The Navy's Littoral combat Ship (LCS) program is in deep trouble. The effort to produce some 50 to 60 small combatant ships for operations in littoral waters has been plagued by massive cost overruns and poor management by both the Navy and the two shipbuilding teams producing competitive LCS designs.

Indeed, in an action rarely employed by the Navy's leadership, Secretary of the Navy Donald C. Winter has cancelled two of the LCS hulls -- one from the team of Lockheed Marine/Marinette Marine and one from General Dynamics/Bath Iron Works/Austal.

Meanwhile, two prototypes, Lockheed Martin's Freedom (LCS 1) and General Dynamics' Independence (LCS 2) are behind schedule and significantly over their original contract costs. This has thrown in confusion the Navy's original plan to produce a few ships of both designs and then select one for series production.

In an attempt to unravel the LCS mess, Representative Gene Taylor (D-Mississippi) has recently directed the Navy and Coast Guard to look into the feasibility of pursuing a "common hull" for the Navy's LCS and the Coast Guard's National Security Cutter (NSC). Ironically, early in the LCS and NSC programs the two services agreed to consider a common design for their very different roles. However, the Navy's demand for a 45-knot-plus speed for the LCS ended that proposal.

The lead NSC, the Bertholf (WMSL 750), began sea trials in December 2007, and should be commissioned this spring.  While the NSC -- part of the Coast Guard's Deepwater Project -- has also suffered problems, the Bertholf  is now at sea.

At this time the requirements for the two ship types are very different:
                             LCS                       NSC
Max. speed           45+ knots              28 knots
Range                   4,500 n.miles*       12,000 n.miles                
Endurance             21 days                 60 days

* At 22 knots; 1,500 n.miles at approx. 45 knots.

Further, and most significantly, the highly innovative LCS designs provide for a modular or "sea frame” concept, intended to embark specialized mission modules for combat operations. Now under development are containerized modules for mine countermeasures, anti-submarine warfare, and anti-surface craft ("swarm" attacks). The Bertholf design cannot accommodate these modules, which are now under development. This issue is a "show stopper” for the common hull concept.

Unfortunately, the Navy's (costly) demand for high speed in the LCS designs caused an early -- some would say premature -- end to a joint Navy-Coast Guard program. However, even that aspect of the LCS and NSC efforts were apparently not thought out at early stages of the program.  Using a common hull, could the gas turbines of the LCS have been replaced by diesel engines or a combination diesel-gas turbine propulsion plant in the Coast Guard variant? Could a maritime security module have been developed for the LCS designs which, despite their higher costs, have been feasible for the Coast Guard through reduced crew requirements, larger LCS productions runs, common crew training, etc.?

Such a joint effort would have also enabled the Coast Guard LCS cutters to perform more-capable military functions during a future conflict, as in past conflicts. But it is now apparently too late for such a joint project. Maybe next time?