conclusion is inevitable: the earmarks add spending requirements; they must be funded either by new money or offsets; Congress prefers offsets.  The offsets that are used are presented in only the...