The U.S. and allied success over the last six months has surprised many critics by achieving a form of "peace" in some of the toughest parts in Iraq. There can be no doubt that the change was partly aided by groups of former Sunni insurgents to side with the US against al-Qaeda. However, the so called "ceasefire" by the al-Mahdi Army loyal to Moqtada al-Sadr, the radical Shia cleric, makes me wonder if the "ceasefire" is for real or something else.

Does anyone recall the "ceasefire" the North Vietnamese conducted after Henry Kissinger negotiated a withdrawal from South Vietnam? Was it a surprise when no North Vietnamese Army units fired on the American helicopters evacuating U.S. and some Vietnamese allies form the roof tops of Saigon and all regional capitals?

Recent historical records seem to indicate that Kissinger negotiated a U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam with an understanding that the NVA would not impede the evacuation of U.S. personnel.

I see the enemy possibly using a page out of the NVA handbook in Iraq as they plan to let the Madi Army and Iranian agents stop attacks on U.S. forces and look to the U.S. Congress ignorance of the ultimate fate of the Iraqis while they permit U.S. forces to leave Iraq without being attacked.

There are little to no signs that the Iraqis are ready for the defense of their country. The Iraqis have not made satisfactory progress toward managing their security forces mostly because they have had to divert a lot of resources to confront sectarian violence.

While the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior, with U.S. and allied assistance, has made some progress in developing their logistics, command and control, and intelligence capabilities, there still is little top level leadership to plan, organize, and lead multi-battalion or division level operations.

Al Sadr's militia, the Jaish al-Mahdi, has killed too many Sunni civilians for the Sunnis to let bygones be bygones.

Many of Sadr's militia has claimed Sadr is not in control of most of the criminals who abducted and murdered Sunni civilians in the sectarian violence provoked by the bombing of the golden-domed shrine in Samarra. With the Sadr militia "ceasefire" mostly holding, it's hard to say exactly how much influence the militia still retains within Iraqi police and army units.

Reuters recently reported that nearly 90 percent of U.S. journalists in Iraq say much of Baghdad is still too dangerous to visit despite a recent drop in violence attributed to the build-up of U.S. forces.  Further, more than two years of sectarian violence have left districts in and around Baghdad completely Sunni or completely Shiite.

Along with concerns surrounding the security of Baghdad, I have to ask who's in charge in Basra today and who pays them, arms them, and controls them.

The success or failure of efforts by the Iraqi government to bring the Sunni former insurgents into the regular security forces without losing their local identities will be crucial. However, the memories of the South Vietnamese sell out and the NVA ceasefire are fresh in my mind.