The term "hot line" is derived from the communications system established between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1963 following the Cuban missile crisis. On several occasions during that crisis in the fall of 1962, the United States and Soviet Union came very close to nuclear conflict. Delays in transmitting messages between the Kremlin and the White House often took 12 hours or more, leading to the hot line that consists of a teletype system in the Pentagon and in the Kremlin that provides multiple, essentially real-time communications routes. (Despite scenes in the classic films Dr. Strangelove and Fail-Safe, the hot line does not use telephones.)

Addressing the need for a China-U.S. hot line, Admiral Keating said that the United States does not have a number to call when problems arise. "I really am anxious to be able to get hold of somebody," said Keating, who recently returned from his second trip to China to meet with senior Chinese military leaders.

He said that he told Chinese officials, "If something comes up I'd like to call you and say what are you guys doing." But, he said, they "just haven't given us the phone numbers yet."

Admiral Keating described his meetings in Beijing as less confrontational and less tense than his previous meetings in China. And, he spoke more optimistically about the prospects for China to become more open about its ongoing military buildup.

Like other U.S. officials, Admiral Keating revealed the bad feelings generated by China's refusal to allow two minesweepers and a carrier battle group to enter Hong Kong harbor last November. The situation was considered critical for the two minesweepers by many persons because of a major storm in the area. A telephone link, Admiral Keating said, might have helped in the standoff last November when the U.S. minesweepers sought refuge in Hong Kong harbor.

And, the admiral said, Chinese officials gave him no explanation for last year's anti-satellite test, when China shot down one of its defunct weather satellites, drawing immediate criticism from the United States and other countries. Keating, like other U.S. officials asked for "transparency" in Chinese military actions.

From a practical viewpoint, U.S. actions last fall, including President Bush meeting with the Dalai Lama, the exiled Tibetan spiritual leader, and certain U.S. actions with regard to Taiwan, upset Chinese leaders. The ability of China to respond to those actions by the United States was severely limited; denying port visits may have been the only practical response available to the Chinese.

While a hot line between the Pacific Command and the Chinese military leadership may help relations between the two countries, especially during emergency and natural disaster responses, the situation is very different than 1963 when the U.S.-Soviet hot line was established. At that time both nations had large numbers of nuclear weapons targeted against the other and, as the Cuban missile crisis demonstrated, normal diplomatic communications were too slow for crisis situations.

Today, although Admiral Keating does not have a telephone number for the Chinese high command, such communications can be rapidly established through the Chinese defense attache in Washington and the U.S. defense attaché in Beijing. And, of course, today's communications technologies enable instantaneous voice links between anyone in either country with a cell phone.

Perhaps the four vice chairmen of the Central Military Commission (the Chinese military leadership body), the members of the U.S. JCS, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, and Admiral Keating should exchange cell phone numbers -- and take Rosetta Stone language courses.