Back in February OnPoint interviewed LtCol William Jurney, CO of 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, who were based in Ramadi. “It’s clear-hold-build, but all done at the same time,” he said, and it’s his strategy that’s being adapted to the current Coalition “Surge” efforts throughout Iraq. Not surprisingly, 1/ 6’s successes in Ramadi are now being duplicated in the various battle-spaces.

Yesterday, MajGen Benjamin Mixon, commanding general of Task Force Marne commented that he thought he could soon take several thousand of his soldiers out of their current combat zones and re-assign them to other AO’s; he thought that the Iraqi Army units assigned to him were good enough to work independently. Col John Charlton, CO of 1stBrig., 3rd I.D, who inherited LtCol Jurney’s pacified Ramadi, also declared that he might be able to re-assign some of his army units also - this is how clear-hold-build is supposed to work; a joint American-Iraqi operation where as the Iraqi Army and Police step up, the American can step down.

In the last few days, OnPoint interviewed three of the commanders involved in these operations; MajGen Walter Gaskin, USMC, CG of 2MEF ( Marine Expeditionary Unit ), who is responsible for Anbar Province, BG Edward Cardon, Deputy CG of MNFI-Central ( Baghdad and south ), and LTC Greg Baker, Deputy CO of the 25th Combat Air Brigade in Diyala, where some of the fiercest fighting has occurred since Surge operations began back in mid-June.

ANBAR PROVINCE :

MajGen Walter Gaskin:

I'd like to say that the progress that you've been hearing and reading about in Anbar is real; that we have gotten the tribal engagement, we've seen economic development; and we have increased the size of the military, that includes the police, the army, border, and the highway patrol, all because of the indigenous folks, the young Anbaris and sons of Anbaris, have joined the military to work for the destruction of al Qaeda and the defense of their nation.

So I am very optimistic about where we are going and the progress that we are making in Al Anbar.

Q - We see pictures of how it looked six months ago with the rubble everywhere and now clean streets, men working in the streets. How can we show the American public that the changes you’re making out in Anbar, which even CNN and Barbara Starr are reporting as unbelievable, can be done in Diyala, Salahuddin, and all the other provinces?

A - I think what you will see is that everything in Iraq is tribal. Full acceptance of that will allow you to have the inner threads that will bind all the Iraqis despite the fact that a lot of Sunni versus Shi'a violence. If you look at what's happening in the northern area around Diyala, that the tribal awakening is occurring there just as it has out in Anbar and that those tribal leaders - those that join the military and the police -- the police are the key to the stability of the cities and the population centers.

I don't think that everything that we do in Anbar is exportable. But I think there are a couple of common threads that my fellow commanders and I talk about, and that if we can secure the cities and the cities are secured by police, we can get al Qaeda, JAM or whatever insurgent group; if we can get them out of the cities and away from the people, out in the hinterland, we can deal with them there.

Once you bring security to the cities, not only do you get economic development but you get human intelligence on where everybody is, where the IEDs are, where the factories are, torture factories, I mean. So it's a start of Iraqis being Iraqis and not being allowed to develop into sectarianism or regionalism but actually a chance to come together.

Q - We see people back here saying: Well, even if we're defeating al Qaeda, big deal, the real problem is going to be the Sunnis we're giving them weapons and arming them in Anbar, they're just going to turn against the Shi'a the day after we leave, and so it's still going to be a civil war, and so this is all hopeless. How the Sunnis are now being integrated into one Iraq?

A - Let me tell you - we haven't listened very well to al Qaeda, which stated one of their objectives is to create resentment between the Sunnis and the Shi'as. If you talk to the Sunnis in Anbar, and about 99 percent of my area is Sunni, they won't talk about Shi'a-Sunni relationships.

This idea that they can't live together is wrong.

They don't see it to the point where it's a civil war; that we're in the middle of a civil war. Well, I'm not. What I am in the middle of is training Iraqis to be in charge of their own destiny, whether that's in the military or in the government. And they very much would like to do that.

Now, we must not forget that the government is very young, as well, and makes sometimes what I think are very junior mistakes in now it handles this reconciliation thing or power sharing with those that are in Anbar. But I think that this is not anywhere close to a civil war, but it is as political as it's going to be.

Q - Is the government of Iraq still basically screwing the Sunnis in Anbar? Are they still withholding funds and paying much less than they promised?

A - Andrew, I think they've gotten a lot better. Again, this is a very young government, and sometimes it's dysfunctional.

This is about Shi'a power. A good analogy is like having Republicans versus Democrats. They avow that they Democrats are in charge of the legislature; that's how the Shi'as are. They are not willing to make any concessions because they remember how it was when the Sunnis were in.

