Multi-National Force - Iraq (MNF-I) has been subject to more than its fair-share of Monday-morning quarterbacking by retired generals and colonels; active duty officers, non-commissioned officers and enlisted; Representatives, Senators, reporters, pundits, bloggers and think-tankers without throwing yet another so-called "expert" opinion into the hopper.

Moreover, the release of the recent National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq and General Accounting Office report combined with the partisan bickering in Congress only add to the fog of war as these documents, as well as other reports, have been interpreted by both sides of the aisle as either an encouraging sign of progress or confirmation of a bad war heading south.

The need for restraint in second-guessing and adding to the noise level is especially true leading into General David Petraeus' and Ambassador Ryan Crocker's much awaited progress report to Congress.

What I offer here are "the basics" - background on the "new" counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine and a quick guide on what to look for in reports and commentary concerning the dynamic and complex operating environment in Iraq - all against assumptions that "we don't know what we don't know" and everything we hold as ground-truth is nothing more than a snapshot in time of a long campaign that is subject to rapid and dramatic change for good or for bad on a recurring basis.

If we had a real Phase IV plan (post-"major" combat operations) and had implemented that plan with full participation of interagency assets things could very well be different now.  Had we efficiently occupied the vacuum that existed immediately following regime change one could credibly argue that the counterinsurgency that developed would have never matured.

Well, we didn't have a coherent Phase IV plan, we didn't have all instruments of national power available and we fueled the development of an insurgency by alienating large segments of the Iraqi population. Water under the bridge and best left to the historians to sort out - it is time to move on. 

What is important is that we now have a "theater-wide" doctrine. The best and brightest tactical commanders implemented sound COIN practices on a local level from the outset, but their efforts were fleeting as units moved on and there existed a denial in many quarters that we were even facing an insurgency. So short of calling it quits, that doctrine is our best, and possibly last, chance on getting this thing right.

History is chock-full of examples of COIN military forces winning every tactical battle only to lose the war. That said, strategic goals are many times vaguely defined and tend to shift with the prevailing political wind over time. Sound and stable tactics, techniques and procedures provide a common and time-tested baseline for military and other agency organizations to operate from in the absence of a well-defined strategic end-state.

While the advantages of a "bottom-up" approach to COIN is arguable; solid tactics, executed correctly and uniformly, provide a solid base while the "top" (host nation or otherwise) sorts itself out.

To meet the goals of a counterinsurgency we require the right tools in the toolbox - FM 3-24 provides tactical tools that, given time, are the best practices to meet the strategic objectives.  Are those tools foolproof and a guarantee for success? Absolutely not, but again - they are our last best chance.

What follows are historical principles of COIN operations as outlined in the opening pages of FM 3-24.  I've provided some abbreviated commentary on the "things to look for" and potential roadblocks in regards to recent and ongoing operations in Iraq. Again, not to judge, but to provide an insight on how FM 3-24 is playing out in Iraq.

Historical Principles for Counterinsurgency

1. Legitimacy is the Main Objective

This is a big (and elusive) COIN principle (along with Principle 8: "Long-term Commitment") in Iraq - fostering development of effective governance by a legitimate government.

Things to look for: Increased (or decreased) ability of the central government to provide security; selection of national leaders in a manner considered just and fair by a majority of citizens; high level of popular participation and support for political processes; culturally acceptable level of government corruption; culturally acceptable level and rate of political, economic, and social development; and a high level of acceptance by major social institutions. In the near-term, look for movement on legislative initiatives such as the oil framework law, revenue sharing, and de-Baathification reform.

Roadblocks: Shia insecurity about retaining political dominance, widespread Sunni unwillingness to accept a diminished political status, factional rivalries within the sectarian communities resulting in armed conflict, and the actions of extremists such as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and elements of the Sadrist Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia.

2. Unity of Effort Is Essential

Unity of effort is essential at every echelon and by every organization - military and civilian - U.S., other Coalition and Iraqi. Well-intentioned but uncoordinated actions can cancel each other out and/or provide vulnerabilities suited to be exploited by adversaries.

Things to look for: Continued close cooperation and coordination between Amb. Crocker and Gen. Petraeus and their staffs - same with coalition partners. Close coordination, cooperation and combined operations between Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) and military units. Expansion of the PRT program to include access to previously denied areas in Iraq. Close coordination, cooperation and combined operations between U.S. military and PRTs and Iraqi security forces (local and national).

Roadblocks: If and when non-military capabilities significantly increase (PRTs - non governmental organizations, international and regional organizations) the challenge of conducting coordinated and complementary operations by diverse organizations with inherently parochial objectives. The Iraqi national government's ability to meet the basic needs of the general population and its perceived legitimacy by a majority are the primary obstacles. Without the Iraqi government there can be no 'political' unity of effort.

3. Political Factors Are Primary

One rule of thumb is COIN is 80 percent political action and 20 percent military action. All military and non-military actions should contribute to strengthen the national government's legitimacy.

Things to look for: Any and all indicators of a true national government capable (or becoming capable) and willing to take on those tasks associated with governance of a country. Solid steps towards national reconciliation is key. Again, movement on legislative initiatives such as the oil framework law, revenue sharing, and de-Baathification reform are critical.

