For the past few weeks, I have discussed recent setbacks in Afghanistan, reasons for these problems, and began to list the underlying challenges in bringing stability and democracy to this troubled country.  The first of that list was the ethnic differences that make prospects for a sustainable democratic system difficult.  Now, we will take a look at the next major challenge: the booming narcotics industry that destabilizes the country and undermines the nascent democratic government.

Afghanistan, by some surveys the poorest country in the world, enjoys one flourishing sector in its economy: opium. The singular voice of Christopher Hitchens can be relied upon to present a divergent view, as he did in an article advocating sustaining the opium crop, "Let the Afghan Poppies Bloom," in Slate in December 2004. Hitchens argued that the opium export from Afghanistan could be redirected to the more constructive production of analgesics, replacing longtime poppy exporters from countries such as Turkey. The Senlis Council, a British think tank active in Afghan affairs, advocated this approach as well and has been critical of American and British security and counternarcotics policies in Afghanistan. The approach is problematic, for reasons aside from the fact that Turkey, which assumed leadership of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force mission in Afghanistan in 2005, would probably not like to lose the millions of dollars from its own export trade.

We cannot realistically expect the poppy crop in Afghanistan to be pushed toward more legitimate and less profitable pursuits for similar reasons that the land on which the poppies are grown cannot be easily redesignated for other crops. The narcotics industry is not only central to the Afghan economy, generating revenues far beyond any other possible industry in the impoverished nation. It is also central to political and military power for an important segment of society. While not as far degenerated as Colombia, Afghanistan's growth in drug trafficking in the years since the Taliban's overthrow has brought the country to the brink of imminent danger from the domination of these narcotics forces. In fact, some U.S. Embassy officials were reportedly urging President Karzai to visit the Colombian president to better understand these dangers.

In December 2004, a research paper from the World Bank, "Drugs and Development in Afghanistan," documented the growing opium problem. Opium has taken more and more a foothold in the Afghan economy, and its domination of the political and social fabric of the country poses a serious threat. Accounting for over 40 percent of the economy, there are few options besides restructuring the agricultural sector. Merely reapplying the poppy crop to legitimate trade would lead to relapse if not mere continuation of the illicit narcotics traffic. And doing nothing would be disastrous. There are more nuanced arguments on how to combat the opium trade, accepting the premise that it must be combated. Most Afghan government officials hope to avoid complete and immediate destruction of the poppy fields. American policymakers, on the other hand, have been faster to advocate a strategy of eradication. The Afghan approach may make more sense to avoid unintended consequences of a war on drugs that does not include rehabilitation of this large sector of the economy. The major negative consequence is the creation of a class of former poppy growers who will be suddenly impoverished and infuriated by harsh government action. This could infuse the Afghan insurgency with a new source of recruitment and popular support. This contingency is particularly dangerous because the rural south and east are the areas where the Taliban was most dominant and the insurgency is most active. Thus, the narcotics situation threatens the nascent democracy and civil society because it empowers the most lawless and dangerous elements of society. However, the developing war on drugs also poses a danger as it reorders the society and removes the largest source of national income.

When I visited the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Farah in western Afghanistan, the civil affairs noncommissioned officer, Sergeant Farrands, informed me that they frequently reported poppy fields during their travels. The poppy crop is more prevalent in the south of the country, but it can be found in the southwest Farah Province as well. There are several indications of the scope and depth of the problem. First, the reporting requirements for the PRT indicate that team members must report the existence of fields greater than one hundred meters by one hundred meters. However, it is much more likely for patrols to find ten thirty by thirty meter fields. This is a problem for two reasons. The smaller, more numerous fields are much harder for tracking and intervention. In addition, the reporting requirements make it less likely to arrive at an accurate picture of the problem. During the time I was in Afghanistan, American military forces, including the development-focused PRTs, were not to get involved with eradication. This was somewhat controversial due to the significant threat posed by the narcotics sector of the economy. In late 2004, the PRT would warn local farmers that poppy growing was illegal. This in itself was probably helpful in at least a small way. Communicating the laws in a country with a weak government, widespread illiteracy, and little electricity was an important step. The PRT also distributed newspapers to people through its psychological operations division, which promoted a poppy-free Afghan future. An Afghan farmer actually informed the Farah civil affairs team that he was happy about eradication because the poppy prices rose from a hundred dollars a bushel to three hundred dollars a bushel. To get an idea of how much poppy was in Farah, which was not the most significant producer of the crop, a six- to eight-hour patrol would typically result in finding fifteen to twenty fields. Another practice that complicates the problem is that fields would often have a border of wheat, which is a taller plant, surrounding the lower poppy crops. The PRT noticed this during talks with farmers and they were on the look out for it afterwards.

The narcotics issue in Afghanistan is a critical issue without easy answers.  On the one hand, it is a criminal business that empowers warlords and terrorists and undermines the Afghan state.  On the other hand, the economy suffers from debilitating poverty, and bringing a sudden end to the poppy sector of the Afghan agricultural industry would lead to a serious employment and national income vacuum.  What is certain is that the issue must be addressed and at least partially resolved in order to develop a stable and sustainable Afghan government.  Last Thursday, I did a radio interview on the Martha Zoller Show about my book, A Democracy Is Born: An Insider's Account on the Battle Against Terrorism in Afghanistan. A caller asked why the US government would not buy up the poppy crop in Afghanistan to prevent its application toward funding the Taliban insurgency there.  There are probably a few major challenges to such an approach, but the caller's question raises a serious point.  With the current Afghan-based opium on the world market at its highest level ever, the intervention in Afghanistan must immediately come to grips with this challenge to both short term counterinsurgency and long term sustainable governance in Afghanistan.