Q - Sheikh Sattar al-Rishawi has a lot of good press here in the States, and the Anbar Salvation Council. Is he going to be someone who will view the United States as positive, once we leave, and will continue to function as part of the new Iraq? Or is it going to be just kind of the Sunni rump state that they're trying to create?

A- I think Sheikh Sattar is very real. You have to realize that Sheikh Sattar has a personal interest in fighting al Qaeda; they killed his father and his brother. His mother is Shi'a, so he's bridged that gap, and he has reached out even to Sadr. He doesn't agree with Sadr on the primary issue, which is the removal of coalition forces, but he does believe that some nationalism should occur and that all should be all-Iraqi.

Sheikh Sattar is a junior sheikh who rose to prominence because of, one, American media; and two, American senators and congressman talking to him because he has been very sincere that anybody sheds any blood of an American or a coalition force is his enemy and they might as well shed the blood of his family. And he has demonstrated that over and over again.

TASK FORCE MARNE

Brig Gen Edward Cardon, Deputy CG of MNFI-Central, working in Baghdad & surrounding areas south of Baghdad and Babil Province: “My areas of responsibility are governance, economic redevelopment, and economic reconstruction. The struggle for the economic and political progress in Iraq is often overlooked, and at times, I'll say, is more frustrating than the efforts to improve security. And right now I'm somewhat disappointed with the political progress in that it hasn't been as rapid as the security progress we've made just over the last few weeks.

If you go back to the purpose of the surge, it was to get the security situation to a point where you could have political growth. I think we're doing that pretty well. But the political progress right now is moving much slower than expected, although it is moving, especially at the lower levels.

The real challenge is, is to get the provincial governments to make the transition from the state-run economy to one based on revenue-sharing from Iraq's national government.

We’re working hard to build government capacity. Sometimes that's training, sometimes that's enabling the government, sometimes it's just providing moral support. But what we really do is try and link the provincial government to the national government, the local government to the provincial government, working on plans for security and cooperation and coordination with each other, and that is the hard work of personal engagement. There's a growing awareness among Iraqi leaders at the political pressure in the United States for our troop withdrawal. And the Iraqis feel the pressure of a clock, and they widely acknowledge that if we pull out early, things will be a real mess and they're going to pay a price.

That's putting some pressure on them for political developments, because ultimately Iraq has to lead Iraq. And the importance of the economic and political progress in Iraq if we do this right generates a stability such that we won't need as much military power, whether that's Iraqi military power or coalition military power.

Q - In the scheme of a clear, hold and build, how are the Iraqi army units doing as far as the holding and helping you build, mostly in Babil province?

A - Well, the army units are, from my experience here in 2005 -- are much, much better. But the police are the same or maybe even worse, and the regular police is very much a mixed bag, depending on the leadership; in the Babil province, that's the 8th Iraqi Army Division. Many of those units are already at their readiness level; one, and generally, the problem is there's not enough of them.

And some of these areas that we're clearing out, we have cleared just to a point that we can hold. And what's starting to fill the gap with the Iraqi security units are these concerned citizens that are, you know, tired of al Qaeda, of these extremist groups and protect their own neighborhoods. I just want to make it clear that we don't arm them, we don't pay them or any of this. But we do acknowledge that they can secure their own areas, and in some areas, that's having a real impact on the enemy as they push al Qaeda out.

Q - General, why don't you arm them and train them? If they're helping out -- if they're better than the IPs, why not use them more?

A - Well, what we have done is we're taking these lists and we're working with the Iraqi government to get them into the Iraqi security forces, and we just recently have provided several hundred names both to the Minister of Interior and Minister of Defense.

The concern is -- by the Iraqi government, and rightly so, is that if you arm them and train them and they're outside of the government of Iraq, then you're training another militia, and that's a valid concern. So everything that we're doing is trying to make sure that these concerned citizens are linked to the government and not to an outside armed group that would work against the government.

This is a touchy area with the Iraqi government, but I think that we -- the Iraqi government agrees with what we're doing and wants to bring these citizen groups in as fast as possible into their government structure.

Q - But aren't the Marines doing that in Anbar? Aren't they arming the local groups?

A - Well, they aren't arming them, because almost everybody in Iraq already has a weapon…

Q - "Organized" might be a better word, then.

A - Yeah, they're organized. And actually, they're -- and generally they organize themselves along tribal lines. And so, you know, you normally start to deal with the sheikh, whether that be Sunni or Shi'a, and then, you know, he organizes it.

