What have we learned from our early intelligence failures in Iraq, Afghanistan and many other places around the world?

Intelligence support for the warfighter during conventional combat operations starts with knowledge of enemy order of battle (OOB) and an understanding of the Mission, Enemy Terrain & Weather, Troops Available and Time (METT-T) -- the center of gravity is the enemy warfighting capability. However, during counterinsurgency (COIN) and/or stability operations, intelligence support for the warfighter starts with knowledge of the people. The center of gravity is the people.

It is understood that defeating enemy combatants or insurgents and establishing or reestablishing security and public order are the first priorities, but it must be done with full appreciation of the culture and the mood and disposition of the population.

Kill one insurgent with overwhelming firepower -- that which kills civilians or destroys critical infrastructure -- and you may create three to five more insurgents. After defeating known enemy forces, understanding the population demographics is paramount to any further actions.

Standard Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield and intimate local situational awareness about the city or village is vital. Combat leaders, operations staff and intelligence staff must have full knowledge and understanding of the critical infrastructure like roads and bridges, power stations and power grids, water and sewerage, schools and mosques, hospitals and clinics, economic and business centers, key government facilities and cultural centers like museums and community centers.

Over time many military leaders have come to understand that they have to provide all military personnel with a better understanding of what to expect in a given region of the world. Many are now beginning to understand that we cannot expect foreigners to understand our culture, let alone impose our cultural values on anyone.

Language skills are becoming more important to all U.S. Armed Forces. The Army and the Marine Corps have developed pre-deployment cultural awareness training and are providing the troops with some language training and pocket training aids to help them with key phrases and the local culture.

No one can properly conduct Human Intelligence (HUMINT) operations unless they speak the language and know the culture. HUMINT trumps all other forms of intelligence collection in COIN and stability ops.

Getting it right the first time cannot be over-emphasized. Much of the early cultural training provided to the troops did not apply to Iraq. Too many thought that any basic Arabic and Muslim cultural training was sufficient. Unfortunately, anyone trying to teach the culture of Saudi Arabia would be sorely wrong to apply the same concepts to Iraq or Afghanistan.

The main question to be answered in gaining a full situational awareness of the population is to understand what is motivating them to do whatever they do. No one will ever learn or understand this in a classroom, no matter how educated or experienced the instructor may be. You need to be there. You need to see and hear what the people are saying and what they are not saying.

Many Americans still do not understand the built-in biases that most Muslims and many Iraqis have against the US. The Palestinian question is always a consideration for Muslims everywhere and for most Iraqis. The unqualified U.S. support for Israel is a question to many.

Then there are many who believe that the US is only interested in the oil in the region. One can reasonably ask the question -- if it were not for the oil, would the US be involved in this region?

Major Beau Higgins, USMC, in an article in the Marine Corps Intelligence Association magazine, INTSUM, Summer 2005, “Overhauling the Mentality of the Military,” noted that Iraqis are survivors above all else. He said: “Most Iraqis have spent the bulk of their lives living under the brutal dictatorship of Saddam Hussein.”

He went on to write: “When contrasted with the American culture, the disconnect is clear. Most Americans share an optimistic outlook on the future, and we believe everyone else must be planning a future. It became obvious that we were very naïve about what the common man in Iraq had been going through over the past decades. The cultural divide led to many problems that still affect operations in Iraq.”

I am reminded of the misery, death and destruction that the U. S. of A. caused the Shi'ite population.

After the Gulf War of 1991, the US encouraged the Shi'ites to rise up and rebel against Saddam Hussein. They did and were massacred in the thousands. While they asked for help, the U.S. government did nothing. The US has very few friends in the Shi'ite community. They see their only hope in survival after a civil war, which now seems to be inevitable, to be with Iran.

Unfortunately, most efforts to incorporate language and cultural training have not been fully institutionalized in the U.S. Armed Forces. Until we have a cognitive transformation in the thinking of our military and civilian DoD leadership, that includes the conventional trained military with an unconventional military paradigm, we will have more difficulties ahead -- not only in Iraq, but anywhere in the world.

Nevertheless, we cannot forget that we have heavily armed and dangerous potential conventional enemies in North Korea, Iran and China. We cannot and must not forsake our conventional military capabilities for the sake of our current war on terrorism.