to U.S. forces stationed in-theater with its single-stage No Dong missile. The No Dong, which serves as the rocketry building block for the Taepo Dong, can reach American bases and forces in Japan, which might be called upon in a Korean Peninsula contingency. On the peninsula, the 25,000 or so American troops also face a North Korean ballistic missile threat, consisting of several hundred short-range scud b/c tactical ballistic missiles capable of reaching targets in the South within minutes of launch. While there are still questions about the ability of Pyongyang to successfully mount a nuclear warhead capable of withstanding the great heat and pressure common to medium- and long-range missile flight, the North Koreans likely can mate chemical and biological weapons to scuds.

Adding to the anxiety about North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities are recent reports about Pyongyang's proliferation activities off the Korean Peninsula: North Korea may have been furtively assisting Syria with a nuclear program of its own. Last September, in a still-secretive raid, Israeli fighters leveled a suspected Syrian nuclear facility in the northern part of the country at al Kibar, which, as details dribbling out into the media have shown, may have been supported by North Korean technology and technicians.

While this sort of negative exposure is not good for Pyongyang's public image on the world stage, the destitute North Koreans are likely willing to work with any number of state actors on nuclear and ballistic missile matters if the price is right.

China challenge

While not an avowed adversary of the United States, China is — without question — involved in an intense competition with America for power and influence in the Asia-Pacific region and, with little doubt, globally. Chinese great power ambitions are buttressed by a robust military modernization effort, which has been growing at a double-digit rate for over a decade now. Indeed, China now has the world's third largest defense budget, according to the Pentagon, growing at an average of 18  percent for the last two years alone. Moreover, according to some security analysts, China has the most active ballistic missile program in the world, most likely a reflection of the unresolved situation surrounding the longstanding political stand-off with China's cross-Strait rival, Taiwan.

Since the end of the Chinese civil war in 1949, the prc has considered Taiwan to be a province of the People's Republic. While progress on any form of political reconciliation has been lacking, China has not renounced the use of force in resolving Taiwan's political future. And while the United States does not have a legal obligation to defend Taiwan, under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, aggression against the island would be considered a serious threat to American interests as well as a violation of longstanding U.S. policy of promoting a peaceful, mutually agreeable resolution of the issue. Consequently, if the prc  were to move against Taiwan with force, it is widely believed in Washington policy circles that the United States would militarily oppose such a move, bringing U.S. and Chinese forces into direct military contact in the Western Pacific.

To deter Taiwanese movement toward independence or other acts China considers "hostile," the prc has deployed vast numbers of df-11/15 (css-6/7) short-range ballistic missiles along the coast opposite Taiwan; Pentagon estimates run in the range of 1,000 to 1,100. Moreover, China is believed to be deploying roughly 100 new, highly accurate ballistic missiles a year to augment an already overwhelming force opposite Taiwan. Some have asserted that the number of new missiles may be pushed to 200 per year.

These missiles not only provide strong Chinese deterrent to unwanted Taiwanese political or military actions, but also could be used to great effect in a "bolt from the blue" scenario to decapitate Taiwan's political leadership or strike critical military targets such as ports, airfields, and air defenses. Apropos of what it considers outside interference in an internal matter, China does maintain limited medium-range, intermediate-range and icbm forces for deterring, delaying or denying the threat of foreign military involvement in a Taiwan contingency, such as by the United States and Japan, as well as other potential military contingencies with the likes of Russia or India.

China has modernized its land-based strategic nuclear deterrent too, adding road-mobile, solid-fueled icbms to its arsenal, increasing its deterrent effect and survivability. A new concern is China's plans to put its nuclear deterrent to sea, equipping its Jin-class (Type 094) nuclear submarines with the new jl-2 missile with intercontinental range; a jl-2 was tested in late May. Of equal concern, beyond the growing capacity of China's ballistic missile force, is the continuing potential for witting — or unwitting — proliferation of wmd and ballistic missile technology or materials. While China's proliferation record has improved, concerns still exist about ties with North Korea and Iran.

Resurgent Russia

The russian federation, like China, is not an enemy of the United States, but it, too, desires to play a leading role on the world stage, balancing other centers of power such as the European Union and nato with its political, economic, and military might. Russia has readjusted its foreign policy orientation from one that was Western-looking to one that is increasingly independent in recent years — even anti-West, deepened by the war in Georgia this summer over the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. As many have asserted, today's Russia is confident, prideful, wealthy, and interested in reasserting Russia as a great power.

Indeed, some would argue that Russia's chief global foreign policy objective is nothing less than recreating its superpower status. While Russia isn't necessarily looking to become the Soviet Union again, it would like to exert decisive leverage on the international system, as the Kremlin did during the Cold War. To achieve these ends, Russia today maintains its position as the world's second mightiest nuclear weapons state, with over 600 strategic offensive weapons, buttressed by a significant military modernization program to revitalize the once-proud Russian military.

Its ballistic missile force is part of that effort. Russia has one of the world's most active ballistic missile testing programs, planning to test-launch nine ballistic missiles in 2008, according to a senior military commander in May. Russia is putting an average of three mobile and three to four of their newest silo-based Topol-m (ss-27) icbms into operation every year. Moscow may double its test launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles after 2009, based on Russian military claims. According to some sources, Russia is already working on a follow-up to the ss-27, based on reports of testing in May. The new version is expected to be equipped with multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicles (mirvs). Moscow is also testing a new submarine-launched icbm.

Adding to security concerns, Russia is threatening to pull out of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (inf) treaty, which eliminated that class of ballistic missiles in a 1987 arms control treaty with the United States. Moscow is uncomfortable with the increase in the number of states around its periphery that now have intermediate range ballistic missiles that did not have them when the treaty was signed over 20 years ago, such as India, Pakistan, Iran, China, and North Korea. This could lead to a bump-up in Russia's missile arsenal.

Treaty trouble

Shortcomings in the 1970 npt and the Missile Technology Control Regime (mtcr), moreover, provide further...