And that's the success of Al Anbar has actually, you know, continued to spread across the belts of southern Baghdad and is even starting to swing all the way around -- you know, around the east side. And so there's some -- this is really a great development that's buying some time for some political development if we can get the political development to move a little bit quicker.

Q - Why is it that we actually see real developments on the ground and that with Congress is invited to briefings of a classified nature, and yet still you hear the mantra: Things get worse; nothing has changed; there's zero progress on the ground. Where's the disconnect here?

A - Well, that's hard for me to answer because, you know, I'm over here and I see progress on the ground. What I think a lot -- I've had a few senators come through. And their greatest disappointment generally is, you know, at the national level and their ability to deliver a national level of reconciliation. Now I can't really speak to that because, you know, that's out of my lane.

But I would say at the local level, we're starting to have some success in this area. It's not perfect and there's still potential for some pretty serious violence in some areas. But you're starting to get a sense that we may have turned a corner in some of these areas that have been violent for a long time.

Q - There's a governors conference next week?

A - Yes. We asked them what they wanted to talk about, which is mainly security and economic development. And then we're working on bringing the ministers down from Baghdad, the appropriate ministers, to work with the governors.

Now, one of the complaints of the governors is, is that they're disconnected from the national government, that the ministers don't ever come down to see them. So, you know, this is a great opportunity to have this as one of these areas where we develop government capacity by just getting them together.

DIYALA and NORTH OF BAGHDAD :

As Deputy CO of the 25th Combat Air Brigade, LTC Greg Baker is responsible for the air support of all the kinetic operations occurring in Diyala and north of Baghdad. LTC Baker’s 25th C.A.B is integrated into MNFI-North, whose AOR runs from Baghdad north to Kirkuk, and east to the Iranian border.

Q -- Col Baker; it’s breaking news this morning ( Sat 0900 EST ) that there is an op in progress in eastern Diyala; is the 25th C.A.B. involved ? 46 insurgents have been captured, with 5 KIA.

A -- While I prefer not to comment on on-going operations, let me say that we have 3 major ops going on as we speak.

Q -- 3 ops is a lot. Is this your normal tempo?

A -- We run air assaults every night. We supply all the air support and over-watch for the 3-2 Stryker Brigade, who are still doing security work across the Tigress River into old Bacuba and the surrounding area.

Q -- It sounds like it’s all still kinetic in Diyala, Bacuba, and the surrounding countryside ?

A -- Oh no. We’re actively engaged in “Phase 4” operations, which are basically reconstruction and engaging the population; We’re running food and fuel convoys in conjunction with the Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police; the IA’s and IP’s are patrolling in the towns. We’re working closely with the Red Crescent. Things are going very well.

Q -- The KIA numbers of insurgents seems to be growing. Is this fight different than the IED war in Baghdad ?

A -- We’re getting into lots of direct firefights, and when that happens, we win decisively. We’ve rooted them out of the towns, away from their bases of support, and the locals are providing a lot of Intel and tips.

The biggest change is the amount of assistance we are getting from the locals; we are actively engaging the Tribes, and it is paying off. A recent example is yesterday, when we fired a Hellfire missile into an IED cache; the locals came up afterwards and thanked us for clearing it out. We’ve raised the price for their dropping an IED now; there are consequences to their action, that weren’t happening previously. In addition to killing AQI and it’s supporters, we’re destroying their equipment. Recently there was a local cell that wanted to use a truck in order to move IED’s -- they couldn’t because we’d destroyed all the trucks.

Q -- How are the Iraq Army units performing ?

A -- The 5th Iraqi Army is getting better. They’re proving themselves daily, and still need some assistance, but they’re improving.

Counterinsurgency operations take time, and cannot be run on either a “Baghdad clock” or a “Washington clock.” Iraq is a tribal society where the Sheiks and Tribal Elders have commanded respect for hundreds of years before a central government in Baghdad tried to impose its will. Saddam also had difficulty in Anbar Province; he found that while paying them could ‘rent’ their loyalty, he could never win their allegiance; which makes the Marine efforts in Anbar even more remarkable. With the Army now copying the Marine strategy, the end result is that Gen Petraeus’s generals see clearly how the key to “winning” in Iraq is to build progress on a local level. Since it is an open question as to whether the Maleki government -- or any Iraqi central government will be successful, it will continue to be the efforts of “the boots on the ground” -- both American and Iraqi -- that will eventually turn Iraq into a stable country. OnPoint thanks MajGen Walter Gaskin, BrigGen Edward Cardon, and LTC Greg Baker for their time and straight-forward answers.