propels itself toward leadership of the Middle East and the Islamic world.

It is also useful to be able to launch your own communications, intelligence or scientific satellites rather than relying on others to launch them for you. (Russia launched Iran's only other satellite into orbit back in October 2005.) Iran would surely argue that it needs to be self-reliant for space launches, just as it (self-servingly) insists it needs to be self-sufficient in enriching uranium to produce fuel for Bushehr despite Russian assistance.

Experts think a two-stage ballistic missile from Iran could reach all of Europe — and America's East Coast.

There are other advantages. Satellites could enhance Iran's military might, relaying secure communications, gathering intelligence, providing early warning and targeting opposition forces, such as U.S. naval and air forces in the Persian Gulf. In addition, a space program, especially a space-launch capacity, is critical to developing an icbm capability. Remember: Moscow's launch of its first satellite, Sputnik, in 1957 meant not only that the Russians had bested us scientifically, but that a Soviet icbm capability was not far behind. Theoretically, if you can launch a ballistic missile that can place a satellite into Earth orbit, you have the scientific wherewithal to hit a target anywhere on Earth with a warhead, including a wmd.

Similarly, Iran's space efforts follow an unnerving proliferation pattern. In the late 1990s, North Korea also used a "civilian" space program to clandestinely manufacture and test a Taepo Dong ballistic missile with intercontinental potential. Fortunately, the 1998 multi-stage missile launch landed in the Western Pacific after overflying Japan, while North Korea oddly insisted the launch had successfully put a small satellite into orbit, transmitting patriotic songs back to eager listeners on the ground in impoverished North Korea.

Also striking, Iran's defense ministry plays a prominent role in the putative civilian space effort. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which is close to Tehran's political leadership, manages Iran's Shahab medium-range ballistic missile program. Some experts believe the Shahab, which is based on the North Korean (medium-range) No Dong missile, could easily morph into an slv/icbm program. Indeed, the Taepo Dong is believed to be based on various No Dong rocketry configurations.

Fortunately, without a Manhattan Project-like effort, an Iranian icbm is not just around the corner: Iran still needs a more energetic (i.e., multistage) missile to carry a nuclear-sized payload (1,000–2,000 pounds) to intercontinental ranges. Although Iran has not yet been totally successful in testing a multistage missile, experts estimate a two-stage ballistic missile from Iran could reach all of Europe — as well as America's East Coast. A ballistic missile with three stages could range the whole of the United States.

The downside is that Iran could move forward with alacrity if it receives outside assistance on its space and/or missile program. The most likely candidates for that assistance are North Korea, Russia, or a Khan-like network of ballistic missile "guns for hire."

Despite mounting evidence to the contrary, Iran could in the end just be working on a space program — not an icbm program. But considering Tehran's record of nuclear denial and deception, it is hard to believe Iran's space program is not just more of the same. Equally troubling, in the view of many analysts, is that absent a political decision by Tehran to stay non-nuclear, it will be almost impossible to prevent Iran from a nuclear breakout, meaning that at some point in the future an Iranian icbm may be capable of being mated with an Iranian nuclear warhead.

Korean conundrum

From a threat perspective, unfortunately, there is not much good news out of North Korea, either, regarding its nuclear or ballistic missile programs. While the situation is perhaps not as volatile as Iran's, North Korea remains a cause of concern.

North Korea is already a confirmed nuclear weapons state, lighting off its first nuclear test in a subterranean event in October 2006 — in another of its irascible "I will not be ignored" moments. Containing, much less rolling back, North Korea's nuclear program (beginning in the early years of the Clinton administration) has been a tough, frustrating slog. At times, it looked as if the nuclear standoff could lead to another Korean conflict.

Even today, despite North Korea's rhetoric and some actions to the contrary, there remains serious concern about Pyongyang's ultimate willingness to fully denuclearize, since its nuclear arsenal is a strong bargaining chip — and a great equalizer against the strength of the U.S.–South Korean alliance. Complicating matters, North Korea is believed to have a clandestine, parallel uranium-based nuclear program in addition to its well-known plutonium-based program centered around its Russian-made nuclear reactor at Yongbyon.

While the United States has accused North Korea directly of having a uranium-based nuclear program, Pyongyang has been evasive, even contradictory, about the existence of this second nuclear program since Washington first confronted North Korean officials about it in the fall of 2002 in Pyongyang. (A major news outlet reported that traces of highly enriched uranium were found on some of the 18,000 pages of North Korean documents provided to the United States in June as part of a nuclear declaration. Some observers, however, believe this story is apocryphal.)

The multilateral effort to address North Korea's nuclear program has labored for several years under a Six-Party Talks process, which includes the United States, China, Russia, Japan, and North and South Korea, hosted by  the Chinese in Beijing. The forum was unable to prevent North Korea from going nuclear, and has evolved from the six-member format into what are now essentially bilateral talks between Washington and Pyongyang, with frequent consultations with the other four players.

Though some progress has been made in capturing the nuclear reactor at Yongbyon, an important site for producing fissile material for weapons, the next steps in addressing North Korea's existing nuclear weapons capability and the uranium-based program remain an open question. (Of course, the issue of verification and compliance of any nuclear agreement with the ultrasecretive North Koreans has to weigh heavily on the mind of any Washington policymaker contemplating an effective, enduring settlement with Pyongyang.)

North Korea is still developing a long-range missile capability to reach out and touch the United States.

Making the future of the nuclear weapons issue more than a matter of regional importance is North Korea's ballistic missile prowess. In addition to the 1998 Taepo Dong launch, North Korea is still developing a long-range capability to reach out and touch the United States. In 2006, North Korea test-fired another Taepo Dong missile that malfunctioned approximately 40 seconds after launch, landing a few hundred miles west in the Sea of Japan. Naturally, once again, Pyongyang claimed a test of an slv; once again, very few outside the Hermit Kingdom were swayed by the claim. While the exact capabilities of the Taepo Dong series of ballistic missile are unknown, mostly due to their largely-failed launches, it is believed the missile is capable of reaching well into the Pacific Ocean, including Hawaii, and possibly the West Coast of the United States. (The deployment of American missile defenses at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California and Fort Greeley in Alaska, totaling 24–30  ground-based interceptors, is meant to provide a rudimentary defense against the North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile threat.)

North Korea poses a...