Roadblocks: The precarious state of the Iraqi Government due to criticism by other members of the major Shia coalition (the United Iraqi Alliance, UIA), Grand Ayatollah Sistani, and other Sunni and Kurdish parties. Increase in divisions between Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the Sadrists and possible alternate coalitions between Shia factions aimed at constraining Maliki.

4. Counterinsurgents Must Understand the Environment

This is much more than traditional enemy order of battle information.  OIF COIN requires a thorough understanding of Iraqi society and culture. Unfortunately, the insurgents hold a home-field advantage in regards to local knowledge. Therefore, to be effective, Coalition forces and other agencies require expertise in such skills as language and cultural understanding.

Things to look for: Increasing and institutionalizing recent and ongoing efforts across the board in cultural understanding in formal military and non-military doctrine, education, and training. Increasing deployment and integrating with Coalition forces of subject matter experts to include "Human Terrain Teams".

Roadblocks: Time, time and more time to train, educate and deploy. Bureaucratic hurdles in formalizing cultural awareness education, training and doctrine. Availability of subject matter expert advisors in Iraq at the tactical level where the vast majority of diverse cultural interaction occur.

5. Intelligence Drives Operations

Without good intelligence counterinsurgents are blind, wasting energy and often causing unintentional harm while conducting COIN operations. With good intelligence they are like surgeons cutting out cancerous tissue while keeping other vital organs intact.

Things to look for: A concerted effort to push intelligence capabilities down to the lowest tactical level.  This includes the capability to conduct intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination.  Human Intelligence capabilities are key. Formalized and properly resourced company-level intelligence cells are key.  Increase in Iraqi civilian's willingness to provide intelligence/information to coalition and Iraqi Security forces.

Roadblocks: Time and resources (trained personnel and intelligence-related equipment) necessary to provide tactical-level commanders more than the current ad-hoc capabilities. Standardized TTP to facilitate seamless sharing of intelligence between tactical commands and during hand-over to follow-on units/organizations. Policy issues that place barriers on intelligence sharing with non-U.S. Coalition partners and non-military organizations.

6. Insurgents Must be Isolated from Their Cause and Support

It is easier to separate an insurgency from its resources and let it die than to kill every insurgent.  While killing or capturing insurgents is often necessary, especially when based in religious or ideological extremism, killing or capturing every insurgent is impossible and can be counterproductive.  Insurgents must be cut off from their sources of power - and the key source is the civilian population.

Things to look for: Continued local reconciliation building towards national reconciliation.  As in Anbar, an increase in local Iraqi leaders coming forward, opposing extremists, and establishing provisional units of neighborhood security volunteers. Government of Iraq support in integrating local volunteers into legitimate institutions to help improve local security.

Roadblocks: Continued sectarian violence and the distrust it produces amongst the Iraqi civilian population. Continued attacks by Al Qaeda, associated insurgent groups, and militia extremists. Continued external support to insurgents - especially by Iran.

7. Security Under the Rule of Law is Essential

The COIN cornerstone is security for the civilian population. Without that security no permanent reforms can be implemented and disorder spreads. Transitioning security duties from COIN combat forces to law enforcement is key. Insurgents must be seen as criminals by the local population. In OIF Iraqi law enforcement organizations must be seen as legitimate and operating under the Rule of Law.

Things to look for: Increased Iraqi security operations with minimal U.S. support. Increased Iraqi government capabilities to provide essential services. Increased presence of regional and international Non-Governmental Organizations.

Roadblocks: Again, the ability of the national government to provide security under the rule of law and continued sectarian violence, continued attacks by Al Qaeda, associated insurgent groups, and militia extremists and continued external support to insurgents.

8. Counterinsurgents Should Prepare for a Long-Term Commitment

Insurgencies are protracted by nature. Constant reaffirmations of commitment, backed by deeds, can overcome a common perception that U.S. COIN forces lack staying power. The perception that the national government has similar will and stamina is critical. At the strategic level, gaining and maintaining U.S. public support for a protracted effort is also critical.

Things to look for: This is huge, and is a very dynamic and complex issue. Congressional actions that extend U.S. COIN efforts in Iraq or set conditions and timelines for withdrawal. U.S. public opinion polls as Congress and candidates often utilize these polls to formulate legislation and platforms. Iraqi public opinion polls that reflect perception on U.S. commitment and confidence in the Iraqi national government's future.

Roadblocks: The Washington Clock vs. the Baghdad Clock - time allocated by the National Command Authority vs. the time needed to successfully conduct COIN operations in Iraq. Operational Tempo - the ability for U.S. military forces to sustain security operations on a level necessary to allow for Iraqi national reconciliation. The ability of the Iraqi national government to achieve reconciliation.

Dave Dilegge is a retired USMCR Intelligence and Counterintelligence officer. He is currently a Small Wars/Urban Operations consultant to the Marines and the Editor in Chief of the Small Wars Journal at www.smallwarsjournal.com. The previous article was excerpted from the Sept. 10, 2007, Small Wars Journal.