that if anyone opened the door to an arms race in space, it was Beijing's ASAT test in 2007, more than 20 years after the last U.S. test. But this argument by some has not dissuaded China from pushing for a new space treaty.

An Astro-Accord?

China, along with Russia, introduced a draft resolution titled "Prevention of Placement of Weapons in Outer Space" in February at the 65-member United Nations' Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Space-related concerns still are addressed by the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which has 125 signatories. It includes a ban on the deployment of weapons of mass destruction, but not conventional weapons, in outer space. The treaty, modeled on another non-armament accord, the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, does not forbid the military use of space, but it does proscribe establishing bases, installations, fortifications, testing of weapons or holding military maneuvers on the moon. The Chinese-Russian draft treaty would disallow the testing and deployment of weapons in space for use against another nation's satellites or orbital craft. Interestingly, the draft does not ban research and development or production.

Although the concept of a new treaty has support among some arms-control advocates, the Bush administration has categorically rejected the idea, concerned about limitations on U.S. access to, and use of, space. There are also worries about treaty language such as the definition of the phrase "space weapon"; a seemingly benign satellite could be used to attack another satellite simply by ramming it — making it, in essence, a weapon.

Other technologies or systems with real counterspace abilities possibly could escape restriction, or even be included to the detriment of other civilian programs, such as when the Soviets tried to identify the space shuttle as a space weapon.

Another concern is verification of treaty compliance, minimizing the possibility of a breakout. A high degree of transparency would be required to inspect every payload to be put into space, not to mention the national security risks from espionage.

And even though they are not included in the draft treaty, what about terrestrially based systems, which could include direct-ascent ASAT and directed energy weapons, which appear to be the future wave of counterspace capabilities?

The Chinese have admitted the challenges of implementing such an agreement but are not interested in discussing their ASAT test, which some states are insisting on as a prerequisite for beginning discussions of the draft treaty. Some argue that considering their great power ambitions, it is naïve to believe that Beijing or Moscow would not deploy space weapons today if they could; the treaty is merely a diplomatic gambit to buy time to develop their own programs.

Detractors of a treaty point out that the U.S. has the most to lose in any new agreement. As a leading space power, the U.S. would be relinquishing much more in strategic advantage than China or Russia — for the moment, at least. No nation relies more on space than the U.S. It is the ultimate military high ground and critical to maintaining the supremacy of American armed forces. Potential enemies know this, seeing space as America's Achilles' heel. As the DNI noted to Congress this year, "Over the last decade, the rest of the world has made significant progress in developing counterspace capabilities."

Moreover, the commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, Air Force Gen. Kevin Chilton, told the House Armed Services Committee in February, "The Chinese kinetic anti-satellite test ... made it clear space is not a sanctuary."

China is on a trajectory to challenge Washington for pre-eminence in space. Beijing believes that if it has the capacity to target U.S. space assets, Washington will be more reluctant to, and less capable of, challenging it on the battlefield.

Protecting American space assets — and freedom of action on the high frontier — must be central to U.S. national security strategy. Failure to maintain space superiority would only invite a Pearl Harbor in space, leaving us deaf, dumb and blind — and at war.