Pakistan" to the one found in Iran — possibly showing connections to Pakistan's nuclear weapons program.

Another iaea concern is work on a new ballistic missile warhead, known as "Project 111," for Iran's medium-range ballistic missile, the Shahab-3, which can reach all of the Middle East as well as parts of southern Europe. According to six technical documents in the iaea's possession, Iran appears to have been involved in the redesign of the payload chamber of the current "Shahab-3 missile re-entry vehicle to accommodate a nuclear warhead."

The iaea  report also questions the Iranian military's apparent involvement in Tehran's civilian nuclear efforts. It seems military-related institutions are involved in suspicious procurement activities for Iran's ostensibly "peaceful" nuclear power program. There are also concerns, according to the report, about an unexplained letter published by the chairman of Iran's high-ranking Expediency Council in September, which makes "reference to possible acquisition of nuclear weapons."

If this is not unnerving enough, it gets worse. The report notes that Iran continues uranium enrichment, the proverbial "long-pole in the tent" in producing a nuclear weapon — at least in comparison with developing a delivery platform or warhead. As the American iaea representative, Ambassador Gregory Schulte, told the press in May: "At the same time that Iran is stonewalling its [iaea] inspectors, it's moving forward in developing its enrichment capability in violation of [un] Security Council resolutions."

Iran's uranium enrichment plant at Natanz is already using at least 3,500 centrifuges. Theoretically, if operating efficiently, this line could produce enough weapons-grade fissile material to build one bomb in the time indicated by El Baradei. (The uranium enrichment process can produce fuel for a nuclear power reactor or fissile material for a nuclear weapon. To date, Iran has publicly stated enrichment rates of over 4 percent, suitable for reactor fuel if produced in sufficient quantities; weapons-grade uranium is usually enriched to above 90 percent.)

Some experts think Iran could have as many as 6,000 centrifuges online, spinning at supersonic speed in the near future, turning uranium hexafluoride gas (uf6) into some level of enriched uranium for reactors, weapons or both. Tehran has steadfastly insisted that it has the right to enrich uranium for nuclear reactor fuel as stipulated under the terms of the npt (ironically, Iran violated the npt by failing to declare its nuclear program to the iaea for some 20 years.)

Iran, with Russian assistance, is continuing construction of its first nuclear reactor at Bushehr.

The new iaeareport also notes the previously undisclosed development of a new generation of centrifuge. The "ir-3" (for third generation Iranian) centrifuge improves upon previous models based on the less efficient Pakistani design, procured from Khan's network. Moreover, agency inspectors raise concerns about the fact that "substantial parts of the centrifuge components were manufactured in the workshops of the [Iranian] Defense Industries Organization," hoisting a red flag about the blurring of the lines between Tehran's civilian and a possible military program.

The bottom-line concern here, besides the fact that Iran did not declare this new equipment (and capability) to the iaea as required, is that the new, more efficient centrifuges will allow Iran to produce more enriched uranium — for reactors or bombs — more quickly. Iran, with Russian assistance, is also continuing construction of its first nuclear reactor at Bushehr. A good deal of the reactor's fuel is already in place, having been shipped in from Russia beginning last December. (Unfortunately, Russian support at the un Security Council for slowing Iran's nuclear program through the imposition of economic sanctions is likely to diminish following this summer's action in Georgia.) The iaea is also monitoring construction of an Iranian nuclear research reactor, which experts are concerned could be used for experimentation on reprocessing spent nuclear reactor fuel into fissile material (e.g., plutonium) for use in nuclear weapons.

Interestingly, in all of this Iran does not see an indictment of wrongdoing on its part. On the contrary, Tehran views the report as an exoneration of guilt. Iran's iaea envoy, via the Iranian news service, called the report: "[a] vindication and reiteration of the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear activities." In addition, Tehran officially said the iaea documents "do not show any indication that the Islamic Republic of Iran has been working on a nuclear weapon," adding that many of the documents had been "forged" or "fabricated," especially since they were in an electronic format. In some cases, Iran did not quibble with the information, instead insisting that "the events and activities concerned involved civil or conventional military applications," such as the testing of detonators for use in the oil industry. While Iran has promised to address all concerns, many of these questions are likely to remain a mystery due to Iran's regular refusal to allow the iaea access to procurement personnel and scientists or to open suspect sites to the agency's atomic sleuths.

The iaea reports starkly call into question the intent of Iran's nuclear efforts, leaving Tehran's claims to a purely civilian nuclear power program increasingly in doubt. As a result, the iaea  has called upon Tehran to increase transparency by signing an "Additional Protocol," which would give agency inspectors access to any facility suspected of undeclared nuclear activity.

This is a fundamental requirement in a large country like Iran (four times the size of California), where sites are numerous and sometimes well-hidden — even below ground. Verification of compliance, even under the best of conditions, is likely to be difficult. But old habits die hard. Tehran will likely continue to obfuscate and dissemble, preventing the iaea from gaining a realistic assessment of the nature of Iran's nuclear program — which unfortunately places time squarely on Tehran's side.

Islamic ICBM

Iran's interest and involvement in a nascent space program is not comforting either. While enriching uranium is a key capability in developing nuclear weapons, Iran may also be working on another important aspect of a military program: a long-range delivery system; that is, a new ballistic missile. Like its "civilian" nuclear efforts that remained undeclared for two decades, long-range ballistic missiles are likely being developed under cover of another supposed nonmilitary effort: Iran's space program. Indeed, Tehran's budding space work could lead to the development of an intercontinental ballistic missile ( icbm) capable of reaching all of Europe and the United States with a wmd payload.

For example, on February 5, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad led the countdown for the launch of a ballistic missile described as a "space launch vehicle," or slv, from a new space center inaugurated the same day. While there is controversy about the success of that day's test, Iran claims it was setting the stage for the future launch of the first Iranian-built satellite — the Omid (Hope) — which is expected to be ready for service by mid-2009. Undeterred, Iran conducted a second space-related missile launch this summer.

Of course, Iran has a lot of relatively benign reasons to want a space program. National pride in such an achievement might distract the restive populace from its social and economic suffering, helping to legitimize the increasingly unpopular regime. The program could also build prestige for the ambitious state: Iran would be the first Muslim state with a space-launch capability. Neighbors would be envious as...