with life-saving aid -- could at best turn into something bitter and dangerous. Garbled or misunderstood communications about intent might lead to (or be blamed for) weapons opening fire, which an eager Beijing might make sure happens and/or makes sure rapidly escalates. In a worst case, a Chinese Navy “relief” task force actually equipped and geared-up for battle might converge on an American task force optimized and psyched for delivering aid, and if Beijing wants to start a war by surprise then this is one terrific way to give them a decisive victory in the first big naval engagement. A forewarned PRC information-warfare operation could swiftly swamp the Internet and airwaves with claims that America started it, fuzzing things up enough that the U.S. hesitates while China throws further combat assets into a fight conveniently near their own front yard. If this sounds far-fetched, so did Pearl Harbor and 9/11/01 before they happened.

The Long-Off War calls for hard-nosed preparation starting now, to deter it or to win it, especially given the lengthy lead time involved in designing, funding, building, and shaking-down any significant number of new or additional naval platforms. The window of risk presented by China begins near the end of the CNO's 30-year shipbuilding plan, and extends well past it. Thirty years might seem like beyond forever to practically-minded American politicians and serving flag officers, but to establish a perspective let me respectfully point out that to many Vietnam Veterans 30+ years ago feels like only yesterday.

(This essay is meant in part to lay the groundwork for the upcoming three-part serialized reprint in Military.com's Warfighter's Forum of my award-winning article “Will China Rule the Waves?”, first published in The Submarine Review.)