(“Risk is a critical part of the intelligence business. Singling out these individuals would send the wrong message… about taking risks….” CIA Director Porter Goss October 5, 2005)

Finally, someone in authority has the courage to put a halt to Washington's accountability jihad against CIA over 9/11, recognizing that it already has severely damaged US intelligence.

Goss announced in early October that he would not convene, as recommended by CIA's IG, a so-called “accountability board” to consider further punitive actions against CIA officers for 9/11 related performance. Goss said that neither this nor the many other reports on 9/11 suggested that any one person or group could have prevented 9/11. Goss added that because CIA was starved of resources and staff in the 90's, the Agency's “stars” were asked to step up to the most difficult tasks, and that any further sanctions would fall heavily on the finest officers still actively serving there.

Most importantly, Goss aimed his decision -- sure to provoke controversy and consternation in many quarters -- squarely at the culture of risk aversion that has grown in the Agency for many decades and which reached its pinnacle just prior to 9/11.

Simply put, we have come to the point where we cannot have both full, untrammeled accountability, which is certainly a splendid concept, and still field a capable foreign intelligence service. At a time of worldwide terrorist threat, this is not a close call.

CIA is hardly the only agency undermined by risk aversion in the toxic Washington environment. Witness the post-Katrina spectacle of former FEMA director Michael Brown under incessant pillorying by largely Republican members of Congress at a hearing in late September.

“I don't know how you can sleep at night,” said one legislator in full-throated outrage.

You don't need to be supportive of Brown or FEMA to appreciate the rank hypocrisy and selective outrage of Congress when, the following day, a Senate committee excused the Governor of Louisiana from addressing her or FEMA's shortcomings during a totally anodyne hearing.

Nary a senior career or appointed official in US government service -- whether in FEMA, DHS or elsewhere -- missed the implicit message here: when you take on a tough job, stick your neck out, and something goes wrong, you are at risk of taking the fall. Therefore, stay cautious, keep your head down, and don't take chances.

As I have written earlier, all of this is a clear result of the obsession by Congress, the press, and political opportunists to point the finger of blame as quickly and categorically as possible. In the case of CIA, it started in the 70's with Watergate-era congressional investigations of abuses -- many real and some imagined or unimportant. It was abetted by the hostility and indifference of the CIA's political masters during the 70's and 90's, and also by the politicization of congressional oversight.

The Agency suffered never-ending and agenda-driven congressional and IG investigations that punished the competent and daring and left untouched the mediocre and cautious. That unleashed battalions of intrusive lawyers and bureaucrats obstructing risky endeavors and risk-taking officers.

In the wake of 9/11, grieving families, a carping press and cowed politicians gave full scope to the misguided 9/11 commission, which blamed and “reformed” intelligence by burying CIA under yet another bureaucracy, further reinforcing the risk averse culture gripping Langley. Even after two presidential commissions and three separate congressional inquiries on 9/11, Congress encouraged the IG's in the national security agencies, including CIA, to take an internal look at what went wrong. And the resulting report in CIA is where Porter Goss took his stand.

Hopefully, Goss' moment on the road to Damascus doesn't come too late to restore CIA's derring-do. We have been reminded this past week how major US cities and states have tuned out federal intelligence and installed their own information gathering and sharing systems to cope with terrorist threats in their jurisdictions.

The New York City Police Department has been a pioneer in this effort, establishing an intelligence capability said to number more than 1000 officers and an in-house operations center. They have also posted police officers abroad in liaison with foreign law-enforcement agencies.

The Wall Street Journal reported October 10 that police in Washington DC, Los Angeles, Miami, Las Vegas, Seattle, and Houston also are setting up their own intelligence shops, working with foreign law enforcement, and creating secure communications networks that bypass federal authorities. It is noteworthy that each of these cities has been targeted by terrorists in the past or mentioned in terrorist threat advisories.

Given the struggles of DHS and the Intelligence Community in developing and transmitting timely tactical threat information, it is understandable that local officials responsible for safety and security in their jurisdictions would take such measures. But this is far from an ideal situation, as demonstrated by the public disagreement between New York City and the federal government over the credibility of information that led to tighter security in the New York subway system. Imagine what would happen if there were another Katrina or 9/11 attack.

If only for this reason, it is imperative that federal intelligence and homeland security regain the confidence of the nation's states and cities.

Patting Goss on the back for a courageous and wise stand does not diminish the reality that putting things right in Langley is an urgent and tall task, particularly in today's bitterly partisan and finger-pointing Washington. But, he has taken a necessary first step.