Last week President Bush and Condoleezza Rice made a bold move in agreeing to participate with Iran in negotiations, provided that the Iranians met certain basic conditions, including the suspension of nuclear fuel production. This shift in the Administration's position on Iran surprised many people in Washington and dismayed others. It should not be viewed as appeasement or surrender to Iran, but rather as a wise move to counter Iran's deceptive effort to split the United States from its allies.

Until about a month ago, President Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice believed that they had reasonably secure support from Russia, Germany and France for a hard line position against Iran's continued development of nuclear weapons. As the Iranians dug in, Bush's support in Moscow and Berlin began to disintegrate. This is not particularly surprising. Both Russia and Germany trade extensively with Iran, and the Russians particularly in all areas including nuclear development. Once again, Russia and the Europeans are placing their own economic self-interests ahead of principle and long-term national security.

This split between the United States on the one hand and the Europeans and Russians on the other deepened with the eighteen-page letter that Iranian President Ahmadinejad sent two weeks ago. There was nothing conciliatory about this letter that declared that liberal democracy was a failure and attacked the West. Yet those who wanted to grasp for straws determined -- with wishful thinking -- that this was an effort to reach out and start a dialogue with the United States.

This was a brilliant move by the masters of deception in Tehran. As they no doubt anticipated, it threw the United States on the defensive. The Iranian leaders would have liked nothing better than for Bush to resist the call for a dialogue and continue to assert a hard line from which Russia, Germany and France would distance themselves. The United States would then be isolated, having a choice between unilateral military action and acquiescence in Iran's nuclear program.

Bush and Rice saw through this Iranian ploy. In an attempt to avoid diplomatic isolation, which may or may not be possible, Condoleezza Rice developed the idea of the letter to Iran offering to negotiate with certain preconditions. As this letter was sent, there was no optimism in Washington that there would ever be meaningful negotiations. On the other hand, the Administration does have a hope that if it plays its cards right in connection with this Iranian gambit it may be able to obtain support from Germany, France and Russia for some sanctions against Iran if the Iranians do not break off their nuclear work. Personally, I think this hope is tempered with far too much optimism. When it gets right down to the moment of decision, I don't think Bush will be able to count on support from Germany, Russia and France for any kind of sanctions in the U.N. I may be unduly pessimistic, but whether or not I am it is still necessary for the Administration to continue to play the diplomatic game that it is not doing.

Already President Bush is receiving some positive value from the letter that Rice prepared. Two days ago Iran's religious leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei lashed out with a series of vitriolic broadsides against the United States contending that suggestions of a consensus against Iran were “a lie.” Khamenei further warned the United States that Iran would respond to any wrong move by disrupting energy flow in the region. This threat was intended to include blockage of the Strait of Hormuz that is a major sea transit point for oil tankers. Threats to disrupt energy supply would have massive economic impact on Iran as well as the United States and its allies. It is questionable whether the Iranians would ever take such an action. However, one can't underestimate the religious zealots who are in control of the Iranian government.

The crucial point is the administration's letter offering to talk, which was certainly a carrot, was met with this bitter attack from Tehran. The Iranians were angered by Washington's show of flexibility in an effort to retain control of the coalition. What Tehran was hoping for was a hard line response from Washington that would have split the alliance. Thus, in this round of diplomatic chess the Administration has won some points.

It is still unclear as to how this matter will play out in the next couple of weeks. The most likely scenario is that the Iranians will formally reject the United States' preconditions in the hope that Merkel and Putin will persuade Bush to drop the preconditions for negotiations. The pressure on Bush to drop these preconditions can be expected to be severe. Whether Bush will abandon them or not remains to be seen.