On October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik I, the first man-made object to achieve earth orbit.  NASA's website labels this as a shock felt round the globe, the event that triggered the Cold War's long and dangerous U.S. versus Soviet Union space race.  In an eerily parallel development one-half century later, on January 12, 2007 local time, the People's Republic of China successfully tested a kinetic-kill antisatellite (ASAT) ballistic missile, destroying one of their own aging weather satellites.  Why care?  Because once perfected and deployed, any operational ASAT system can hold at risk hundreds of assets vital to American network-centric intelligence, deterrence, and warfighting.  What are we to make of this latest strain to the Beijing/DC relationship, specifically in the sphere of China's future military intentions?

Much commentary has already been published.  Reactions by experienced China watchers seem to range all over the map.  The ASAT weapon test has variously been called a direct challenge to America's superpower status, or a symbolic bargaining chip, or a possible rogue operation, or a foreign policy blunder that's certain to have bad repercussions, or an irresponsible act of pollution with hazardous orbital debris.  Even media outlets that traditionally have come across as sympathetic to China warn that the test might be the harbinger of a new arms race in space.  My own take is that most but not all of these interpretations are at least partly correct.  It's not a question of picking only one as the most fitting.  The ASAT test is best weighed by putting it within a much broader context, of China's pronouncements in print and her observable behaviors upon the world commons.

Perhaps by no coincidence, the rather dramatic test came only two weeks after the PRC government released its biennial  white paper in official English translation, "China's National Defense in 2006," and not quite three months after the troubling encounter on the high seas between a Song-class diesel sub and the USS Kitty Hawk carrier battle group; it also came barely half a year after a Chinese ground-based laser painted an orbiting American satellite.  (A sufficiently powerful laser can knock out a satellite; a weaker one can illuminate it for accurate terminal homing by a kinetic-kill antisatellite missile.)

While continuing to proclaim that China is "following a peaceful development road" and "standing for effective disarmament and arms control," the defense white paper in self-contradiction makes reference to strengthening PRC nuclear counterattack capabilities, enhancing offensive air operations, modernizing C3I and ECM through "informationization," and building a powerful navy which as President Hu Jintao put it must be prepared for combat "at any time."  The white paper, though well organized and crisply written, has been rightly criticized as doing nothing real to clarify China's future martial intentions.  Reading between the lines is not reassuring.  If anything, China's latest pacifist verbiage comes across as boilerplated, disingenuous propaganda.

One example of Chinese aggressiveness is that the ASAT test wasn't formally announced in advance.  This violated well-established international norms, where prior notice is both an expected diplomatic courtesy and a critical method of avoiding misunderstandings that could start a war.  Such an omission by Beijing is unmistakably provocative and has to be intentional.

The vexed question remains of whether the PRC is actually becoming -- either by design or as a collateral effect of its overall rise -- a serious military threat to the United States and our allies and interests abroad.  When publicly discussing Washington's policy of constructive engagement toward a peaceful partnership with Beijing, the (joint, theater-wide) Commander, U.S. Pacific Command emphasized that a foreign nation can't be categorized as a threat unless it has or will have both actual capabilities and verifiable intent to challenge America in some form of armed conflict.  This clarification of nomenclature is more than semantics or sophistry; it reiterates the onus placed on the U.S. defense, intelligence, and diplomatic communities to pin down China's genuine aspirations, whatever they may be.

I'd make the case that any consistent pattern of overt actions, combined with a climbing or falling trend in military muscle, viewed together in detail can sometimes unambiguously telegraph a country's main goals, no matter how tight-lipped its leaders.  China's continuing de facto insistence on opacity regarding the ASAT test and her massive military build-up in general are important data points for figuring out what Beijing ultimately wants.  One would think that a peace-loving nation, which China stridently professes to be, should be much more forthcoming as to transparency demanded from abroad.

But the PRC insists that democracy is something practiced between nations, not necessarily within them.  Sovereignty is claimed to take absolute primacy on the global stage; outside pressures about human rights, free speech, foreign currency exchange, etc., amount to unwelcome meddling.  This PRC doctrine applies equally to security issues.  Things do look problematic regarding China opening up sincerely about her military intent.  Thus one useful approach is to carefully watch what China does, not just listen to and naively accept whatever she says -- or treat her silences as meaning good news.

At the start of the 20th century, famous British naval strategist Julian Corbett articulated that the world's oceans could be viewed as a form of "common."  By that he meant territory open to all for the unfettered conduct of commercial, exploratory, transportation, and defense affairs.  But like any common in the conventional sense, such as a city park, police enforcement was needed to prevent illicit or belligerent activities.  This is how sea power became prominent in Corbett's writings, consistent with his great near-contemporary, American sea power theorist A. T. Mahan.

Since the dawn of aviation, international air space turned into another common, with its own set of rules and safety protocols.  Much more recently, analysts have said that both outer space and cyberspace can also be seen as world commons.  Unfortunately, China is increasingly militarizing all these commons, in a way that seems substantially more belligerent than benign.

In the common of outer space, China has disturbed and angered many other countries by her ASAT weapon demonstration  followed immediately by a stubborn refusal to even confirm or deny that the testing took place.  And one thing this definitely wasn't is a fait accomplit by rogues or a clique of "disgruntled generals."  Via shrewd machinations President Hu has contrived to consolidate his position as both head of state and commander in chief, with tight control over a loyal People's Liberation Army, Air Force, Second Artillery Force (includes ICBMs), and Navy. Another one of the hats Hu wears is General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party.  As the defense white paper indicates, the PLA "is dedicated to providing an important source of strength for consolidating the ruling position of the Communist Party of China."  It also says that one key task of the PLA's General Political Department is "guaranteeing -- politically, ideologically and organizationally -- the nature of the people's army under the absolute leadership of the Party."  The ASAT test must have been authorized at the highest levels of government.

In the common of air space, China's increasing offensive ambitions have already been alluded to (as documented in the white paper). ...