While the media and the Congress are focused almost entirely on the political ramifications of President George W. Bush's upcoming Iraq strategy speech, the consequences of the administration's recent personnel changes in our defense and intelligence communities have significant long-range implications.  Moreover, in one case, the administration's nominee seems to have been selected because he is easily confirmable, not necessarily because he's the best person for the job.
 
The administration has taken this route in the past.  John Negroponte, who is leaving his post as Director of National Intelligence to become Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's chief deputy was initially selected not for his intelligence expertise or his knowledge of spycraft (he had neither), but because he could easily make it through the Senate confirmation process.  Negroponte may in fact be "one of the finest guys and best diplomats that we have had in this era," according to former secretary of the Navy and 9/11 Commission member John F. Lehman.  But Lehman is equally vehement that Negroponte was "totally miscast as DNI." 
Indeed, as the nation's top spy, Negroponte's schedule often appeared far more ambassadorial than spookish.  He regularly took three-hour lunches and massage sessions at Washington's tony University Club.  Like the experienced bureaucrat he is, Negroponte built an empire of 1500 like-minded souls, surrounding himself largely with diplomatic personality types most of whom lacked the conniving, manipulative, amoral, push-the-edge-of-the-envelope thinking that makes for great spies, but poor diplomats.  As retired CIA case officer Robert Baer once put it to me, "If I'm not breaking the laws of the country to which I'm assigned, I'm not doing my job."  Ambassadors like Negroponte detest the very sorts of diplomatic 'flaps' that spies like Baer, if they're good, are bound to create sooner or later.

And yet, given the chance to supplant Negroponte with a tough-minded choice who understands the wilderness of mirrors, the administration is replacing him with the easily confirmable retired Vice Admiral J.M. (Mike) McConnell.  McConnell has spent the majority of his career in Naval Intelligence, and has worked since his retirement as a consultant at Booz Allen Hamilton.  Like the current CIA director Air Force General Michael Hayden, McConnell is a former director of the National Security Agency-the signals intelligence vacuum at Ft. Meade MD that sucks up millions of conversations, emails, faxes, and other communications from around the globe.  His corridor file depicts him a cautious, thoughtful, intensely bright but politically malleable individual. 
The most significant aspect of McConnell's personality with regard to his new job is that, just like Negroponte, he's no spy.  Nor, from all the available evidence, will he ever think like one.

"Consider the irony of this nomination," says legendary CIA operations officer Duane "Dewey" Clarridge.  Clarridge, who created and was first chief of CIA's Counter Terrorist Center, believes that McConnell is totally miscast.  "You've now got two signals intelligence officers [Hayden and McConnell] running America's spy business when everyone knows it's the HUMINT (HUMan INTelligence) side that needs fixing.  That's absolutely crazy."  One former high-ranking administration official who declines to go on the record puts McConnell's nomination in an even more ominous light.  "Putting another career bureaucrat as DNI will only make matters worse as he sets about continuing [to] rearrange Negroponte's deck chairs."

On a much more positive note are some of the tectonic shifts about to take place at the Pentagon.  The good news is that for all his flaws as CIA director, the new secretary of defense Robert M. Gates seems to have weathered his first round of  personnel changes with good-sometimes even inspired-choices.

It has been obvious for some time now that John Abazaid was the wrong man to lead CENTCOM.  As a combat decorated NCO who has worked for Abazaid puts it, "John is much better suited to the classroom than the battlefield."

Indeed, Abazaid's cautious leadership was frustrating to Soldiers who believe that war is about breaking things and killing people.  "There are seven-seven!-steps that we must satisfy in Sadr City before we can fire at an Iraqi target," says a Soldier who works prosecuting high-value targets in Baghdad.

Replacing Abazaid will be Admiral William Fallon, a Naval Flight Officer currently the commander of the U.S. Pacific Command.  The RUMINT and corridor file on Fox Fallon, as he's known, is almost universally positive.  Former SECNAV John Lehman calls Fallon "a fighter and a leader but also a thoughtful person always listening and seeking ideas from intelligence and experienced people."  Fallon also, says Lehman, brings to the job a strategic worldview that will help the administration develop a long-term strategy with regard to such adversaries as Iran.  "[Fox Fallon] knows how much the Navy has fallen behind in ASW (Anti-Submarine Warfare) and missile defense, meaning that our ability to protect our tankers and aircraft carriers from Iranian submarines and missiles is chancy at best." Fallon's appointment, says retired Pacific Fleet Commander Admiral James A. (Ace) Lyons, Jr., "sends a strong signal that in a strategic sense a new direction is being taken with regard to the region.  I read it as a direct signal to Tehran, because in order to deal with the Iranian threat we will have to rely on air and naval power, backed up by Marines and Special Forces."

A more controversial choice was the selection of Lieutenant General David Petraeus to replace General George W. Casey, Jr. (who many of the Army's Warriors see as a brilliant pick to become Army Chief of Staff) as the top U.S. commander in Iraq.  Petraeus is a Warrior/Scholar in the classic tradition -he was the motivating factor behind the new Army and Marine Corps Field Manual on Counterinsurgency-- whose brash, in-your-face manner and confident self-assurededness offends many of the Army's current generation of all-too-play-it-safe generals.

A sampling of current and former E-Ringers brought the following not-for-attribution comments:
· "Petraeus is the Army version of Jim Mattis."  [Mattis is the proud, unapologetic Warrior Marine Lieutenant General who commanded the First Marine Division on its 22-day march from the Kuwaiti border to Baghdad and whose politically incorrect but spot-on remarks about war and killing offended some of the risk-averse manager flag officers back in Washington]  "Both do not let the conventional wisdom get in the way of the best answers.  Neither suffers fools gladly, especially if they are peers."
· "Both [Petraeus and Mattis] are especially aggressive dealing with the uncertainties of combat-adaptive in the face of adversity."
· "Petraeus should be the prototype for the Army's future leaders.  [But that's an] uphill battle, resisted inside the Army by the stovepipe, conventional battlefield generals."

One of Petraeus's major problems, according to an E-8 with extensive time on the ground in Iraq, will be ensuring that those reporting to him -especially the JAG corps  prosecute their missions aggressively.  Only then can the surge of combat troops the president is talking about sending do their jobs properly.

Admiral Ace Lyons agrees: "You can't pacify Baghdad without cutting off the heads of the Mahdi Army, killing the radical cleric Sheikh Muqtada al-Sadr, decimating the al-Qa'ida faction, and securing the borders.  [Petraeus] needs to be given increased...