Defense Secretary Robert Gates called Senator Kent Conrad at home recently and urged the Senate Budget Committee chairman to give the State Department more money in 2010. I wasn't there for the call, but I'm sure you could've heard a pin drop as Washington, D.C. came to a screeching halt. From the Military Times:

Conrad said he was ready to propose a $4 billion reduction in international relations and foreign aid in the belief that spending money on domestic programs was more important. "They were a little unhappy or disappointed that I was cutting," Conrad said. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called to ask Conrad to change his mind, which is nothing unusual. But Gates' call was something new, Conrad said. "I have never before in my 22 years on the budget committee had the secretary of defense call me to support the budget for the State Department," Conrad said. Gates said it was in the Pentagon's interest to have a healthier foreign aid budget, Conrad said. "He told me there is a lot that is being spent out of the Defense Department budget that should be spent out of the State Department budget for activities in Afghanistan and Iraq," Conrad said.

Conrad is correct. A Defense Secretary calling to plead for more money for the State Department isn't something the Washington establishment is accustomed to seeing. But it goes in line with what we now know about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan: That they're not going to be won or lost on the success or failure of our military.

Instead, while our main goal of eradicating both international terrorism and its safe havens remains intact, ultimate success in both places hinges on a mix of political reconciliation, diplomacy, and reconstruction. As Spencer Ackerman noted recently, we're seeking a counterterrorism goal through the use of a counterinsurgency strategy. And that means we have to deny the enemy key pieces of terrain--which in this case become the hearts and minds of rural villagers, government institutions, and local economies. In other words, instead of chasing bad guys around the mountains of Afghanistan and Pakistan, we need to focus more on securing the population and training the Afghan military so that all the other, more important, aspects of the strategy can work.

And this is what Gates knows. He sees that Western powers can never win the wars outright for the people of Iraq or Afghanistan. They have to do this themselves. And while our military will play a crucial role in moving this process forward--especially in Afghanistan now--it is the State Department that must become the main effort in the fight against extremism and government instability in that part of the world.

It's a refreshing sight to see a Defense Secretary who not only understands the big picture, but who also recognizes that to avoid failure in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq, we need a less militarized strategy for success. In the end, it's about our own national security, and in the long term, this is the best way to achieve that.