Everywhere, from under the sea to cyberspace and outer space, the People’s Republic of China continues to strengthen its offensive military power even as a dangerous myth gains currency in American pop culture. The “China Myth” states that the PRC presents no possible future armed threat to the United States nor to our critical interests and allies overseas. The China Myth in its full form claims that any appearance of threat is a fabrication by our own Pentagon, in cahoots with U.S. intelligence agencies. The motivation behind such alleged propaganda? Getting bigger defense budgets to buy better but unneeded toys.

This came to a head last week when two arms-control advocacy groups together issued a 250-page report whose purpose in large part was to unmask these supposed shenanigans. “Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning,” by the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) and the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), in my opinion gives the impression that there is hard proof supporting the China Myth. But the China Myth itself is a myth; China is truly dangerous.

The most egregious aspect of the FAS/NRDC report is how it impugns the Department of Defense and all its minions, the U.S. intelligence community at large, lawmakers, the shipbuilding industry, think tanks, other private institutions, and even “certain news organizations”.  It’s as if the FAS and NRDC are trying to create a monopoly for themselves on China-related defense commentary. They also continually castigate those multiple named or unnamed offending parties for having in the past repeatedly underestimated the timing by which China would achieve military technology development benchmarks. I feel the need to point out that this is part and parcel of defense work anywhere. The U.S. military-industrial complex has frequently missed deadlines by years -- but the majority of those new weapon systems eventually come on line, doing what they’re meant to do and reasonably satisfying most end users.       

Some of the validity of the report starts to fall apart early, in the press release, which may be as far as many readers get. The press release, like the report, states that People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) sub patrols have declined from single digits at the turn of this century to zero in 2005. The recent Song/Kitty Hawk encounter is described as “the first reported Chinese submarine patrol in nearly two years.” The key word here is “reported.” This decline in patrols is apparent, not real. Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence -- nor are American submariners and antisubmarine specialists publicly telling everything they know. The report itself also erroneously downplays the strategic significance of a Ming-class diesel boat’s undetected outbound penetration of the First Island Chain in 2003. What’s actually happening, according to numerous reliable sources, is that China’s submarine force is gaining fast in practical experience, stealth, and seagoing professionalism.  The Ming and Song could never have done what they did unless the PLAN conducts a classified but active program of constant training and forward deployment of a significant portion of their subs and crews. 

The report also makes a mistake, I believe, by focusing on a static snapshot of what’s implicitly described as China’s only strategic nuclear deterrent sub, a Xia-class SSBN dating back to the early 1980s. Virtually ignored is the future impact of the much newer Type 094 SSBN submarines, whose rapid follow-on to the Type 093 fast-attack SSNs impressed U.S. intelligence services.  Worse, the very existence of the 093s caught our intel experts by surprise. To me, claims that anybody is exaggerating the pace and potential of China’s progress on the submarine front seem to fly in the face of reality.

Another factual blooper occurs when the report downplays the significance of China’s move to next-generation ICBMs that are road mobile. The statement is made that “the majority of China’s ballistic missile force always has been mobile.” The problem here is that the FAS and NRDC miss or gloss over the distinction between conventional (high explosive) ballistic missiles and missiles tipped with hydrogen bombs. Yes, the majority of China’s ballistic missiles, which are conventionally armed, have been road mobile for years (this includes, among others, a lot of the 800 or so positioned near the Chinese coast across the strait from Taiwan). But only recently has China moved toward road-mobile thermonuclear ICBMs. Up to now, China’s ICBMs have been silo based, making them comparatively easy to target. Road mobile ICBMs are the natural next phase toward a survivable second-strike nuclear force, a step on a path where the ultimate goal -- in any country -- is quiet SSBNs with mechanically reliable submerged-launch missiles. Road mobile ICBMs can be tracked by space-based synthetic aperture radar (SAR), but those SAR birds are vulnerable(see more below).

Any strike needs missiles that can reach whatever they’re aimed at. To say that China’s latest land-based ICBM design, the DF-31A, which has the intended range to hit anywhere in the U.S., has not yet had any test flights begs the question in two ways.  The DF-31A is a variant on the proven shorter range DF-31, and test flights of the DF-31A are surely on China’s schedule(maybe after the 2008 Olympics in Beijing). Meanwhile, China’s commercial satellite launching industry continues to thrive, and her manned space exploration efforts advance by undeniable leaps and bounds. It’s a mistake to think that China is badly behind the curve in rocket science.  

A systematic weakness throughout the whole FAS/NRDC report is its emphasis on first-strike capabilities; it’s not news that such a strike by either nation would kill tens of millions of innocent civilians in the other. Anyone who’s studied Henry Kissinger and Herman Kahn and Barry Posner, for instance, would understand that deterrence depends on having an indestructable second strike always held in reserve. Yet on this essential topic the report is almost entirely mute.

Let’s step back and look at everything from a broader perspective. First, I urge those who need convincing that the future military threat from China is not just a Pentagon-fomented daydream to study two serious academic monographs, rife with footnotes to primary references and both with non-Americo-centric views. One was written by a Brit and the other by an Aussie, Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era by Christopher R. Hughes and China’s Rising Sea Power: the PLA Navy’s Submarine Challenge by Peter Howarth. Published in 2006, they’re up-to-date and timely.

Second, let’s talk more about subs, satellites, and nuclear weapons. China has made no secret of her constant investment in offensive cyber-warfare, an element of information warfare.  Beijing recognizes that a crucial potential weakness in U.S. network-centric warfare doctrine is the integrity of the data involved and also the security of the hardware and software infrastructure needed to gather, interpret, and promulgate real-time battlespace knowledge. Beijing also knows that the American military, for its network-centric force coordination (including  look-down synthetic aperture radar mentioned above), is heavily dependent on platforms based in space. So China is giving a priority to anti-satellite weaponry. Here’s where things get interesting, and scary.

Actual tests around 1960, and theoretical research in recent years, have shown that the most terrible weapon for fighting information warfare and anti-satellite warfare simultaneously is a high-altitude nuclear explosion(for more information on this, search Scientific American magazine’s Internet archives). Were China to set off a single...