Over the past few weeks the Senate and the House have debated the Iraq occupation in terms of "stay the course" versus "cut and run."  The debate was irrelevant.  At the same time Congress debated, Gen. George Casey Jr., the U.S. commander in Iraq was briefing a plan that would begin "redeployment" this fall and lead to a force level of 50-75,000 by the end of 2007.  The issue that should be debated is whether redeployment continues and is completed, or whether there is an essentially permanent U.S. combat presence in Iraq.

The Bush Administration appears to be preparing to stay the course for a very long time.  It has refused to declare that it desires no permanent bases in Iraq.  It is reportedly spending $1 billion to create four to six permanent mega-bases in Iraq complete with bowling alleys, swimming pools and BX facilities.  This is either a colossal waste of taxpayer money or a signal of intentions.  Republicans in Congress also killed a provision in the Emergency Appropriations Bill to forbid funding of such bases.  And then there is the Presidents declaration that it will be up to his successors to decide on final withdrawal.

One hint that the groundwork is being laid for a permanent U.S. presence in Iraq is the analogy of U.S. Forces remaining in Germany, Japan and Korea.  The analogy fails.  Germany and Japan were defeated and exhausted. There was no organized opposition and no U.S. soldiers died from hostile action during the occupations.  Both countries had largely homogeneous populations.   None of these conditions prevail in Iraq. These occupations ended by the early 1950s. In the case of Germany, U.S. -- and British, French and Canadian -- forces remained under the auspices of the North Atlantic Treaty and bilateral Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA).   Japan was similar except that U.S. forces remained to provide a defensive umbrella for a country that had renounced the use of force as an instrument of national policy. 

Korea was altogether different.  There the American forces went in under a United Nations Security Council mandate to repel the North Korean invasion.  More than 50 years after the armistice, U.S. and allied forces remain under UN mandate to police the cease-fire and deter another invasion.  In all three cases, the mission of the forces was deterrence.  Treaties provided the basis for continued presence. With the end of the Warsaw Pact threat, U.S. forces in Germany are being drawn down.  The threat and the forces remain in Korea and Japan.

The analogy is, however, instructive as to the true choices we face in Iraq. It highlights the issue of whether to fully re-deploy or to prepare to remain for a very long time. This is where the Iraq discussion should focus and where both military and political questions need addressing.

Militarily, the mission of any residual force must be clear.  Is it just to support the Iraqi government's internal security needs?  Will those forces take sides should full-scale civil war erupt?  Is a residual force needed to deter external aggression from Iran or Syria?  Will the forces be used to project U.S. power outside Iraq?  What will be the terms and conditions of any treaty and a Status of Forces agreement?  What threats will residual forces face from indigenous l and external (al Qaeda) insurgents?

More important are the political questions. Will the American and Iraqi people tolerate an indefinite commitment of U.S. forces?    Can the sovereignty and legitimacy of the Iraqi government be accepted so long as U.S. forces remain?  What will be the impact of our choice in the region?  What posture will more likely enhance stability and prevent Iran from agitating the Shia minorities in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan and the Gulf States.  What posture will be more likely to encourage international participation in the stabilization and reconstruction of Iraq?

The issue of a permanent American military presence in Iraq deserves full discussion and debate now.  The choice will determine what forces are re-deployed, how much should be spent on bases in Iraq, the U.S. force posture in other countries in the region, the structure of any reconstruction program and what cooperation might be forthcoming from our allies.  That U.S. forces will re-deploy from Iraq is certain.  The timing of that withdrawal is being debated.  The extent of the withdrawal has not been but desperately needs to be.