In late December, Tehran crowed that its 1,000-megawatt Bushehr nuclear plant, supposedly meant to produce peaceful nuclear energy, would be "online" as early as this spring, cementing in place another important building block of its questionable nuclear program.

While the builders of the Bushehr plant, the Russians, insist the plant will not be completed until the end of the year, Moscow did make the first of several deliveries of fuel rods to Iran in late December.

This unwelcome news comes as Iran is continuing to spin as many as 3,000 centrifuges to enrich uranium, ostensibly to produce low-enriched uranium reactor fuel, but which could also be used to make highly enriched uranium (HEU) for nuclear weapons.

Indeed, while Iran is planning for some 50,000 centrifuges, some experts believe that just these 3,000, if running efficiently and 24/7, could produce enough HEU for one bomb in a year.

Enter Israel

This sort of news cannot help but rattle even the steadiest of policymakers' nerves, no matter what the narrowly focused National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) said about the current dormant state of Iran's nuclear weapons program — especially in a country like Israel. While Israeli intelligence reportedly has no new — or different — information than that contained in the American intelligence assessment, it draws a very different conclusion than the U.S.: Israel believes the weapons program continues. You have to wonder, then, if Israel — the country most threatened by an Iranian nuclear (weapons) breakout — might take matters into its own hands. It has done so at least once, and maybe twice, before. And considering that an American strike on Iran's nuclear facilities is likely off the table for the moment, due to the NIE, the time may be here — again — for the Israelis to take action.

Indeed, Lt. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi, the Israeli Defense Forces' (IDF) chief of staff, said at a December conference in Tel Aviv: "It's up to the international community to act in a determined way to stop Iran's nuclearization. ... But at the same time we have the responsibility to prepare for any scenario in the event that international efforts do not succeed."

That sort of no-nonsense, self-help attitude seems to be backed up by the IDF's record against regional nuclear programs that the Israelis have perceived as serious threats to their national security. In a 1981 dawn raid lasting less than 90 seconds, IDF fighters attacked the nearly completed 40-megawatt Iraqi Osirak nuclear reactor complex south of Baghdad, setting back Saddam Hussein's ability to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. And again in September, the IDF appears to have struck a nascent Syrian nuclear program, which was possibly benefiting from outside help, in a preventive airstrike that may have also been meant as a warning to Iran of unpleasantries to come.

Eyes on Iran

So, could Iran be next? It just might be, especially considering the new timelines revealed by the Iranians involving the construction, fueling and initial operating capability of Bushehr — not to mention an influx of new weaponry. It is possible that within about a year of Bushehr becoming operational, some of its spent nuclear fuel could be stripped of enough plutonium to produce a handful of nuclear weapons if the rods are not returned, as agreed, to their owner/supplier, Russia.

Because the production of sufficient fissile material is the most challenging task in constructing a nuclear weapon, the diversion of material at Bushehr is potentially as big a problem as the 3,000 centrifuges Iran has currently whirring at supersonic speeds, enriching uranium.

Attacking Bushehr — like Osirak — before it comes online would not only stop it from being used to produce fissile material for weapons, but would also prevent radiation from being spewed into the atmosphere after a strike.

Also possibly spurring the Israeli government into action sooner rather than later is other recent unpleasant news: Iran's defense minister announced in December that Tehran is buying the highly capable Russian S-300 air-defense system. The sale of the strategic S-300 (SA-10/Grumble) will complement the $700 million in Tor-M1 (SA-15/Gauntlet) short-range surface-to-air missile systems Moscow supplied last year, further enhancing Iran's air defense network. (The Russian defense ministry denied the sale of military equipment to Iran in a likely effort to avoid unnecessarily further cooling Moscow's already frosty relations with Washington — or roiling the water with other regional countries concerned with such a transfer.)

Iran likely purchased the Tor-M1 to stave off a repeat of Israel's success against Osirak — or the possibility that the U.S., well-suited for an air- or sea-based strike, would take action against Iran's nuclear program. The long-range S-300s — likely a response to the IDF's September strike on Syrian facilities — will enhance Iran's ability to protect its nuclear sites scattered around the country, some of which are already ringed with air defenses. (While understandable, considering the saber-rattling coming from a number of corners, it is curious the extent to which Iran is willing to go to protect its so-called "peaceful" nuclear program with military might.)

Iran is also suspected of possibly having a new ballistic missile, the Ashura, with a 1,200-mile range, capable of reaching Israel — and beyond. It is not clear whether the missile is being produced, or has, in fact, been tested by Iran, as Tehran claimed in late November.

Tyrannies of Targeting

But despite these possible proximate reasons for the Israeli government giving the "go-ahead" for an attack on Bushehr before it is up and running, successfully dealing militarily with Iran's nuclear program is no small task. First, while Bushehr is certainly a key element in Iran's vast nuclear program, due to its ability to produce large amounts of bomb-worthy fissile material (i.e., plutonium) for weapons use, it is not the only element that needs to be addressed. To cripple — or at least set back — Iran's nuclear program, the IDF would have to hit other major sites: the Natanz uranium enrichment plant, the Arak heavy water facility and the Isfahan uranium conversion complex, plus, possibly, tens of other nuclear-related sites around the country. (The Iranians are also reportedly building a 40-megawatt research reactor at Arak, which, like Osirak, is too small for power production, but just right for the production of plutonium from its spent fuel, according to experts.)

There's also the tyranny of distance. Iran is a lot farther from Israel than Iraq — and the targets are not conveniently clustered like at Osirak. They're spread across Iran — a country nearly four times the size of California (or neighboring Iraq). Since key targets are out of range of Israel's ballistic missiles, the routing of strike packages would also present significant challenges. This raid would be more difficult that the Osirak raid in which IDF fighters slipped with impunity along the Jordanian and Saudi borders. Besides the most likely flight skirting Jordan and Saudi Arabia en route to Iran, IDF fighters could also go through or along the borders of Turkey (a friendly country) or Syria (a nonfriendly country), or a combination thereof, pushing flight routes of about 1,200 miles.

Secrecy would be a problem, too. While Israel has good operational security — witness how much is still unknown about the Syrian raid — an airstrike would require an armada of fighter, tanker, airborne early warning and electronic intelligence aircraft, which would light up radars across the region.

Even an uncoordinated, surprise Israeli air raid would likely quickly be known to others, especially the U.S., which "owns" the...