Threats in the AO
The insurgents that U.S. forces find themselves fighting are looking to inflict the most damage possible with the best chances of survivability. And along those lines, the best way for insurgents to attack U.S. personnel is by creating the most damage with the least cost. The most effective means of conducting such missions is through the use of IEDs.

IEDs are therefore the biggest threats to convoys. IEDs are the preferred method of attack by insurgents for several reasons. First and foremost, they provide insurgents a large bang for the buck at a small cost. Two types of IEDs that convoys are most likely to encounter are victim activated and remote detonated. Both types of IEDs provide a good degree of standoff. Victim activated devices are emplaced by insurgents and rigged to go off as a result of a convoy tripping the wire or other triggering mechanism. In these types of devices, the insurgent exposes himself to potential observation and danger while implanting the device. However, once the device is set up, he can get out of the area quickly and avoid U.S. forces in the aftermath of the blast. So long as a convoy does not come along while he is placing the device, and if he is proficient at his trade, he has little to fear. Additionally, the IED man is most often not alone. He usually works with a partner or a team who provides early warning of any threats.

Remote control activated IEDs also leave a degree of standoff. They do require the triggerman to stay in the vicinity of the device in order to detonate it. The IED man can be several hundred meters from the actual ambush site. In the aftermath of the event he has to avoid detection as he egresses the area. Observation may come in the form of air support called in as a result of the event, or the deployment of troops who survive the blast as they sweep the area and cordon it off for an explosive ordnance disposal postblast investigation. Once again, although the triggerman still must avoid detection, this attack method is not nearly as dangerous and likely more effective than confronting a heavily armed convoy with a direct fire weapon.

IEDs do not only come in the form of roadside bombs, however. Vehicleborne IEDs (VBIEDs) are also a serious threat. VBIEDs can come in the form of a broken down vehicle on the side of the road that blows up as a convoy passes by, or the VBIED may be a moving vehicle with a suicide driver who drives into a convoy. (In this case the VBIED is called a suicide VBIED or SVBIED.) VBIEDs can often be more dangerous because they can carry large quantities of ordnance. Additionally, those with a suicide driver can allow insurgents to troll for targets of opportunity and more accurately target specific vehicles. They also provide an excellent psychological advantage, coupled with the fact that they often cause more casualties. During 24th MEU's time in theater, the number of VBIEDs increased exponentially. Fortunately, as the number of incidents increased, their effectiveness against CF dropped dramatically from the summer to the fall of 2004. The drop in success was likely due to better situational awareness on the part of convoy personnel and their efforts to ensure adequate standoff of vehicles coming near them.

Although not as effective as IEDs, indirect fire (IDF) was another attack method used against convoys. IDF was not always used as a lone attack method; it was usually used in conjunction with enemy direct fire weapons, such as small arms and machinegun fire, as well as with rocket propelled grenades (RPGs). Although the combined arms approach to attacking convoys had the potential to be devastating, MEU Service Support Group 24 (MSSG–24) convoys suffered no killed in action and very few wounded in action to these types of complex attacks.

Most attacks on convoys that were not solely IED attacks usually commenced with some sort of explosion, either IED or mortar. Then they were usually followed by small arms and sometimes RPGs. Fortunately, the firepower available to the convoys was sufficient to lay down heavy fire and suppress the enemy with them having little effectiveness with their fires.

Once again, as survivability more than effectiveness was their emphasis when combating CF, insurgents often placed some sort of natural barrier or obstacle between themselves and the CF. Usually they were on the other side of a canal allowing them quick egress once they were overpowered with firepower. The canals often impeded HWMMVs and dismounted Marines from giving chase to kill the insurgents.

The North Babil Province of Iraq proved to be one of the AO's most tenuous. Insurgents preferred to target what they considered to be less hard targets, such as convoys and CSS operations, rather than tangle with infantry forces face to face. The 24th MEU's innate ability to integrate the elements of the Marine air-ground task force proved vital to their success in Iraq.

Capt Meglathery served as the MSSG–24 intelligence officer based out of Camp Kalsu, Iraq. He is currently the intelligence officer for II MEF G–7 (Exercise and Training), Camp Lejeune.